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This thesis argues that transnational corporations (TNCs) bear primarily negative moral 
duties in relation to human rights, i.e. to avoid doing harm, and that they can be held 
responsible when they fail to discharge such duties. Thus, their duties are not primarily to 
protect human rights, as some commentators have argued. To defend the negative duties 
claim, I detail ways in which corporations inflict harm not only directly through their 
operations, but also by shaping and supporting a global institutional arrangement that 
foreseeably and avoidably produces human rights harms. Therefore, the negative duties 
of corporations should be understood to include refraining from engaging in harmful 
institutional practices, or participating overall in a harmful institutional order without 
providing adequate compensation to the victims of harm. If they fail to do so, TNCs can 
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. Introduction  Chapter 1
 
 
Corporations, which should be the carefully restrained creatures of the 
law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people’s 
masters. 
–Grover Cleveland, US President 1885-89, 1893-97 
 
 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) have been regarded as increasingly 
important actors in the global arena, given their sizable economic power, cross-border 
organisational capacities, high mobility and capacity to have impact on virtually every 
aspect of societal life (Cragg, 2000, p. 209; Wettstein & Waddock, 2005, p. 306; Sethi, 
2011, p. 3). In contrast, the state, which has been considered to bear the main 
responsibility to protect and fulfil the human rights of its population in the current 
human rights regime, is not always willing or able to discharge its duties. The mismatch 
between the capabilities and roles of states and some non-state actors has led to the 
question of whether some moral duties can be attributed to transnational corporations 
and, if so, which ones. This thesis seeks to answer this question by arguing that TNCs 
can be attributed primarily negative duties to avoid doing harm, both directly through 
their operations and activities, and indirectly by participating in an institutional order 
that foreseeably and avoidably generates human rights harms.  
A transnational corporation can be defined as any business that owns and 
controls activities in more than one country. Several terms have been used to describe 
these companies, such as ‘international trusts’, ‘multinational corporations’, 
‘multinational enterprises’, ‘transnational firms’ or simply ‘international corporations’. 
The term ‘enterprise’ is considered more inclusive than ‘corporation’, as the latter refers 
only “[…] to businesses that possess a legal charter and state recognition and excludes 
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unincorporated entities such as partnerships and joint enterprises” (Weissbrodt & Kruger, 
2003, p. 908). However, the term ‘transnational corporation’ conforms to the United 
Nations’ modern official usage adopted in the mid-1970s, and it reflects better the trans-
border activities and operations of these firms. In contrast, the term ‘multinational 
corporation’ suggests a merger of capital from more than one state, but albeit with a few 
exceptions, most companies that operate internationally are owned and controlled by 
nationals of one country (O'Brien & Williams, 2007, pp. 178-179; Sagafi-Nejad & 
Dunning, 2008, pp. 2-3). I will thus use the term ‘transnational corporation’. Further, for 
the purposes of this thesis it will be understood that the main goal of corporations is 
maximising profits for their stockholders, and that they will consider any others as 
secondary goals.1 While the conception of the TNC as essentially a profit-maximising 
entity has been contested (see O'Neill, 2001; Sorell, 2004; Kollman, 2008), such a 
conception, I contend, reflects and explains the behaviour and decisions of modern 
private corporations. 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the discussion on the responsibilities of 
corporations by developing an alternative normative approach for the allocation of moral 
duties to TNCs in relation to human rights. So far, the bulk of the literature in political 
theory and philosophy has tended to argue that TNCs have negative duties to respect 
human rights as well as prima facie positive duties to protect and fulfil them, particularly 
                                                       
1 This concept coincides with the definition of the corporation from neoclassical economics, which does not 
necessarily account for newer types of corporation such as the ‘benefit corporation’ and the ‘low-profit 
limited liability company’ (L3C). The benefit corporation is a new corporate form that allows companies to 
consider societal and environmental factors along with profit maximising in their decision-making processes. 
Laws recognising this type of company have been passed in the US states of California, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia. 
The main characteristics of the benefit corporation include “[…] a corporate purpose to create a material 
positive impact on society and the environment, an expansion of the duties of directors to require 
consideration of non-financial stakeholders as well as the financial interests of shareholders, and an 
obligation to report on its overall social and environmental performance using a comprehensive, credible, 
independent and transparent third-party standard” (B Lab, 2013). The L3C is a type of corporation also 
recognised in some states of the United States which, among other characteristics, “[…] may not have as a 
significant purpose the production of income or the appreciation of property [and…] shall significantly 
further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes […]” (Utah Revised Limited 
Liability Company Act, 2009). While it is true that these new types of companies do not have as a main goal 
maximising profits, they are mainly national companies operating within the United States, with limited 
legal recognition. This is why this thesis will not take such types of companies into consideration.  
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towards those directly affected by their operations. These positive duties are mainly 
attributed to corporations on two grounds: their capability to discharge these duties, and 
characteristics shared with states that allow TNCs to behave in an analogous way and to 
bear similar duties. This view, which I refer to as the ‘positive duties approach’, has 
tended to simply transpose the duties of the state to other capable actors such as TNCs in 
order to fill a vacancy left by governments, running the risk of “dumping” the duties of 
states onto other actors on the basis of their superior capabilities. While capabilities are a 
necessary condition, they are not sufficient to attribute positive duties; thus, even if 
corporations can do much to advance human rights, this does not necessarily mean that 
they ought to do so. Nevertheless, a significant part of the literature has tended to assume 
that in the case of TNCs, “can implies ought”. 
This thesis proposes the use of the Institutional Responsibilities Framework for 
the attribution of moral responsibility to TNCs. It argues that the moral duties of TNCs 
should be understood as essentially negative duties to refrain from violating human rights. 
Therefore, according to the proposed approach, responsibility is not simply determined 
by the capabilities of corporations to protect and fulfil human rights. Instead, 
responsibility is attributed on the basis of the breach of negative duties, i.e., on the 
contribution of corporations to specific harms. While this does not deny that TNCs may 
bear some positive duties, it argues that conceptualising the moral duties of corporations 
as negative duties is theoretically more robust, and given that negative duties are 
generally deemed more stringent than positive duties, all things considered, there is little 
reason for focusing on the latter when both sets of duties are involved. Furthermore, the 
proposed framework allows the circumvention of the most significant challenges of the 
positive duties account, and it better addresses current challenges concerning TNCs and 
human rights, which mainly involve the breach of TNCs’ duties to respect rights, rather 
than the underfulfilment of their positive duties.  
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The proposed framework also emphasises the participation of corporations in 
structural harms. Some contemporary accounts of corporate responsibility presume that 
TNCs can only inflict harm directly on the people and communities close to their 
operations, and therefore they focus on attributing responsibility when there is direct and 
clear relation between corporate activity and human rights outcomes. While appropriate 
in many cases, such agent-relative approaches fail to take into consideration the 
significance of institutional channels as mediators between corporate agency and the 
resultant human rights outcomes. This deficiency has been noted by Macdonald (2011), 
who has also proposed allocating moral responsibility according to the harm 
corporations contribute to inflicting via institutional channels such as business networks 
and supply chains. While the proposed addition is a welcome step towards a more 
precise attribution of responsibility, it still falls short of reflecting the complexity and 
variety of institutional channels through which TNCs operate, as it fails to consider at 
least one significant way in which TNCs indirectly impact human rights: namely, 
through the global institutional order. 
The core arguments of this thesis develop from the global institutional approach 
extensively developed by Thomas Pogge. He argues that the current global institutional 
order foreseeably and avoidably engenders human rights deficits, and therefore, those 
who contribute to it can be attributed some responsibility for the harms that the order 
inflicts (2002, pp. 72-74; 2005c, pp. 36-53; 2005d, p. 76; 2007, pp. 25-53; 2010, esp. Chs. 
1 & 2). While Pogge’s account focuses on the participation of the citizens of affluent 
countries, this thesis explores the role of TNCs. It examines ways in which corporations 
contribute to shaping and maintaining the global institutional order through both the 
political and the private spheres. By ‘political sphere’ I refer to the dealings of TNCs with 
public authorities, such as governments or international organisations. Here, 
corporations contribute to shaping the rules of the global order, for example, through the 
representation of their interests by national governments or by directly participating in 
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international forums such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, 
corporations can also contribute to the configuration of the global institutional order 
through what I refer to as the ‘private sphere’. Here, they may use particular attributes 
such as purchasing power, reputation, established networks and size to influence 
common practices, conventions and industry standards in their favour. They can do this 
through several mechanisms, including establishing a corporate culture, launching 
voluntary initiatives, funding think-tanks, preventing or enabling technology transfer, etc. 
Recognising that TNCs can also cause harm via institutions means that they can be 
allocated a negative duty not to support an institutional order that foreseeably and 
avoidably leads to human rights deficits. In turn, this duty generates some derivative 
positive duties, including duties of coordination, duties to strengthen the government’s 
capacities to discharge its positive duties, duties of accountability and duties to promote 
institutional change.  
The approach detailed in this thesis would expand the scope of responsibility for 
TNCs to encompass instances in which they contribute to doing harm via institutions, in 
breach of their negative duties. While the approach aims to contribute to the ethical 
debate on the duties of TNCs in relation to human rights, it can also have significant 
implications for policy initiatives, such as the United Nations Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework (UN Framework) considered to be the most authoritative document 
on the issue of business and human rights. The Framework developed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie, 
sees states as bearing duties to protect human rights and provide remedy when rights 
have been violated, whereas corporations are said to have a primary responsibility to 
respect human rights, i.e. avoid doing harm. While human rights can be described as 
essentially moral claims (Pogge, 2005c, p. 43; Wettstein, 2012a, p. 153), the Framework 
does not develop the moral dimension of corporate human rights responsibility (Arnold, 
2010; Cragg, 2012; Wettstein, 2012a, pp. 739-740). Such a gap can be partly explained by 
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reference to the Special Representative’s original mandate to identify and clarify 
standards of corporate responsibility for TNCs in relation to human rights. However, 
“[…] the failure to ground the framework on explicitly moral foundations makes the 
framework both pragmatically and intellectually unpersuasive […]” (Cragg, 2012, p. 10).   
The Institutional Responsibilities Framework developed in this thesis could 
contribute to addressing some of the deficiencies of the UN Framework and other recent 
accounts by emphasizing the moral duties of justice that TNCs can be allocated 
regardless of their recognition in instruments of law. It could also contribute to ensuring 
more consistency in the UN Framework, to addressing the concerns of a broader range 
of stakeholders, and to clarifying the discussion on the voluntary versus the mandatory 
nature of TNCs’ duties. Contrary to a primarily positive duties approach, the proposed 
account is compatible with the main premise of the UN Framework, that TNCs bear 
negative duties to respect human rights. However, it would entail significant changes to it, 
such as expanding the notion of impact that the UN Framework considers as the grounds 
for attributing responsibility to corporations. It may also pose several pragmatic 
challenges such as empirically determining the contribution of corporations to 
engendering harm. Nonetheless, not only is the proposed account theoretically sound, 
but it is also consistent with recent policy developments, including the Guiding Principles 
for the Implementation of the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (the 
Guiding Principles), which move in the direction of recognising the relevance of 
institutional channels for determining corporate responsibility.   
 Methodology 1.1.
 
The current thesis can be described as a work of non-ideal theory as it takes into 
consideration situations of non-compliance from both states and TNCs in the 
formulation of the Institutional Responsibilities Framework. The normative approach 
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proposed in this thesis aims not only to advance the discussion on political theory 
regarding the moral duties of corporations, but it also intends to inform current 
international policy-making in the area of business and human rights. For this reason the 
proposed approach incorporates abstract models of companies and states as well as 
empirical facts about the conduct of these actors. For example, while in the current 
human rights regime the state is considered as the main duty-bearer in relation to human 
rights given its large capabilities, this thesis also studies the cases when the state is not 
capable or willing to fulfil its role. Similarly, it also discusses situations in which TNCs 
do not comply with legal rules. It notes that while companies can be conceptualised as 
economic actors with multiple goals and purposes, they are often very reluctant to accept 
stringent legal human rights responsibilities even when they publicly commit to respect 
or protect them, which can be regarded as a reflection of the paramount place of the 
corporations’ profit-maximising goal. Thus, wile this thesis proposes an approach that 
develops from a theoretically sound discussion on the justifiability of attributing moral 
duties to TNCs, it also provides a framework that can overcome some of the main 
efficiency problems of existing ones in order to contribute to the actual realisation of 
human rights.   
 Overview 1.2.
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 situate this work within the 
current debate on business and human rights, in particular within the discussion of the 
moral duties of TNCs. Chapter 2 elaborates on the governance gap, or lack of effective 
regulation of TNCs, and the attempts to try to bridge it since the 1970s. Special attention 
is given to the most recent initiative, the United Nations’ Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework and the Guiding Principles for its implementation. Chapter 3 introduces the 
debate on the legal obligations of TNCs, which has tended to inform international policy 
mechanisms. Here, two positions can be distinguished: the statist and non-statist legal 
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approaches. The ‘statist approach’ holds that states are the only subjects of international 
law and that any mechanisms to regulate non-state actors should be of a domestic nature. 
In contrast, the ‘non-statist approach’, which has gained currency in recent years, 
maintains that non-state actors, including transnational corporations, have some degree 
of legal personality and can also be subject to obligations under international law.  
While the UN Framework has focused on the legal grounds of corporate duties, 
political theorists and philosophers have increasingly questioned the broader moral 
duties of non-state actors, meaning duties that are not necessarily reflected in current 
international law. Chapter 4 engages with some current approaches on the moral duties 
of TNCs. It notes that the bulk of the literature has tended to argue that TNCs bear prima 
facie positive duties to protect, promote and fulfil human rights. This argument tends to 
rest either on the basis of the superior capabilities of TNCs or on the idea that TNCs 
share with states similar characteristics that have traditionally bestowed some positive 
duties upon the latter. I highlight some problems with this positive duties approach, in 
particular its tendency to transfer the duties of states to corporations without adequately 
considering the role and nature of TNCs as profit-maximising entities. I give reasons to 
think that the moral duties of TNCs should be understood as essentially negative duties 
to respect human rights. While this does not deny that corporations may bear some 
positive duties, it contends that focusing on the negative duty to avoid doing harm allows 
circumvention of the major issues of the positive duties approach and also makes the 
proposed approach more feasibly adopted at the policy level. 
Part of the contribution of this thesis lies in re-thinking what the negative duty to 
respect entails. Generally, transnational corporations are considered to be able to do 
harm through their direct actions or operations. Therefore, the negative duty not to harm 
has been reduced to requiring corporations to refrain from inflicting direct, unmediated 
harm. Nevertheless, Chapter 5 argues that corporations can also inflict mediated harm by 
participating in and contributing to shaping global institutional arrangements that 
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foreseeably and avoidably cause human rights harms. Thus, if it is accepted that 
corporations may also have impact on human rights indirectly via institutional 
mechanisms, it is possible to attribute to corporations a negative duty to avoid 
participating in a global institutional order that foreseeably causes human rights harms. 
Participating in such a harmful order thus could engender moral responsibility to TNCs. 
There is nonetheless another significant ground to allocating moral responsibility to 
TNCs, namely, actively benefiting from harm. Given that sometimes it is not possible to 
avoid contributing to and benefiting from harm at a reasonable cost, corporations may be 
allowed to compensate some of the harms they have caused or contributed to causing. 
These cases, however, should be limited to those in which the injustice can be traced 
back to features of the global institutional order upon which companies have limited 
opportunity to have impact. 
In recognition of the institutional channels in which corporations participate and 
through which they can inflict harm, the negative duties of corporations can also give rise 
to derivative positive duties. Chapter 6 argues that corporations bear, for example, duties 
of due diligence that require TNCs to map the different instances in which they may have 
negative impact on human rights. While often, duties of due diligence would allow 
corporations to identify and avert negative impacts on human rights, this might not be 
sufficient in cases where corporations are unable to do so without the cooperation of 
other business or parts of their supply chain. In these cases, in order to fully discharge 
their negative duties, corporations also acquire some duties of coordination, whose 
stringency increases according to the power or leverage that they have within a particular 
industry. Other duties include duties of accountability towards those who can be affected 
by corporate action, duties not to undermine the ability of the state to discharge its duties 
in order to respect an established moral division of labour and duties to reform the 
harmful global institutional order in order to prevent the continuance of structural harm.  
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Given that the proposed framework shares some significant premises and 
principles with the global institutional approach, it might be subject to similar objections. 
Chapter 6 surveys five possible objections to the approach: the conception of human 
rights as claims against those who share a global institutional order; the validity of the 
claim that the global order engenders human rights violations and that negative duties 
are necessarily more stringent than positive duties; the attribution of responsibility to 
those agents that support the global institutional order; and the significant 
demandingness of the approach. Even when both approaches share similar principles, the 
Institutional Responsibilities Framework is not susceptible to the same objections, or at 
least not to the same extent. This is because the framework proposed focuses on 
analysing defined agents with significant leverage to impact on the global institutional 
order, as opposed to citizens of affluent countries whose participation in the global order 
is complex to determine. Furthermore, unlike individuals, corporations by definition 
operate within a global institutional order which, in turn, contributes to clarifying the 
significance that the proposed framework attaches to the global institutional order.    
The proposed approach can have implications both for political theory, and for 
policy mechanisms, such as the UN Framework, as is explained in Chapter 7. According 
to the UN Framework, responsibility is attributed to corporations on the basis of their 
impact, which refers to direct causation and contribution to human rights harms, and this 
is closely tied to unmediated corporate agency. According to the proposed approach, 
however, institutionally mediated harms can also give rise to moral responsibility. Thus, 
it is argued, the UN Framework should expand the notion of impact in order to 
accommodate the institutional mechanisms through which corporations can exert or 
contribute to harm. In turn, the derivative positive duties recognised under the 
Framework would be considerably expanded, and the duty of due diligence would have 
to reflect the immediate institutional channels in which TNCs participate, and also their 
role in the global institutional order. While this approach is more demanding than 
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existing accounts of corporate responsibility, and therefore might encounter some 
resistance from transnational corporations and home countries, recent documents, in 
particular the UN Guiding Principles, have started to recognise the indirect impact that 
corporations may exert on human rights. Such developments suggest the possibility of 
incorporating some of the demands of the proposed account into current initiatives and 
documents on the issue of business and human rights in the near future.  Finally, Chapter 
8 concludes by providing a general evaluation of the proposed framework and suggesting 
some avenues of future research.  
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There is an evil which ought to be guarded against in the indefinite 
accumulation of property from the capacity of holding it in perpetuity 
by… corporations. The power of all corporations ought to be limited in 
this respect. The growing wealth acquired by them never fails to be a 
source of abuses. 




The discussion of the responsibilities of corporations in relation to human 
rights has partly developed from the perception of the existence of a “governance gap”. 
This concept refers to a vacuum in the effective regulation of transnational 
corporations’ activities. This gap has originated from a misalignment between 
economic forces and the governance capacities of states, and it is seen as constituting a 
permissive environment in which TNCs are able to perform wrongful acts without 
adequate sanctioning or reparation (Cragg, 2000, pp. 209-210; 2012, p. 13; Sethi, 2002, 
p. 90; Muchlinski, 2003, p. 33; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 235; Wettstein & Waddock, 
2005, p. 305; Ruggie, 2007b, pp. 16, 23; 2008 p. 3, 5, 6; Wettstein, 2009, p. 214; 
Macdonald, 2011, p. 549). 
On one hand, it is argued, the power of TNCs has significantly increased in 
recent years thanks to their possession of certain resources, including economic assets, 
organisational capacities, knowledge and prestige. Some of the largest TNCs report 
annual revenues comparable to the gross domestic product (GDP) of medium-sized 
 Chapter 2: Bridging the Governance Gap 
   
 
13 
countries. For example, in 2011, the revenues of the US retailer Wal-Mart were similar 
to the GDP of Austria and South Africa in the same year, while the net profits of the 
US oil company Exxon Mobil were larger than the GDP of Latvia and more than 
twice the GDP of Jamaica and Iceland2 (Fortune, 2011; World Bank, 2013). Besides 
their monetary assets, TNCs also possess intangible resources that contribute to their 
power or leverage in specific domains. Some specialised companies, for example, 
possess not only sophisticated knowledge but also the monopoly to exploit it through 
the acquisition of patents and copyrights on products ranging from software and books 
to seeds and essential drugs to combat life-threatening diseases (Drahos & Braithwaite, 
2002; Tyfield, 2008; Pogge, 2010b, p. 189).  
Although transnational corporations have significant impact on the lives of a 
large part of the global population, they are not obliged to be accountable to a similar 
extent within public institutions, and they are perceived as capable of evading public 
control thanks to their high mobility and economic power (Hsieh, 2004, p. 656; 
Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 235). This capacity to move with relative ease across 
borders also allows them to decide where to locate different parts of their business 
according to the competitive advantage offered by each location (Cragg, 2000, p. 209; 
Winston, 2002, p. 73; Zerk, 2006, p. 47). Thus, it is common for corporations to locate 
their manufacturing operations in countries where they can offer low wages, such as 
China, India, Bangladesh or Mexico, while at the same time maintaining their fiscal 
domicile in territories that charge low corporate tax, such as Bermuda, the Bahamas, 
the Channel Islands, the Netherlands or Luxembourg.3  
                                                       
2 The revenues of Wal-Mart in 2011 were $421,849 while the GDP of Austria was $417,656 and the GDP 
of South Africa was $408,236. In the same year, Exxon Mobil reported net profits of $30,460, which were 
larger that the GDP of Latvia ($28,252), Jamaica ($14,436) and Iceland ($14,026) (all amounts in millions 
of US dollars at PPP). 
3 This phenomenon is also visible within countries. For example, the US state of Delaware is home to 
more than 50% of all US publicly-traded companies and 64% of the Fortune 500 including American 
Airlines, Apple, Bank of America, Berkshire Hathaway, Cargill, Coca-Cola, Ford, General Electric, 
Google, JPMorgan Chase, and Wal-Mart, as it has the lowest corporate tax rate in the US and requires the 
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On the other hand, states face several challenges brought by globalisation. This 
will be understood as a set of processes involving the erosion of economic borders, 
extensive financial integration and hypermobility of goods, services, people, capital 
and information across state boundaries. At the same time these processes have been 
intensifying, the scope of state authority has remained largely confined to their 
boundaries. Thus, there is a mismatch between state capacity to regulate and the ability 
of transnational actors such as TNCs to have impact on those within states. In other 
words, the power of the state is seen as having been diminished, as it has been 
compelled to surrender to the interest of big capital. In their perceived need to remain 
competitive, states have opted to provide favourable conditions for business, engaging 
in “regulatory competition” in order to attract investment, thus enhancing the 
bargaining position of large corporations (Cragg, 2000, p. 209; Young, 2004, p. 370; 
Wettstein, 2009, p. 240). The on-going privatisation of public domains such as health, 
housing, education and security, it is argued, has also led to a transfer of control and 
authority from governments to corporations (Wettstein, 2009, p. 240).  
Thus, the mismatch between TNCs’ operations and powers and the state’s 
perceived diminished capacities and limited jurisdiction, along with the absence of 
strong supranational regulatory bodies, combine to create a governance gap. This gap 
is seen as giving rise to some problems that affect with particular intensity the most 
vulnerable people and communities (Ruggie, 2007a, p. 23; Mayer, 2009, p. 562). With 
these issues in mind, social scientists, policy-makers, lawyers, international 
organisations and NGOs have proposed various solutions to try to narrow the gap.  
These range from re-thinking the current state-centric conception of human rights to 
proposing international legal or quasi-legal instruments to regulate the conduct of 
transnational corporations at the international level (De Brabandere, 2010).  
                                                                                                                                                          
disclosure of only minimal information to set up a company (Wayne, 2012; State of Delaware, 2013; State 
of Delaware, 2013; State of Delaware, 2013; State of Delaware, 2013). 
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This chapter will map some of these efforts at the global policy level, in order to 
provide context for a broader discussion of the possible human rights duties of TNCs. 
It will focus in particular on UN initiatives, because they are key referents in every 
stage of the discussion from the 1970s onwards. Also highlighted will be critiques of 
various initiatives, primarily from a failure to generate coercive mechanisms to ensure 
compliance. Such challenges have led to some nationally-based attempts to hold 
corporations to account, but as will be shown, these have been curtailed by recent 
legislation. 
The historical development of the debate on business and human rights that 
will be presented in this chapter aims to illustrate the changing position of transnational 
corporations regarding their own responsibilities in relation to human rights, which has 
become increasingly progressive. Such developments will be helpful to argue in the 
next chapters for the viability of implementing the approach proposed in this thesis. 
While historically, companies have been reluctant to recognise stringent duties for 
themselves, they have become acceptant of the idea that they have at least a moral duty 
not to harm, which is the basis of the proposed Institutional Responsibilities 
Framework.  
 First Wave of Global Initiatives to Regulate TNCs: The 1970s 2.2.
 
The last day of the year 1600 marked the birth of the first transnational 
corporation, when Queen Elizabeth I of England granted a charter of incorporation to 
the East India Company. During the period of European colonialism, the domestic law 
of the home country regulated corporations and generally gave them access to the 
colonies’ wealth on extremely favourable terms. European companies became the main 
agents for the economic exploitation of their colonies and some of them even acted as 
de facto administrators of the overseas territories. In contrast, the people from the 
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colonies received few economic benefits and had hardly any resources to complain 
about these conditions (Ratner, 2001, p. 453). However, with the fall of the European 
empires after the Second World War and the start of a decolonisation period, the 
relationships between states and TNCs changed significantly.  
The emergence of new sovereign nations, the so-called Third World, was 
accompanied by a wariness of TNCs, which were denounced by many as economic 
and political agents of a neo-colonialist project (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 234; Zerk, 
2006, p. 9). Many developing countries saw TNCs as posing a threat, since their 
resources and influence allowed them to evade national regulation and taxation, to 
abuse their competitive power, distorting market relations, and to oppose the 
technological transfer necessary for the development of their economies (Muchlinski, 
2007, p. 120). These concerns were fuelled by the involvement of TNCs in high-profile 
cases of human rights violations and interference in national political affairs. Two 
notorious examples were the participation of the US company, United Fruit 
Corporation, in the coup d’état against Guatemalan president Jacobo Árbenz in 19544 
and the involvement of the US company, International Telephone and Telegraph, Inc. 
(ITT) in a campaign against Chilean president Salvador Allende in the 1970s.5 
Most developing-country hosts of TNCs believed that economic development 
could be best promoted in a regulated rather than in a completely open environment 
(Jenkins, 2001, p. 3). Consequently, they implemented cautionary measures aimed at 
ensuring that TNCs would become instruments of development. National and regional 
                                                       
4 In the early 1950s, the United Fruit Company started a public relations campaign to warn the US public 
against the “communist threat” posed by Árbenz, as the company was concerned that the land reforms he 
proposed would threaten their interests as one of the largest property owners in Guatemala (Litvin, 2003, 
pp. 117-119). It has also been claimed that the company provided substantial aid in the coup d’état 
orchestrated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which ranged from shipping weapons in the 
company’s boats to providing food and housing to the coup’s leaders (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 167; 
Litvin, 2003, p. 119).   
5 It has been claimed that in the 1970s, the International Telephone and Telegraph, Inc. (ITT) conspired 
with the CIA to prevent Salvador Allende’s election (Meyer, 1998, p. 181), as it was feared that he would 
nationalise some industries, including telecommunications, upon becoming president of Chile. After 
Allende’s electoral victory in 1970, the ITT and the government of the United States continued their efforts 
by funnelling money to support the anti-Allende media campaign in Chile and Europe (Church, 1975, p. 
13; Litvin, 2003, p. 150; Meyer, 1998, pp. 181-183; Sagafi-Nejad & Dunning, 2008, p. 43).  
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laws were passed imposing a range of restrictions, including requirements on foreign 
investment regarding profit repatriation, promotion of local development through joint 
ventures, local purchasing, technology transfer, exports, domestic participation, local 
content of products and indigenisation policies (Jenkins, 2001, p. 3; Koenig-Archibugi, 
2004, p. 241; Sagafi-Nejad & Dunning, 2008, p. 28). They also wrote domestic 
agreements detailing the rights and duties of states and investors, and many developing 
countries engaged in the expropriation of resources or whole firms, particularly in 
extractive industries  (Kobrin, 1984, p. 329; Jenkins, 1999 in Jenkins, 2001, p. 3; 
Ratner, 2001, pp. 455-457). Some examples are the nationalisation of copper in Chile 
in 1971, petroleum in Venezuela in 1975, the expropriation of British Petroleum in 
Nigeria in 1979, and the nationalisation of the US oil company, Texaco, in Libya in 
1973. 
The first attempts to set international standards for corporate behaviour can be 
found in the early 1970s. In 1972, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
issued its Guidelines for International Investment. Contrary to the policies of 
developing host countries, the document was focused on promoting the liberalisation 
of international trade and investment, and on protecting the interests of corporations 
from unilateral national measures. Also, in 1977 the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
prohibited American corporations from performing abroad certain acts that would be 
illegal in the United States, including bribing foreign government officials and 
providing false information in the company’s books (Stohl, Stohl, & Popova, 2009, p. 
611). The Act fostered the creation of corporate codes of conduct, as US corporations 
were required to write a code delineating expected behaviours and rules. While these 
initiatives came from the government and corporate sectors, most efforts in the 
following years would originate within intergovernmental organisations, particularly 
the United Nations, as a response to the increasing establishment of TNCs in 
developing countries and the economic and social concerns this engendered.  
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 The Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational 2.2.1.
Corporations 
 
The UN first attempted to create binding rules to regulate the conduct of 
TNCs in the 1970s. As part of the discussion of the New International Economic 
Order6 the United Nations established the Commission on Transnational Corporations 
(the Commission) and the Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), which 
started operating in 1974. The main functions of the Commission were to serve as a 
central forum within the UN for the consideration of issues related to TNCs, 
promoting the exchange of views among governments, conducting inquiries, 
undertaking studies and preparing reports on TNCs. It also was to provide guidance 
and advisory services to the UNCTC, assist the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) regarding intergovernmental arrangements, and provide it with a set of 
recommendations that would serve as the basis for a code of conduct to deal with 
TNCs (Sagafi-Nejad & Dunning, 2008, pp. 90-91).  The main objectives of the Centre 
on Transnational Corporations included furthering the understanding of the effects of 
TNC activities in developing countries, strengthening the negotiating capacities of 
developing host countries in their dealing with TNCs, and securing international 
arrangements that promoted the positive contributions of TNCs towards economic 
growth while mitigating the negative effects (UNCTAD, 2002). During its 17 years of 
existence, the Centre performed a range of tasks, including collecting, analysing and 
disseminating information on foreign direct investment, undertaking research to better 
understand the impact of TNCs in developing countries, advising governments of 
                                                       
6 In the 1970s, the Group of 77, a coalition of seventy-seven developing countries in the United Nations, 
called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) “[…] based on equity, sovereign equality, 
interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States […]” (United Nations, 1974). This 
set of proposals aimed at ensuring economic development and eliminating the widening gap between 
developed and developing countries. The main propositions of the NIEO included respect for sovereignty, 
sharing equitably technological advancements between developed and developing countries, cooperation 
among countries, providing assistance and preferential treatment to developing countries, ending the waste 
of natural resources, and improving the terms of trade of raw materials (United Nations, 1974).  
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developing countries in their negotiations with TNCs and formulating an international 
code of conduct to regulate TNCs activities (UNCTAD, 2002). 
In 1976, the Commission started to write a document that would later be 
known as the draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (the draft UN 
Code). Its aims were to establish common standards for the conduct of TNCs, enhance 
the negotiating capacities of states vis-à-vis TNCs, and to set rules for the treatment of 
foreign investment. It touched upon political, economic, financial and social issues 
associated with the operation of TNCs, disclosure of information, treatment of 
transnational corporations by host countries and intergovernmental cooperation. 
However, human rights did not feature in this initiative, because most of the developed 
countries opposed their inclusion (Ruggie, 2007b, p. 819). In fact, the only mention of 
human rights is in Article 13, which states that TNCs should respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the countries where they operate (United Nations, 1983). The 
final version of the draft UN Code was submitted to Economic and Social Council in 
May 1990. During the negotiations, developed countries urged discussion of the 
standards of treatment of TNCs and foreign investment, whereas developing countries 
stressed the importance of the political, economic and social aspects of the Code 
(Madley, 2008, p. 174). At the same time, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) was developing a draft Code on the Transfer of 
Technology (1979). That code, however, was never finalised due to disagreement 
between developing and developed countries on models of technology transfer 
regulations (UNCTAD, 2001, p. 22). 
The harsh economic conditions of the 1980s (see Section 2.3) were particularly 
unfavourable for the draft UN Code, and developing countries lost interest in 
formalising it. In July 1992, all negotiations were abandoned, and the UN Centre on 
Transnational Corporations was downgraded and renamed the Transnational 
Corporations Management Division, one of eight divisions of the UN Department of 
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Economic and Social Development. One year later, in 1993, it was moved from New 
York to Geneva and reformed as the Division of Investment, Technology and 
Enterprises (DITE) of UNCTAD. Unlike the UNCTC and the Commission, which 
were able to negotiate international rules, the DITE is a more limited think thank, 
focused on research and policy analysis, intergovernmental consensus-building and 
technical assistance to developing countries (Muchlinski, 2007, p. 121).  
 The ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 2.2.2.
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
 
In 1977, the International Labour Organization7 (ILO), the specialised UN 
agency concerned with labour issues and the promotion of internationally recognised 
human and labour rights, formulated the Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (the Tripartite Declaration) 
(revised in 2001). As with the draft UN Code, it was created in order to respond to the 
concerns of developing countries, which had urged the creation of international 
instruments to regulate the conduct of TNCs and define the terms of the relations 
between them. The Tripartite Declaration aimed to ensure that corporations positively 
contributed to the economic development of host countries while minimising potential 
abuses of power or clashes with national laws. Their principles offered guidelines to 
TNCs, governments, employers’ associations and workers’ organisations on labour-
related and social policy issues such as employment, training, conditions of work and 
industrial relations. Unlike the draft UN Code, the Tripartite Declaration explicitly 
exhorts the parties to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
(International Labour Organization, 2006, p. 3).  
                                                       
7  Given its purpose of promoting social justice and internationally recognised human and labour rights, as 
well as its unique tripartite structure of governments, workers, and employers, the ILO has been closely 
involved in issues regarding industrial relations, corporations and human rights. Between 1969 and 1974, 
the ILO conducted studies, established working groups, held meetings with experts on TNCs and 
published policy papers on the topic, such as the 1973 Multinational Enterprise and Social Policy, which 
would later contribute to the creation of the Tripartite Declaration (Sagafi-Nejad & Dunning, 2008, p. 177).  
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According to some critics, the impact of the Tripartite Declaration on human 
rights is limited, as it is not legally binding and does not oblige companies to engage in 
social responsible activities beyond the legal requirements of the host country (Jenkins, 
2001, p. 4). It has also been coldly received by corporations; for instance, only 3% of 
corporate codes of conduct make reference to the ILO’s core labour conventions 
(Clapham, 2006, p. 215). Yet, it has been seen as significant in that it constitutes a set 
of principles upon which further standards can be elaborated, provides a framework for 
activists and NGOs to formulate their own appeals, and is considered an authoritative 
interpretation of other binding international conventions such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Clapham, 2006, pp. 212-213).  
 The OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2.2.3.
 
As a response to growing criticisms from the developing countries and in order 
to prevent further control of TNC activities, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development adopted in 1976 the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (updated in 2011), which formed part of its Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises8 (Jenkins, 2001, p. 2; Clapham, 2006, p. 201). 
The Guidelines are non-legally binding recommendations addressed to TNCs 
operating from or in adherent countries (plus Argentina and Brazil) on a range of issues 
such as employment and industrial relations, taxation, science and technology, 
environment, information disclosure, competition and consumer interests (OECD 
Observer, 2001, pp. 1-2). According to the OECD, the Guidelines’ purpose is to 
encourage positive contributions from TNCs to the economic, environmental and 
social progress of host countries as well as promoting investment among OECD 
                                                       
8 The aim of this declaration is ensuring that foreign TNCs are treated as favourably as domestic 
corporations, promoting cooperation among governments on international investment and minimising the 
imposition of conflicting requirements on TNCs by different governments. 
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countries through the harmonisation of TNCs’ operations and government policies 
(2011b, pp. 7, 13). When they were updated in 2011, a new human rights chapter was 
added to make the Guidelines more consistent with recent developments such as the 
UN Framework and the Guiding Principles, which will be described in Section 2.5.3. 
The OECD Guidelines have enjoyed widespread acceptance among TNCs, which can 
be partly explained by their voluntary nature, moderate approach and lack of effective 
enforcement mechanisms (Jenkins, 2001, p. 4). 
 Codes from Civil Society 2.2.4.
 
Civil society actors also contributed to the creation of codes of conduct that 
tackled specific problems regarding corporate operations. One of the most 
representative of such efforts was the Sullivan Principles, a voluntary code of conduct, 
adopted in 1977, which aimed at regulating the operations specifically of US 
corporations9 in South Africa, particularly in their relations with black workers10 (Sethi 
& Williams, 2000, p. 169).   
The Sullivan Principles represented one of the early attempts to introduce the 
concept of corporate responsibility and some related ideas, including the role of 
corporations as agents of change, and well as their responsibilities to follow minimum 
standards of behaviour and to treat stakeholders in an equitable manner (Sethi & 
                                                       
9 The original corporations that committed to the Principles were American Cyanamid, Burroughs 
Corporation, Caltex Petroleum Corporations, Citicorp, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Company, 
IBM Corporation, International Harvester Corporation, Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company, 
Mobil Corporation, Otis Elevator and Union Carbide Corporation. By 1994, there were more than 150 
companies that had pledged to abide to the Principles (Sethi & Williams, 2000, pp. 170-171). 
10 These principles were named after their creator Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, who at the time was a board 
member of General Motors. The principles were: 1) non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort 
and work facilities; 2) equal and fair employment practices for all employees; 3) equal pay for all 
employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time; 4) initiation of and 
development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites 
for supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs; 5) increasing the number of blacks and other 
non-whites in management and supervisory positions; and 6) improving the quality of employees’ lives 
outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation and health 
facilities (Sethi & Williams, 2000, p. 170). 
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Williams, 2000, p. 171). In enacting the principles, Rev. Sullivan expected corporations 
to help address segregation, and in the long run to contribute to the abolition of 
apartheid (Sethi & Williams, 2000, pp. 176-177). However, at the time, US and 
European business leaders did not embrace the concept of corporate responsibility and 
treated it with suspicion, as they were antagonistic to the idea of imposing non-market 
constraints on managers (Sethi & Williams, 2000, pp. 172, 177). Instead, they 
perceived the Principles as a means to limit the pressure from social groups that 
advocated the withdrawal of US companies from South Africa and as a protective 
umbrella to implement changes in the workplace without retaliation from the South 
African government (Sethi & Williams, 2000, pp. 172, 177).  
The results of the Principles were mixed. Critics point out that the Principles 
stalled rather than accelerated the end of apartheid, as they legitimised the operations 
of signatory companies (Mangaliso, 1997, p. 228). Some have also asserted that that 
the Principles did not help the black majority, as they only focused on the employees of 
US corporations and did not tackle other serious issues such as the ban on black 
persons voting and owning land in South Africa (Mangaliso, 1997, p. 229; McCrudden, 
1999, p. 177).  However, they did contribute to mainstreaming the idea that 
corporations are expected to fulfil certain expectations from society. Instead of 
discussing whether corporations should be held responsible for their impacts on society, 
the debate moved towards discussing how they could discharge such responsibilities 
and to what extent they should be held accountable (Sethi & Williams, 2000, p. 172). 
The Principles also inspired other governments to produce similar codes of 
employment practice for firms operating in their countries with subsidiaries in South 
Africa. In 1977, for example, the European Community adopted the Community Code 
of Conduct for Enterprises Having Affiliates, Subsidiaries or Agencies in South Africa, 
and in 1985 Canada adopted its own such code. The Principles were abandoned in 
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1994, after the United States passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act,11 and Rev. 
Sullivan disassociated from the Principles and instead advocated disinvestment 
measures (McCrudden, 1999, p. 178). 
 The Changing International Climate: The 1980s 2.3.
 
While the 1970s had been an active period on terms of the introduction of 
initiatives to regulate the behaviour of TNCs, the onset of the international debt crisis 
late in the decade, and especially in the early 1980s, changed the landscape. Many 
developing countries experienced a shortfall of investment in comparison to the early 
1970s, when several international banks decided to stop much of their lending after 
Mexico announced in 1982 that it could no longer service its debts. This served to 
expose the weak financial condition of other developing countries (O'Brien & Williams, 
2007, p. 224). The main concern of these countries was not anymore the potentially 
negative impacts of TNCs, but ensuring continued inflows of investment. Therefore, 
their policies shifted from controlling foreign investment to promoting it, facilitating 
access to markets and attracting capital, technology and skills. Developing countries 
relaxed or abandoned restrictions on foreign ownership, profit repatriation terms, 
technology transfer agreements and requirements for local content and exports (Jenkins, 
2001, p. 3).  
In the 1980s, developing and developed countries signed numerous bilateral 
investment treaties to remove barriers to trade and protect foreign direct investment. 
Investors were allowed to hire their own senior personnel, and host countries 
committed to paying the full value of the investment in the event of expropriation. 
Many also guaranteed free repatriation of profits and liquidated proceeds (Ratner, 2001, 
                                                       
11 The Act adopted in 1986 imposed sanctions against South Africa, banned new trade, investments and 
some imports from this county. It also demanded the elimination of apartheid laws and the release of the 
political prisoner Nelson Mandela. 
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p. 458; Madley, 2008, p. 178). Sectors that had traditionally been closed to foreign 
direct investment, such as manufacturing and natural resources, started to be 
deregulated and privatised in line with nascent neoliberal policy emphases (Jenkins, 
2001, p. 3; Bruno & Karliner, 2002, p. 26). This resulted in increasing inflows of 
foreign direct investment and a favourable climate for corporations that would persist 
into the future.   
Unsurprisingly, during this time the efforts to create an international 
regulatory framework for corporations and the pressure for adopting codes of conduct 
subsided (Jenkins, 2001, p. 5). Most of the corporate codes enacted at the time were a 
response to specific issues. Two examples are the Valdez Principles,12 launched in 1989 
after the Exxon-Valdez oil spill13 to guide corporations in establishing environmentally 
sound policies; and the MacBride Principles, issued in 1984 with the aim of eliminating 
discriminatory practices of the Protestant majority against the Catholic minority in 
Ireland via US-owned companies (Perez-Lopez, 1993, p. 9; Compa & Darricarrère, 
1996, p. 185). 
 Second Wave of Attempts to Regulate TNCs: The 1990s 2.4.
 
The negative impacts of the governance gap became more apparent in the 
1990s as a result of the emergence of TNCs in larger numbers than ever before and the 
increasing influence of economic neoliberalism from the mid-1980s (Zerk, 2006, p. 13; 
Ruggie, 2013, p. xv). During this decade, a series of corporate scandals emerged 
involving some of the largest retailers, including Adidas, Disney, Gap, Nike, Reebok, 
and Victoria’s Secret which revoled around their use of child labour and sweatshops. 
                                                       
12  They are now called CERES Principles, after the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible 
Economies, the organisation that proposed them. 
13 On March 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez struck Prince William Sound's Bligh Reef in Alaska, 
spilling 11 million gallons of crude oil and greatly affecting the environment of the region (USEPA, 2013).  
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Scandals also involved companies in the extractive industry, including Shell,14 for their 
role in environmental disasters and violations of human rights in host countries 
(Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 235; Shamir, 2004, p. 638; Young, 2004, p. 367; McBarnet, 
2005, pp. 68-69; Ruggie, 2013, p. xv). These cases raised fresh concerns regarding the 
lack of accountability of TNCs and its implications for social and environmental 
standards, and they sparked waves of anti-corporate activism (Zerk, 2006, p. 21).  
As a consequence, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement, 
characterised by the recognition of stakeholders’ interests in the companies’ policies 
gained prominence (Zerk, 2006, pp. 30-32). Here, term ‘stakeholder’ refers to groups 
and individuals who have a stake or interest in the corporation. In the narrow sense, it 
includes those on which the corporation depends for its survival; such as employees, 
customer segments, suppliers, shareowners, key government agencies and certain 
financial institutions (Freeman & Reed, 1983, p. 91). In the wider sense, it also 
encompasses those who potentially can affect or be affected by corporate conduct such 
as public interest groups, protest groups, government agencies, trade associations, 
competitors and unions (Freeman & Reed, 1983, p. 91) 
While CSR-related themes had featured in corporate public relations for some 
time, it was only in this period that these became associated with a recognisable social 
movement (Zerk, 2006, p. 17). Within this framework, large TNCs and industrial 
organisations started to produce voluntary codes of conduct, informed by the 
experiences of the extractive sector and the outcry surrounding the labour practices of 
some of the global retail chains (OECD, 2001, p. 8; Ruggie, 2013, p. 14). Initially, 
NGOs supported the creation of voluntary codes and other similar initiatives as a 
                                                       
14 During this decade, Shell’s image was one of the most affected, as it was involved in a series of scandals, 
ranging from environmental damage to human rights violations. In 1995, Shell was targeted for its plans to 
dispose of the Brent Spar oil storage tanker in the North Sea with uncertain ecological consequences. At 
the same time, Shell was also accused of complicity in the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other 
campaigners who demonstrated against the Nigerian government’s oppression and the exploitation of oil 
by TNCs. Human rights attorneys sued Shell under the US Alien Tort Act (see Section 2.6.1) for human 
rights violations in Nigeria (CCRERI, 2009; McBarnet, 2005, p. 68; Shamir, 2004, p. 638). 
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response to inadequate governmental solutions (Clapham, 2006, p. 195). However, 
NGO critics later observed that the content of the codes was not translated into social 
change and that, instead of advancing human rights, they were actually hindering them, 
as they provided a false sense that corporations were addressing human rights concerns 
(Ethical Trading Initiative, 2013).  
 Several NGOs suggested that, contrary to their stated purpose, many of the 
codes were created to enhance companies’ public image, respond to public pressure, 
improve their financial results,15 attract investors and potential employees, and obtain 
permissions to operate and enable further deregulation by showing that they could rule 
themselves (Christian Aid, 2004, pp. 9-15; Clapham, 2006, p. 197). Some of the 
criticisms voiced against codes of conduct included their lacking any independent 
accountability system, being ambiguous and fragmented, being unilaterally developed, 
and in general, lacking a true commitment to improve human rights (ICHRP, 2002, p. 
10; Amnesty International, 2004, p. 5; Ethical Trading Initiative, 2013; Ruggie, 2013, p. 
34). NGOs and civil society actors, in particular the union movement, soon began to 
fear that codes of conduct would be seen as appropriate substitutes for actionable legal 
obligations (Clapham, 2006, p. 197). This was particularly worrying for them given 
that most codes did not include the protection of certain rights and labour standards 
developed by the ILO, predominantly those regarding unionising and collective 
bargaining (Jenkins, 2001, p. 22). In fact, according to the OECD, in a study of 246 
voluntary codes of conduct, the only consistent issue across all of them was a ban on 
child labour (ICHRP, 2002, p. 16). While some initiatives were created, corporations 
still continued enjoying handsome advantages in binding agreements; for instance 
“[…] some 94 per cent of all national regulations related to foreign direct investment 
                                                       
15 There are mixed results on the link between corporate social responsibility and financial performance. 
Some studies report no relation between these variables (see Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985; Nelling 
& Webb, 2009; Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010) and a few argue that this relation is negative (see 
McPeak, Devirian, & Seaman, 2010). However, a significant portion of the literature argues that these two 
factors are positive albeit weakly related (see Chochram & Wood, 1984; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003; 
Sánchez & Sotorrío, 2007; Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
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that were modified in the decade from 1991 to 2001 were intended to further facilitate 
it” (Ruggie, 2013, p. xxv). 
For those reasons, most NGOs shifted their efforts from advocating corporate 
‘responsibility’ to corporate ‘accountability’. That is, instead of demanding that 
corporations sign voluntary agreements, NGOs pressed corporations to behave 
according to established social norms and to face consequences if they failed to do so 
(Clapham, 2006, p. 195). The common pledge across NGOs was (and still is) that it is 
necessary to give “teeth” to the commitments of companies (ICHRP, 2002, p. 7; 
Amnesty International, 2004, p. 12; Christian Aid, 2004, p. 56). They argue that 
binding codes of conduct and more legislation could even be beneficial for companies 
that are genuinely committed to respecting human rights, because they would provide 
a level playing field, protecting them from competitors that do not adopt human rights 
norms (ICHRP, 2002, p. 18).  
In the UN context, a significant event in this period was the discussion of the 
social clause on labour standards and trade at the launch of the World Trade 
Organisation in 1994 (International Labour Organization, 2012). This opened a 
window for the ILO to press for recognition of workers’ rights in the context of trade. 
In 1998, the ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, which constituted an expression of the commitment of governments, employers 
and workers' organisations to uphold basic rights already stated in other ILO 
conventions (International Labour Organization, 2010). The rights and commitments 
include freedom of association and collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of 
forced or compulsory labour, abolition of child labour and elimination of 
discrimination in the workplace.  
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 Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives  2.4.1.
 
At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, companies began to 
develop more systematic mechanisms to engage with external stakeholders. New 
initiatives emerged with the purpose of enhancing the accountability of corporations 
through standardised procedures, regulatory actions and transparency mechanisms 
(Ruggie, 2007b, p. 835). Some of the most prominent initiatives included: 
• Social Accountability International (SAI) (1997): A New York-based 
organisation that convenes meetings worldwide involving companies, trade 
unions and NGOs to conduct research, training and capacity-building 
programmes. It has the mission of advancing the human rights of workers, 
eliminating sweatshops and promoting ethical working conditions, labour 
rights and corporate social responsibility globally. It created the SA8000 
Standard, an auditable social certification for decent workplaces, whose 
normative elements are based on international human rights norms and ILO 
conventions (Social Accountability International, 2012). 
• Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) (1998): An initiative originated by a group of 
UK companies, NGOs and trade unions with the purpose of deciding the best 
ways for companies to implement their codes of labour practices. Currently 
there are 70 member companies and it covers around 10 million workers 
worldwide (Ethical Trading Initiative, 2013).  
• Fair Labour Association (FLA) (1999): A multi-stakeholder initiative based in 
Washington DC that has as affiliates companies across the world, (mostly from 
the United States), universities and colleges and civil society organisations. It 
was created following a meeting between TNCs and NGOs in 1996 convened 
by US President Bill Clinton, in which he asked them to work together to 
improve working conditions in the apparel and footwear industries (Fair Labor 
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Association, 2012). The goal of the FLA is protecting workers’ rights globally 
and ensuring that goods are manufactured under fair and ethical conditions. Its 
main areas of activity are setting standards for affiliated companies, conducting 
external assessments, monitoring and publicly reporting on the activities of 
companies, and providing training and resources to companies to ensure that 
they comply with the standards (Fair Labor Association, 2011).   
• The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2000): A set of 
commitments launched following a discussion on security and human rights by 
the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Norway, companies in the extractive and energy sectors and NGOs (VPSHR, 
2013). The Principles were designed to help companies in the extractive 
industries to operate within a framework that respects human rights and 
international humanitarian law, particularly in areas of conflict and weak 
governance. Although they are voluntary, several companies have incorporated 
them into their management systems and agreements with contractors 
(BHRRC, 2010). 
• The Kimberley Process (2002): A certification scheme for rough diamonds that 
guarantees that certified diamonds are conflict-free and are not financing 
violence in producer countries. The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme 
currently has 76 member countries and is open to all states that agree to abide 
by its requirements (The Kimberley Process, 2012). 
 Third Wave of Attempts to Regulate TNCs: The 2000s 2.5.
 
This period has been characterised by the explicit introduction of the concept 
of human rights in the discussion regarding the responsibilities of TNCs. As described 
in previous sections, the negative effects of some TNC activities have been a concern 
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for decades. However, from the late 1990s, NGOs and UN bodies started to see human 
rights as a political concept and political project suitable for addressing the main 
problems associated with TNC operations (Karp, 2009, p. 88). The four initiatives 
developed within the UN during this period –the Global Compact, the UN Norms, the 
UN Framework and the Guiding Principles– explicitly referred to human rights as 
enumerated in the International Bill of Human Rights (the Bill). It consists of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights16 (UDHR), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. The UN Norms are most direct about their grounding in the Bill, 
stating in Article 23 that their usage of human rights includes civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights as set forth in the Bill (United Nations, 2003). Meanwhile the 
Global Compact, the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles state that to establish 
the content of human rights, at minimum, companies should look to the Bill and the 
core conventions of the ILO (Ruggie, 2008, p. 17; 2011, p. 13; UNGC, 2013b).  
The introduction of the concept of human rights marked a shift in the debate 
regarding TNCs from corporate social responsibility to the issue of ‘business and 
human rights’. The latter can be described as a recent cross-disciplinary debate whose 
unified aim is discussing and determining the responsibilities of corporations and other 
business enterprises in relation to human rights, and answering several questions that 
unfold from this main concern. These include, for example, rethinking the moral and 
legal duties of states vis-à-vis non-state actors, how to attribute and distribute duties 
across agents, and how to measure compliance. In contrast with the corporate social 
responsibility approach, which emphasises the voluntary and discretionary nature of 
                                                       
16 Some of the most important rights included in the Declaration are: the rights to life, liberty and security; 
physical freedom; freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; right 
to be recognised as a person before the law; right to equal protection of the law; right to an effective 
remedy from national tribunals for violations of their rights; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile; right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty if charged with a penal offence; right to privacy; right to freedom of 
movement; right to seek asylum; right to a nationality; right to property; freedom of religion; freedom of 
speech; freedom of peaceful association; right to work, rest and leisure and right to education (United 
Nations, 1948) .  
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corporate obligations, “[…] the ‘business and human rights’ discourse is presenting a 
very different picture: a picture according to which corporate social obligations are 
non-discretionary at least some of the time” (Karp, 2009, p. 106). Specifically, during 
this decade, the initiatives within the United Nations largely focused on discussing and 
clarifying some of these obligations in order to produce an account that would be 
politically authoritative.  
 The UN Global Compact 2.5.1.
 
In 1999, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced at the World 
Economic Forum in Geneva, Switzerland, the creation of a voluntary corporate 
accountability initiative, the Global Compact. This was designed as a learning forum to 
promote socially responsible practices in the areas of human rights, labour, the 
environment and anti-corruption. 17  Currently, the Global Compact is the largest 
corporate social responsibility initiative with around 7,000 company participants and 
national networks in more than 50 countries (Ruggie, 2013, p. xxvii). While the Global 
Compact has gained ample support from the business community, it has also been 
widely criticised by NGOs for what they see as its business-friendly attitude, its 
voluntary nature and its association with some of the companies that had been 
implicated in human rights harms, such as Nike and Nestlé (see EarthRights 
International, 2004). The voluntary and business-friendly attitude of the Global 
Compact is apparent from its light-touch affiliation process, which involves submitting 
a letter in which the business or non-business organisation commits to supporting the 
                                                       
17 The UNGC principles are: 1) businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally 
proclaimed human rights; and 2) make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses; 3) 
businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; 4) the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 5) the effective abolition of 
child labour; and 6) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 7) 
Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges; 8) undertake initiatives 
to promote greater environmental responsibility; and 9) encourage the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies; and 10) businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery. Originally, there were only 9 principles and the last one was added in 
2004. 
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UNGC 10 principles,18 and to issuing an annual document called ‘Communication on 
Progress’, in which the company publicly discloses the steps it took to implementing 
and advancing such principles during the year.  
The Global Compact does not have any system to monitor or enforce 
compliance; instead it relies on self-assessment, as it “[…] is more like a guide dog than 
a watch dog […] focused on learning, dialogue and partnerships […]” (UNGC, 2013b). 
Despite its stated purpose, corporations have tended to treat the Global Compact and 
its endorsement as seal of approval to raise their profile  –for example, by using the 
Global Compact logo on the company’s official websites and documents. Such 
handling of a company’s affiliation to the UNGC can be misleading, as some members 
of the UNGC have been implicated in systematic violations of human rights. An 
example is the British mining company, Anglo American, which has been allegedly 
involved in several cases of human rights harms against their employees and the 
communities of their operations across the countries where it and its subsidiaries 
operate, including Colombia and South Africa (ActionAid, 2008; BHRRC, 2013a). 
Another example is the Canadian mining company, Barrick Gold Corporation, whose 
security personnel have been allegedly involved in cases of gang rape and extrajudicial 
killings (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Both companies are full members of the Global 
                                                       
18 The process of admitting new members into the UNGC is mostly conducted by interns at the Global 
Compact Office in New York, United States. To become a member of the UNGC, the CEO of the 
business or the highest executive of the non-business organisation commits to supporting the 10 Principles 
of the Global Compact by sending a letter using a template provided. After the letter is received, the intern 
in charge of the process searches on the Internet for information on the company and checks the identity of 
the person who signed the letter (sometimes this is not possible given that some potential members do not 
have an electronic presence). The next step is checking on an electronic database of politically exposed 
persons if the company or the person signing the letter is associated with any scandal or felony (sometimes 
it is difficult to determine this, as there are numerous homonyms, especially in the case of Chinese 
business). The profile of the company is also checked against a confidential document that lists companies 
subject to sanctions from the United Nations or that have been blacklisted by UN Procurement. While the 
reasons for banning these corporations are said to be “moral reasons” (UNGC, 2013b), companies can 
eventually have their status reinstated. If there are no major concerns, the profile of the company is sent to 
the local network to be reviewed and the membership is automatically approved in seven working days. In 
case of concerns, the local network is contacted and more information can be required from the company. 
If there is no local network, the application is automatically approved in seven working days. (Author 
observations as intern at the Global Compact office in New York, Uniyed States, April-June 2011). 
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Compact and explicitly endorse the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles (see 
Anglo American, 2013; Barrick Gold Corporation, 2013). 
Furthermore, critics have identified some inconsistencies, or at least clear 
tensions, in the Global Compact’s policies and joining process. For example, 
companies engaged in the manufacture and sales of anti-personnel landmines or cluster 
bombs are banned from joining 19 (UNGC, 2013b); nonetheless, companies involved in 
manufacturing arms, ammunition, missiles and the provision of defence services 
(armed personnels) can become members. Examples are Mitsubishi and EADS 
(Netherlands), which produce missiles; Thales (France) and Kongsberg Gruppen SA 
(Norway), which produce arms, ammunition and missiles (SIPRI, 2011), as well as the 
private military company, AEGIS (UK). A similar inconsistency is highlighted in the 
Global Compact policy on tobacco companies. While they are discouraged from 
becoming members, they can join –albeit with several restrictions20– under the rationale 
that tobacco is “[…] a legal product whose use United Nations Member States have 
not yet outlawed […]” (UNGC, 2013g). This inconsistency between the Global 
Compact’s purported support of human rights and the admission of “bad” companies, 
has led critics to claim that the initiative is no more than an attempt to “bluewash” the 
image of corporations, i.e. associating them with the UN and the values the institution 
embodies in order to clean their image or be perceived as part of the global 
humanitarian community (Bruno & Karliner, 2002, pp. 78-79). 
While a range of actors was consulted prior to the creation of the Global 
Compact, particular attention was paid to corporations in order to make the initiative 
more attractive to them. From 1998, Secretary-General Annan held meetings and 
                                                       
19 It should be noted that the use of anti-personnel landmines is banned by the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction, which aims at eliminating personal landmines around the world. To date 161 states are party 
to the Convention.  
20 This is because the UNGC supports the World Health Organisation's efforts to raise awareness of the 
health effects of tobacco use. It thus actively discourages tobacco companies from participating in the 
initiative, does not accept funding from them and does not allow tobacco companies to make 
presentations at any of the Global Compact’s events (UNGC, 2013g). 
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issued joint statements with the International Chamber of Commerce and 
representatives of corporations such as Coca-Cola, Unilever, McDonalds and 
Goldman Sachs (Bruno & Karliner, 2002, p. 43; Kell, 2005, p. 71). While other 
stakeholders, including NGOs and labour organisations, have become involved, 
companies have exercised significant influence on the way in which the Global 
Compact principles are interpreted and applied, through their participation in forums, 
policy dialogues, networks and the advisory board of the Global Compact Office 
(Bruno & Karliner, 2002, p. 41; Seppala, 2009, pp. 408-409). For instance, of the 34 
members of the board, 20 are businesses and two are business organisations, the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the International Organisation of Employers 
(UNGC, 2013a).  
The response of NGOs to the Global Compact has been mixed. Some, 
including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights, welcomed the initiative but have not formally endorsed it because 
of its lack of independent verification and enforcement mechanisms (Winston, 2002, p. 
78). Upon the Compact’s launch, another group of NGOs, including Corporate Watch 
and Greenpeace International, issued a press release criticising the initiative as 
threatening the mission of the UN, and because they feared that it would prevent 
progress on binding and legally enforceable documents or initiatives (Bruno & Karliner, 
2002, pp. 78-79; Winston, 2002, p. 78; EarthRights International, 2004).  
 The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 2.5.2.
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights 
 
In August 1998, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, in its Resolution 1998/8, decided to establish a sessional working 
group. This group was tasked with identifying and examining the working methods 
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and activities of TNCs, and analysing the compatibility of the various international 
human rights instruments with regional and international investment agreements. It 
also was to help ensure that TNC methods and activities kept in line with the economic 
and social objectives of host countries, and to examine the scope of the obligation of 
the state to regulate the activities of TNCs where their activities have or are likely to 
have a significant impact on the enjoyment of the human rights of all persons within 
their jurisdiction (UNHCHR, 1998). For five years, the working group developed a 
document that would become known as the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights (the UN Norms). The Norms established standards for regulating the activities 
of TNCs and preventing human rights violations and other corporate misconduct in the 
areas of sovereignty, corruption, environmental protection, child labour, development, 
working environment, adequate wages, workers’ rights and the right of security of the 
person (Sorell, 2006, p. 284). Contrary to other initiatives, the UN Norms were not 
limited to transnational corporations, but also included other business enterprises. This 
move was aimed at preventing corporations from using legal or financial devices to 
conceal their transnational nature in order to avoid responsibility under the UN Norms 
(Weissbrodt & Kruger, 2003, p. 909).  
The Norms considered states to be the primary duty-bearers in relation to 
human rights, but they were notable for ascribing to corporations the same range of 
duties that states have under international law, namely “[…] to promote, secure the 
fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in 
international as well as national law […]” (United Nations, 2003). The only difference 
between states and corporations was that the latter were considered secondary duty-
bearers, and their responsibilities were confined to their “spheres of activity and 
influence”. The UN Norms echoed some of the responsibilities already outlined in 
other documents, and they required corporations to pay particular attention to those 
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areas that historically have been the most affected by corporate activity, such as labour 
standards and corruption. For instance, the Norms required corporations to refrain 
from using forced labour and exploiting children, ensuring equality of opportunity and 
treatment, providing a safe and healthy working environment, providing workers a 
living wage, ensuring freedom of association and collective bargaining, and abstaining 
from condoning, benefiting from or demanding bribes or incurring in other acts of 
corruption. However, they also included further demands regarding consumer 
protection and the environment that not even states have accepted for themselves 
(Arnold, 2010, p. 379; Ruggie, 2013, pp. 48-49). For example, the UN Norms required 
corporations avoid producing, distributing, marketing or advertising harmful products, 
and acting in accordance with fair business practices in order to guarantee the safety 
and good quality of their products. 
 The UN Norms triggered a division between advocacy groups and businesses. 
Prominent NGOs, including Amnesty International, Christian Aid, Oxfam and 
Human Rights Watch, supported the Norms, as they proposed making corporate 
obligations binding under international law (Ruggie, 2013, p. xix). On the other hand, 
leading business-sector representatives, including the International Chamber of 
Commerce and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), fiercely opposed 
them. They argued that the UN Norms were effectively transferring to corporations the 
obligations of states, a move they described as “the privatisation of human rights”, and 
they feared that new guidelines were mapping the road towards binding regulations 
(Kinley & Chambers, 2006, pp. 457-458; Ruggie, 2007a, p. 821; 2013, p. xvii; Sorell, 
2006, p. 287). It was also feared that advocacy groups would use the Norms to declare 
corporate acts illegal, as opposed to merely being able to claim corporate wrongdoing, 
and that, in the end, the constraints that the UN Norms imposed would undermine 
corporations’ autonomy, risk-taking and entrepreneurship (Ruggie, 2007b, p. 822; 2013, 
p. 51).  
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Critics of the UN Norms also highlighted what they saw as some deficiencies 
internal to them. The first was their unclear identity. While the authors of the Norms 
asserted that they were simply expressing existing international legal principles that 
applied to companies, critics targeted the similarities between the ascribed duties of 
states and corporations, and they saw the UN Norms as introducing new standards 
with unclear international legal standing, such as the right to a living wage, consumer 
protection and environmental precautionary principles (Arnold, 2010, pp. 374, 379; 
Ruggie, 2013, pp. 48-49). Second, the Norms were seen by critics as not providing a 
clear basis for determining which rights had to be included and which did not, beyond 
the rationale that some were more at risk than others of being abused by corporations. 
The UN Norms’ approach thus seemed to disregard the fact that corporations can have 
an impact on virtually any human right, ranging from labour and health to civil rights 
(Ruggie, 2013, pp. 20-23).  
The third issue related to the attribution of duties to corporations on the 
grounds of influence, which in practice means that “can implies ought”. This was seen 
as problematic because corporations may be attributed some responsibilities in cases 
where they have some influence over the sources of harm, even if they are unrelated to 
it. Similarly, in cases where corporations have some relation to the harm but can 
demonstrate that they did not have any influence over the source of harm, they could 
be absolved (Ruggie, 2013, p. 50). Another consideration refers to some alleged 
contradictions of the UN Norms, which imposed on corporations a range of duties 
recognised under international law and also required them to follow national laws and 
to apply the most protective standards wherever they might be found. However, the 
Norms did not offer clear guidance on what standards corporations must follow in case 
of contradiction. Furthermore, the term ‘sphere of influence’, which was conceived as a 
metaphor to illustrate the reach of the impact of TNCs’ behaviour, was been regarded 
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as “misleading”, as it may ignore the fact that corporations can exert significant impact 
on distant communities (Ruggie, 2013, pp. 49-50).  
In 2004 the Sub-Commission presented the Norms to its intergovernmental 
parent body, the Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council) for 
their approval. On receipt, however, the Council noted that it had never requested such 
a document (Council Decision 2004/116). It said further that the Norms had no legal 
standing, and it demanded that the Sub-Commission refrain from performing any 
monitoring function in relation to the proposed guidelines (OHCHR, 2004, p. 1). This 
was not a surprising outcome, given the perceived flaws of the UN Norms and the fact 
that home states and business had little incentive to adopt such an ambitious document, 
not only because it was against their perceived interests, but also because of the 
existence of an organisation more sympathetic to their interests, namely, the Global 
Compact. 
 The UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework for 2.5.3.
Business and Human Rights and the UN Guiding Principles 
 
The dismissal of the UN Norms did not mean that the discussion around the 
issue of business and greater human rights accountability was abandoned. Some 
governments and advocacy groups perceived a necessity to continue the dialogue, and 
businesses demanded more clarity regarding their human rights responsibilities from an 
authoritative source (Ruggie, 2013, pp. xvii-xviii). In 2005, led by the United Kingdom, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights created a mandate for an individual to look 
into the issue of business and human rights. Annan then appointed Harvard Professor 
of International Affairs John Ruggie as Special Representative on Business and Human 
Rights (SRSG). Ruggie had served as Annan’s Assistant Secretary-General for 
Strategic Planning from 1997 to 2001, and he had also been involved in the 
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development of the Global Compact (Whelan, Moon, & Orlitzky, 2009, p. 369; Ruggie, 
2013, p. xviii).  
Ruggie’s original two-year mandate21 was largely descriptive and required the 
Special Representative, among other things, to identify existing standards of corporate 
conduct and accountability and to clarify the terms ‘complicity’ and ‘sphere of 
influence’ introduced by the UN Norms. Ruggie began his work in a polarised 
environment. On one hand, businesses insisted that he should recognise that there was 
no need for a new international regulatory framework, and instead urged him to 
identify and disseminate good practices and tools to enable them to cope with human 
rights challenges. On the other hand, NGOs supported the UN Norms and expected 
him to build upon them and work toward their implementation (Ruggie, 2013, pp. xix-
xx). In order to advance the discussion, Ruggie notes that he tried to move beyond the 
binding/voluntary dichotomy, and instead decided to follow what he calls “principled 
pragmatism”, “[…] an unflinching commitment to the principle of strengthening the 
promotion and protection of human rights as it relates to business, coupled with a 
pragmatic attachment to what works best in creating change where it matters most – in 
the daily lives of peoples” (Ruggie, 2006, p. 18).  
 Ruggie rejected the self-regulatory mechanism that the business community 
wanted, as he felt it would lack credibility and alienate NGOs. However, a treaty-like 
document was not an option either, as he considered that there was no foundation to 
negotiate such a document, and that it would entail a very lengthy process that would 
not provide the immediate solutions needed (Ruggie, 2013, p. 57). He also rejected the 
                                                       
21 The mandate asked the Special Representative: 1) to identify and clarify standards of corporate 
responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard 
to human rights; 2) to elaborate on the role of States in effectively regulating and adjudicating the role of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, including through 
international cooperation; 3) to research and clarify the implications for transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises of concepts such as ‘complicity’ and ‘sphere of influence’; 4) to develop 
materials and methodologies for undertaking human rights impact assessments of the activities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises; and 5) to compile a compendium of best 
practices of States and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (OHCHR, 2013). 
 
 Chapter 2: Bridging the Governance Gap 
   
 
41 
idea of simultaneously writing a treaty and taking short-term practical steps, as he 
identified some major challenges to that path. First, there was little consensus on the 
desirable responses that the issue of business and human rights required, as it was a 
relatively new topic on the international agenda. Second, some policy incoherence 
existed within governments, as entities in charge of human rights were isolated from 
those that protect business, which were generally larger and more powerful; thus it was 
feared that a treaty would lock in commercial interests at the expense of human rights. 
Third, he noted, treaty negotiations are sometimes used as an excuse by governments 
to avoid taking concrete steps to protect human rights (Ruggie, 2013, pp. 58-60).  
Additionally, given the sensitivity of the issues, there was the latent risk that 
the only standards reached would be very low or would not be ratified. Finally, some 
countries also expressed their concern that imposing on corporations the same range of 
duties as states would ultimately diminish the state’s roles and responsibilities (Ruggie, 
2013, pp. 58-60, 64). The Special Representative also cast some doubts on the 
effectiveness of a treaty-like document, as it would create yet another set of laws that 
could potentially collide with existent national or international norms, doing little to 
solve the real problem. Even if a document like that was eventually created, there 
would be still many issues to resolve regarding enforcement, as, specifically, the most 
affected countries are those which lack sufficient organisational resources to monitor 
compliance (Ruggie, 2013, pp. 60-68).  
As noted, part of Ruggie’s mandate was to clarify the term ‘sphere of influence’ 
introduced by the UN Norms; however, he soon made it clear that he could not 
endorse or build upon the Norms, as he found them deeply flawed. He accused the 
Norms’ effort of becoming “[…] engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses [and on 
creating confusion due to] its exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities […]” 
(Ruggie, 2006). He also rejected continued development of the term ‘sphere of 
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influence’, as he considered that even when it had some practical applicability, it 
lacked any “legal pedigree” (Ruggie, 2007a, p. 24). 
After the first mandate period ended, the Human Rights Council invited 
Ruggie to take another year to develop what would become the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights. The Framework puts forward 
the idea that corporations’ primary responsibility22  is to respect human rights as 
recognised under various international instruments of soft law, i.e. that are not legally 
binding, whereas states bear the duties to protect the rights of their population and seek 
remedy for the victims of abuses committed by third parties, including business (Ruggie, 
2008, p. 8). According to the Framework, the distribution of duties between 
corporations and states conforms to both existing state-centric legal and political 
mechanisms that consider governments to be the “[…] appropriate entities to make the 
difficult balancing decisions to reconcile different societal needs” (Ruggie, 2008, p. 28). 
In contrast, corporations’ responsibility to respect human rights means that they should 
act with due diligence to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address 
their adverse impacts on human rights and enable remediation when harm has been 
done. Corporations are allocated a set of duties distinct from those of states because, it 
is argued, corporations are “[…] specialized economic organs, not democratic public 
interest institutions” (Ruggie, 2008, p. 17). 
When the Framework was presented in 2008, the Human Rights Council 
unanimously welcomed it and extended Ruggie’s mandate, asking him to create 
guidelines for operationalisation. 23  These guidelines would become the Guiding 
                                                       
22 In the reports the word ‘responsibility’ is used to indicate the fact that respecting human rights is 
currently not an obligation for corporations under international human rights law. 
23 The 2008-2011 mandate required the Special Representative 1) to provide views and recommendations 
on ways to strengthen the fulfilment of the duty of the State to protect all human rights from abuses by 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, including through international cooperation; 2) 
to elaborate further on the scope and content of the corporate responsibility to respect all human rights and 
to provide concrete guidance to business and other stakeholders; 3) to explore options and make 
recommendations, at the national, regional and international levels, for enhancing access to effective 
remedies available to those whose human rights are impacted by corporate activities; 4) to integrate a 
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Principles on Business and Human Rights for Implementing the UN Protect, Respect 
and Remedy Framework, which the Council then unanimously endorsed. The 
document comprises 31 principles that correspond to the three pillars –protect, respect, 
remedy– of the UN Framework, each with a commentary elaborating its meaning and 
implications. The Guiding Principles combine public corporate and civil governance 
mechanisms. For states, the focus is on the obligations that they have under 
international law, and for companies, the emphasis is on complying with legal 
obligations and managing the risks of being involved in human rights harms. The UN 
Guiding Principles are also intended to serve as a tool for empowering victims of 
human rights violations. At the conclusion of the Special Representative’s mandate in 
2011, the Council established a working group in charge of disseminating and 
implementing the Guiding Principles. Its main tasks are to promote the 
implementation and dissemination of the UN Guiding Principles, to identify good 
practices, to help to build institutional capacity in developing countries and to provide 
further recommendations to the Council. At the present time, several standard-setting 
bodies such as the International Organisation for Standardisation, the European Union 
and the OECD have started to incorporate the UN Guiding Principles into their own 
regulations (Ruggie, 2013, pp. 120, 160).  
Such developments help to illustrate the changing ideas regarding TNCs and 
their responsibilities towards human rights. While in the 1970s companies were 
reluctant to recognise stringent duties for themselves, it has become widely accepted 
that companies have at least some moral duties to respect human rights and that they 
                                                                                                                                                          
gender perspective throughout his work and to give special attention to persons belonging to vulnerable 
groups, in particular children; 5) to liaise closely with the efforts of the human rights working group of the 
Global Compact in order to identify, exchange and promote best practices and lessons learned on the issue 
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises; 6) to work in close coordination with United 
Nations and other relevant international bodies, offices, departments and specialized agencies, and in 
particular with other special procedures of the Council; 7) to continue to consult on the issues covered by 
the mandate on an ongoing basis with all stakeholders, including States, national human rights 
institutions, international and regional organisations, transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, and civil society, including academics, employers’ organisations, workers’ organisations, 
indigenous and other affected communities and non-governmental organisations, including through joint 
meetings; and 8) to report annually to the Council and the General Assembly (OHCHR, 2013). 
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can be held accountable for their indirect contribution to human rights deficits. For 
instance the UN Guiding Principles explicitly allocate to companies a responsibility to 
“seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to 
their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have 
not contributed to those impacts” (Ruggie, 2011, p. 14). Such evolution, I will contend 
in the next chapters, offers some reasons to think that it is possible to expand the 
responsibilities of companies to encompass their contributions to harmful social 
structures, as long as they are rooted in their primary negative duty not to harm.  
 Holding TNCs Accountable Under National Law 2.6.
 
As is suggested by the above discussion, efforts to address the governance gap 
have focused mainly on developing international standards and rules in order to match 
the transnational activity of corporations and avoid competing regulations among 
states. Nevertheless, in some countries, grave cases of human rights violations have 
been heard in the courts of home countries or third parties. This section will present the 
cases of legal provisions under US legislation to prosecute TNCs for complicity in 
human rights violations abroad, which usage nonetheless has become limited by recent 
legislative decisions.  
 US Alien Tort Statute 2.6.1.
 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA), was enacted in the United States as part of the Judicial Act of 1789. The Act 
allows aliens, i.e. any person who is not a citizen or a national of the United States, to 
bring claims in US federal courts for a tort, i.e. an offence in violation of the law of 
nations (Ramasastry, 2002, p. 120). It operates under the universality principle, which 
maintains that violations may trigger legal responsibilities regardless of where the 
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offence occurred and the nationality of the defendant (Reinisch, 2005, p. 56; 
Ramasastry, 2002, p. 153). The Alien Tort Statute has been invoked in cases against 
foreign companies, financial institutions and political groups for violations of 
international law and human rights abuses in foreign territories. Up until 2013, around 
180 alien tort cases had been filed against business entities; two resulted in default 
judgments and 13 in settlements (Goldhaber, 2013, p. 128) (see Appendix C).  
Until very recently, in all cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute there was 
a tacit understanding that corporations, as legal persons, were capable of violating the 
law of nations and therefore could be sued (Murray, Kinley, & Pitts, 2011, p. 59; 
Ramasastry, 2002, p. 121; Ratner, 2001, p. 88). 24 However, on 17 September 2010, in 
two cases involving transnational corporations: Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc. (Talisman)25 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (Kiobel), 26 the US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that corporations could not be held liable under 
the Alien Tort Statute because there was no customary norm that recognised corporate 
liability for violations of international law27 (Murray, Kinley, & Pitts, 2011, p. 59). The 
US District Court for the District of Columbia contested this claim during the hearing 
                                                       
24 This idea was in line with the recognition of the corporate personhood under United States federal law, 
(see Korten, 2001). Unlike suits against natural persons for direct violation of international law, most suits 
against corporations have been brought for their complicity or secondary liability, usually with the 
government of the host country (Murray, Kinley, & Pitts, 2011, p. 66). In the case of Khulumani v. Barclay 
National Bank Ltd. (Khlumani) where the plaintiffs sued around 50 corporations for their complicity with 
the government of South Africa in maintaining apartheid, the judges differed on their understanding of 
‘complicity’. One judge argued that international law requires demonstrating that the corporation acted 
with the purpose of facilitating the commission of the crime, while the other judge, based on federal law, 
held that the corporation must knowingly assist in the principal violation (Murray, Kinley, & Pitts, 2011, 
pp. 67-68). As the international meaning prevailed, it was determined that for the TNCs to be judged 
under international law, they had to be recognised as subject to international law in the first place (Murray, 
Kinley, & Pitts, 2011, p. 70). 
25 In 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan accused Talisman Energy, a Canadian oil company, of being 
complicit with the Sudanese government in ethnic cleansing against the non-Muslim population living in 
the area of the company’s oil concession.  
26 In 2002, Esther Kiobel, the wife of an Ogoni activist executed by the Nigerian government, filed a suit 
against Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria on the charges of complicity with the Nigerian 
government in the commission of torture, extrajudicial killing and other human rights violations.  
27 According to Murray, Kinley and Pitts this decision was based on 1) the fact that the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg granted it jurisdiction over natural persons only; 2) the fact 
that during the Nuremberg Trials, in the case of IG Farben only the executives and not the corporation 
were prosecuted; 3) the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and International Criminal Court give them jurisdiction over 
natural persons only; 4) the proposal to extend the Court’s jurisdiction to include corporations was 
rejected; and 5) the few treaties that do provide for corporate liability are not widely ratified (2011, pp. 72-
73). 
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of the case of Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon).28 On 8 July 2011, the DC Circuit 
ruled that “ […] neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate 
immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in 
violation of the law of nations” (2011, p. 4). Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit Court, in 
Flomo v. Firestone29, added: “the factual premise of the majority opinion in the Kiobel 
case is incorrect […] suppose no corporation had ever been punished for violating 
customary international law. There is always a first time for litigation to enforce a 
norm; there has to be” (2011, pp. 6-7). 
The Supreme Court heard two rounds of oral arguments, and on 17 April 2013 
it affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the case on the premise that the Statute does 
not explicitly indicate extraterritorial application. This decision effectively limits the 
application of the Alien Tort Statute, which now can only be invoked when the 
defendant is a US national or when the “[…] defendant’s conduct substantially and 
adversely affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct 
interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as 
well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind” (Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2013). 
Besides the Alien Tort Statute, there are a few comparable legal mechanisms in 
other countries. In the UK’s legal system, it has been possible to pursue similar cases 
under the “foreign direct liability theory”, which refers to the notion that  
[…] when a parent company is directly involved in its subsidiary’s 
operations or exercises de facto control, then it owes a duty of care to 
its employees or anyone affected by its operations. Accordingly, it 
may be held liable for harm flowing from its failure to competently 
                                                       
28 In this case, the plaintiffs accused the Indonesian military forces whom the oil company Exxon had 
hired to perform security services. They claimed that the company was complicit in serious human rights 
abuses including genocide, murder, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual violence and kidnapping. 
29 In November 2005, a group of people who lived and worked on the Firestone rubber plantation in 
Liberia filed a class action lawsuit against the company in US federal court in California. They alleged that 
the working conditions at the rubber plantation amount to forced labour and that supervisors at the 
Firestone plantation required workers to put their children to work to meet the company’s production 
quotas (BHRRC, 2013b). 
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perform the functions it controls, or to give foreign subsidiaries sound 
advice on environmental, worker safety, and human rights policies 
(Goldhaber, 2013, p. 132).  
This legal resource has been used several times against British mining30 and oil 
companies. 31  However, a proposed reform to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders bill to limit legal expenses in the United Kingdom may 
jeopardise the continuity of those cases (Goldhaber, 2013, pp. 133-134; Mathiason, 
2011). This is because under the new provisions, in some cases the plaintiffs instead of 
the defendant found guilty will have to cover the legal fees. In addition, the amount of 
money that can be claimed may be limited, which means that in some cases the costs 
incurred on bringing a case may not be covered even if the case is won (Mathiason, 
2011). This is an important development, as many of the largest TNCs in the world 
have their headquarters in the United Kingdom.32 These include some companies in 
extractive industries, which conduct a large part of their operations in vulnerable 
communities in developing countries. Similar cases have been filed, albeit in much 
small numbers, in other countries, including the Netherlands, Australia and Canada 
(Goldhaber, 2013, pp. 134-136).  
 
 
                                                       
30 One example is the suit that several farmers in Peru filed in 2007 against UK-based Monterrico Metals 
for its alleged involvement in abuses committed by police forces during a protest against the operations of 
the mining company. Another example is the suit against UK’s Anglo American South Africa Ltd. filed by 
over 450 individuals in 2011 in the London High Court. The claimants alleged that they were suffering 
from silicosis and silico-tuberculosis as a result of the company’s failure to control the levels of dust on its 
South African gold mines (see Leight Day & Co. Solicitors, 2011a). The settlements reached are calculated 
to be worth around £10.5 million excluding legal fees (Goldhaber, 2013, p. 130). 
31 Two recent cases include lawsuits against BPXC and Shell Petroleum Development Company. In 2011, 
a group of Colombian farmers filed a claim against BPXC (a BP subsidiary) because, allegedly, the 
company failed to observe proper environmental procedures while constructing an oil pipeline in 
Colombia. Also, in 2011 Shell admitted liability in Bodo Community v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. of 
Nigeria, for an oil spill that caused contamination in creeks, mangroves, rivers and waterways in the Bodo 
area in Nigeria (see Leight Day & Co. Solicitors, 2011b). The settlements reached are calculated to be 
worth around £3.3 million excluding legal fees (Goldhaber, 2013, p. 130).  
32 By 2013, 95 out of the 2,000 TNCs with the largest assets has their headquarters in the United Kingdom 
(Forbes, 2013). 
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This chapter has presented some of the efforts at the international level to 
bridge the existing gap in the governance of transnational corporations. It has shown 
how the focus of United Nations initiatives has reflected the changing global 
environment and concerns regarding TNCs at each stage, as well as the increasingly 
progressive view of companies regarding their own responsibilities. The idea that 
TNCs have at least negative duties to respect human rights as well as the increasingly 
accepted principle that they can be held responsible for their indirect participation in 
human rights matters starkly contrast with the prevailing views of the 1970s.  
During these years, efforts were directed towards ensuring the fair treatment of 
developing countries, which enjoyed significant leverage at the global level until many 
were dramatically affected by the international debt crisis of the early 1980s. The 
Global Compact, announced in 1999, was an effort to perpetuate economic 
liberalisation (Kell & Levin, 2002, p. 7) and preserve the global economy, which was 
thought to be “fragile and vulnerable” (Annan, 1999), particularly in the sight of the 
anti-globalisation movement, of which the protests in Seattle during the WTO 
ministerial conference later that year became one of its symbols. The development of 
non-binding documents and partnerships with corporations became the preferred 
approach of the United Nations. This was crystallised in the Global Compact and the 
UN Framework, which had as its stated purpose the creation of “[…] a formula that 
was politically authoritative, not a legally binding instrument” (Ruggie, 2013, p. xlvi).  
Before the 1990s, companies were reluctant to recognise many stringent duties 
for themselves; however partly as a result of demands from NGOs and civil society at 
large, companies became significantly more progressive. The policy developments of 
the 2000s –the UN Norms, the UN Framework and the UN Guiding Principles– 
captured and contributed to conceptualising the responsibilities of corporations in 
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terms of human rights. Increasingly NGOs, UN bodies and policy think tanks have 
argued that TNCs ought to have duties that are similar in some respects to states’. In 
other words, they have been arguing that the human rights regime developed in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, which ascribes primary human rights duties to 
states, ought to be extended to also include non-state actors, in particular TNCs (Karp, 
2009, p. 88). This raises a series of ethical, political and legal questions regarding the 
justifiability of allocating responsibilities to corporations, the content of such 
responsibilities and how they can be politically and legally codified and enforced. The 





: The Responsibilities Chapter 3
of TNCs Under International 
Law 
 
The fortunes amassed through corporate organization are now so large, 
and vest such power in those that wield them, as to make it a matter of 
necessity to give to the sovereign –that is, to the Government, which 
represents the people as a whole– some effective power of supervision 
over their corporate use. In order to insure a healthy social and industrial 
life, every big corporation should be held responsible by, and be 
accountable to, some sovereign strong enough to control its conduct. 




The use of human rights as a framework in which to place demands upon 
corporations has had important implications for the debate on the responsibilities they 
can be allocated. While states are at the centre of the current human rights regime, over 
the last decade, non-governmental organisations, UN bodies, and policy think-tanks have 
argued for extending it to include transnational corporations (Karp, 2009, p. 88). While 
they do not contend that corporations should bear the same range of responsibilities as 
states, they argue that TNCs should be seen as duty-bearers in relation to human rights, 
given their growing capabilities and their involvement in several cases of human rights 
violations around the world. Furthermore, the view of the state as the main party 
responsible for preventing violations of human rights within its jurisdiction can be hard 
to reconcile with the fact that states are not always willing to play, or capable of playing, 
that role.  
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The problem is that international law does not easily accommodate non-state 
actors. This is because its foundations were developed upon the image of the state as the 
main player in the international arena and the main threat to human rights. Nonetheless, 
these elements have significantly changed over the last 60 years; it has become accepted 
that while the state has a privileged position, non-state actors also possess some status 
under international law and therefore are susceptible to rights but also to responsibilities. 
The challenge remains to develop the content of such responsibilities. While some argue 
that corporations should bear responsibilities similar in some respects to states’ duties, 
legal scholars have argued that the duties allocated to corporations must reflect their 
distinct capacities, roles and purposes as profit-maximising entities (Ratner, 2001, p. 493; 
Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 961; Zerk, 2006, pp. 79, 83). In order to begin moving toward 
a coherent and fully defensible set of moral principles applicable to determining TNC 
duties, I will in this chapter consider and contextualise the predominant positions on 
TNC responsibilities under international law.    
 Duties, Responsibilities and Obligations 3.2.
 
It will be useful to begin with a clarification of some key terms. First, the terms 
‘responsibilities’, ‘obligations’ and ‘duties’ refer to varying actions or constraints that an 
agent is bound to observe (Erskine, 2003b, p. 11). While there are several distinctions 
drawn between these terms by various authors, the present work will follow Pogge’s 
usage. He would not draw a firm distinction between ‘duties’ and ‘responsibilities’. 33 For 
                                                       
33 Other authors, however, have offered different typologies. For example, Goodin (1995) differentiates 
between ‘duties’ and ‘responsibilities’. For deontological ethics, duties dictate an agent’s actions or inactions 
and ascribe to agents moral credit or blame for what they have done or contributed to an outcome. For a 
duty to be discharged one must do or refrain from doing something, thus discharging a duty is binary as there 
is no substitute for doing what one is required to do (Goodin, 1995, p. 85). For deontological ethics, 
intentions and motives are important so doing what one is required incidentally or accidentally to the pursuit 
of some other goal does not qualify as discharging one’s duties in the fullest sense. In contrast, utilitarian-
consequentialists ascribe responsibilities according to outcomes. To discharge one’s responsibilities one must 
oversee that what is required to reach the goal is done, but they leave open the choice for actions to be taken. 
Contrary to duties, discharging a responsibility is gradual as in a consequentialist ethic different outcomes are 
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example, he states that “[…] the claim ‘there is a human right to X’ is tantamount to the 
claim that members of the global order have some responsibilities with regard to other 
members’ having X” (emphasis added) (Pogge, 2009a, p. 42). In another source, he 
asserts: “the positive duties correlative to human rights will be discharged more efficiently 
if the bearers of these duties focus their efforts within their own country” (emphasis 
added) (Pogge, 2007, p. 23). Both terms, duties and responsibilities, are treated as 
correlative to rights34 and therefore are owed to special persons i.e. right-holders (see also 
Brandt, 1964, p. 375; Fieser, 1992; Frazier, 1998, p. 178). 
For Pogge, duties are considered as fundamental unconditional demands that 
apply to us always, such as the duty to keep a promise. Under certain empirical 
circumstances certain kinds of duties, generative duties, can generate moral obligations 
or derivative duties (see Cruft, 2005, p. 31; Macdonald, 2011, p. 557). Obligations merely 
spell out what the underlying duties entail under given conditions (Pogge, 1992b, p. 234). 
For example, “a duty to keep one’s promises generates obligations whenever a promise is 
made. Those who make no promises do not have obligations. But they still have the 
duty: to keep any promises they make” (Pogge, 1992b, p. 234). Likewise, a positive duty 
to assist in an emergency in conjunction with a situation of a car crash generates an 
obligation to –at least– call an ambulance. Therefore, while duties are unconditional, 
obligations are conditional to particular empirical circumstances.35  
                                                                                                                                                              
suitable in different degrees (Goodin, 1995, p. 85). For utilitarians, responsibilities (goals) can determine 
duties (actions) if a particulate duty is the only way to discharge a responsibility (Goodin, 1995, pp. 81 -85).   
34 According to other typologies, ‘duties’ arise from special status, position, occupation or role, e.g. as a 
president, as a teacher, as a dean or as a parent (Lemmon, 1962, p. 140; Brandt, 1964, p. 375; Frazier, 1998, 
p. 178). Whereas ‘obligations’ are based on promises and are voluntarily incurred or created such as giving 
one’s word or signing an agreement (Lemmon, 1962, p. 141; Brandt, 1964, p. 375; Feinberg, 1966, p. 137). 
Obligations are said to function in agreement, contractual and retributive relations and are closer related to 
conscience and personal moral standards; while duties have a more compelling force and the term is 
normally used in status-situations and when moral demands are backed up by institutional sanctions (Brandt, 
1964, pp. 392-393; Lemmon, 1962, p. 142). Frazier (1998, p. 178) suggests that the indistinct usage between 
both concepts might be explained by the fact that nowadays many roles are taken on voluntary. 
35 This typology is similar to O’Neill’s, which nonetheless uses a different terminology; instead of referring to 
duty and obligation she uses the terms ‘fundamental’ and ‘non-fundamental obligations’ (see O'Neill, 1989, p. 
190). 
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In legal scholarship it is common to make a distinction between duties and 
responsibilities. For example, Ruggie, refers to “duties” as those claims that are codified 
in binding legal instruments, whereas “responsibilities” denote standards of expected 
conduct (2010a, p. 2; 2013, p. 91). Therefore, he distinguishes between the state duty to 
protect human rights as embodied in binding documents of international law and the 
corporate responsibility to respect as recognised involuntary and soft law instruments 
(Ruggie, 2010a, p. 2; 2013, p. 91).  
 Positive, Negative and Intermediate Duties 3.2.1.
 
Moral duties can be divided between positive and negative duties. Negative 
duties involve not depriving other people of what they have rights to, or not interfering 
with their realisation of rights, i.e. duties to respect the rights of others. Therefore they 
are considered to be less restrictive of individual liberty than positive duties. What is 
given up in discharging a negative duty is the opportunity to do what one is not supposed 
to do (Kolstad, 2008, p. 572; Shue, 1988, p. 689). Negative duties are unconditional and 
universal: the duties not to violate the rights of someone must be observed by everyone, 
and they are not dependent on the duties observed by others. This is because if someone 
did not have a duty not to deprive another from a human right, that right would not be 
secured (Kolstad, 2008, p. 572; Shue, 1988, p. 690). They are also general duties, insofar 
as they can be provided to everyone and are not weakened by special relations (Pogge, 
2008, p. 137; Shue, 1988, p. 689). For example, we all have a negative duty not to harm 
others and we need to discharge this duty whether or not they are our compatriots, our 
family or part of any other group with who we share a special relation.  
Frequently, negative duties are related to inaction or refraining from performing 
an action. For example, to fulfil my negative duty not to kill, I must simply refrain from 
murdering another person. Sometimes, however, negative duties require positive actions 
to fulfil (Pogge, 2010b, p. 193). For example, if a corporation is releasing highly 
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poisonous fumes into the air and it wants to fulfil its duty not to kill, it might have to 
actively do something such as investing in new technology to prevent the release of the 
deadly pollutants. Thus, while the corporation bears a negative duty not to kill, this 
triggers the obligation or derivative positive duty to invest in new technology.  
By contrast, straightforwardly positive duties are ones that require a moral agent 
to perform certain actions or provide something to protect, secure or fulfil the rights of 
others (Caney, 2005, p. 64; Kolstad, 2008, p. 572; Shue, 1988, p. 689). They require the 
expenditure of some resource that is already in someone’s possession, such as money or 
time, so that fulfilling them can feel more burdensome than fulfilling a negative duty. 
Though it is also the case that fulfilling negative duties can require positive expenditure 
and related action. Providing police protection, for example, requires the payment of 
taxes (Shue, 1996, pp. 51-55). While negative duties fall upon everyone, positive duties 
need to be divided among capable moral agents and delimited according to some specific 
criteria (Kolstad, 2008, p. 574; Shue, 1988, pp. 690-691). Comparatively, negative duties 
are considered to be more stringent than positive duties when what is at stake for all 
concerned is held constant (Pogge, 2007, p. 74; 2008, p. 140). For example, the duty not 
to injure someone is more stringent than the duty to prevent injuries caused by someone 
else; however, his does not convey that we do not have a duty to prevent someone from 
being injured if we can do so, for example, by anonymously calling the police. Rather, it 
means that when what is at stake is similar, negative duties have overriding moral 
relevance.      
Pogge usefully identifies a third category of ‘intermediate duties’, which entail 
averting harms that one’s past conduct may cause in the future (2005c, p. 34). These 
duties do not comfortably fit into the traditional positive/negative dichotomy: “they are 
positive insofar as they require the agent to do something and also negative insofar as this 
requirement is continuous with the duty to avoid causing harm to others. One might call 
them intermediate duties, in recognition also of their intermediate stringency” (Pogge, 
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2005c, p. 34). For example, if I have failed to discharge my negative duty not to 
physically injure someone, my intermediate duty is activated and in consequence, I will 
be required to ensure that the injury I caused will produce further harm. I can discharge 
my intermediate duty, for example, by calling an ambulance or administering first aid. In 
this scenario, my intermediate duty to assist the person that I injured would be greater 
than the positive duty of a bystander to provide aid, all else being equal. 
Within the literature on business and human rights, there is a tendency to use 
the term ‘respect human rights’ to convey the idea of not doing harm or not violating 
human rights.36 For example, in his 2008 report to the UN Human Rights Council, 
Ruggie states: “[…] to respect rights essentially means not to infringe on the rights of 
others –put simply, to do no harm” (emphasis added) (2008, p. 19). Also, in principle 6 of 
the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,37 it is 
stated that: “failure [of the state] to perform any one of these three obligations [to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights], constitutes a violation of such rights” (emphasis added) 
(United Nations, 1997). It is important to note here that ‘harming’ and ‘violating human 
right’s are not exact synonyms. Harming someone involves making a person worse-off 
than she would have been. Harms can be understood as shortfalls a person suffers, and 
they might or might not relate to human rights. For example, one might harm someone 
else’s health, which corresponds to a human right, but one can also harm someone else’s 
finances through offering informal, ill-conceived, though well-intentioned advice. That 
would not necessarily correspond to a human rights violation. For the purposes of this 
thesis ‘harming’ or ‘doing harm’ will be understood to refer to human rights, and 
therefore it will be used as a synonym of ‘violating human rights’. Also, in line with the 
                                                       
36 Note, however that the interchangeable use of the terms ‘refrain from harming’ and ‘respect’ has not 
remain unchallenged (see Karp, forthcoming 2014). 
37 The Maastricht Guidelines were conceived in a workshop organised in Maastricht, Netherlands on 
January 1997 to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Maastricht Guidelines were designed 
with the purpose of supplementing the Limburg Principles, identifying and understanding the violations to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and providing recommendations to 
monitor these rights are respected. 
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current literature on business and human rights, “avoid doing harm” and “respect 
human rights” will be interchangeably used. 
 Moral and Legal Conceptions of Human Rights 3.3.
 
Two conceptions of rights are central to this thesis. These are rights as moral 
claims, and rights as recognised in national and international legal instruments. The 
moral conception holds that human rights are a set of entitlements all human beings have 
simply in virtue of their humanity (Shue, 1988, p. 687; Buchanan, 2004, pp. 121-122; 
Campbell, 2004, p. 12; Griffin, 2004, pp. 33-35; Caney, 2005, p. 64; Pogge, 2005a, p. 17). 
They have high, if not overriding moral importance by common acceptance (Campbell, 
2004, p. 12; Pogge, 2010b, p. 10) because they express ultimate moral concerns relevant 
to all human beings, and as such, they should not normally be violated in pursue of other 
goals (Campbell, 2004, p. 22). Therefore, their conception is restricted to certain vital 
human interests. Something cannot be a human right just because it is desirable or good; 
it needs to be morally very important to be considered as such (Campbell, 2004, p. 19). 
Although there is no consensus on which rights should be included as moral human 
rights, a good account is provided by Buchanan (2004, pp. 128-129). He argues that there 
exists some basic human rights, whose violation pose the most serious threat to living a 
decent life, and if respected they protect the most crucial interests of human beings. 
These rights are the right to life; the right to security of the person; the right against 
enslavement and involuntary servitude; the rights of due process and equality before the 
law; the right of freedom from religious persecution; the right to freedom of expression; 
the right to association; the right against persecution and against the most dangerous and 
systematic discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation 
(Buchanan, 2004, p. 129). 
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 These rights are often formulated as demands against the state. Pogge, however, 
offers a more nuanced institutional understanding of human rights, which he conceives 
primarily as claims on a range of coercive social institutions and secondarily as claims 
against those who uphold such institutions, especially those who are more influential and 
privileged (2005b, p. 15; 2008, pp. 50-51). Social institutions are understood as a “[…] 
public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, 
powers and immunities, and the like” (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 47-48). Thus “a human right to 
X entails the demand that insofar as reasonably possible, any coercive institution be so 
designed that all human beings affected by them have secure access to X” (Pogge, 2008, 
p. 52). This view thus presupposes the existence of social institutions and an institutional 
order, which are regarded as crucial factors for securing and impeding the access to the 
objects of human rights.    
On the other hand, legal human rights refer to the rights recognised in the law 
and which can be enforced by judicial or administrative mechanisms. Human rights as 
moral rights can act as the motivation behind the enactment of legal human rights (Sen, 
2004, p. 319), and frequently legal human rights have a direct moral counterpart that has 
inspired them. An example is the moral human right that recognises human life as a 
universal interest, which has motivated the generation of a legal right to life embodied in 
Article 3 of the UDHR. However sometimes moral rights do not give origin to legal 
rights, for example, in the cases of rights that present practical difficulties to be realised or 
rights that are not widely accepted, such as the rights of the unborn. Therefore, the fact 
that moral rights are not automatically legal rights and vice-versa means that some moral 
rights might not be legally recognised, or that certain human rights that are legally 
recognised might not actually be moral rights (Risse, 2005, p. 9).  
Some legal rights cannot be justified by appealing to a corresponding moral right, 
but to their instrumental value in protecting it, hence they are called “instrumental 
rights”. “In some cases, the best justification for recognizing a legal right to X is not that 
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it is the legal counterpart of a moral right to X, but rather that including X as a legal right 
best serves to protect some moral right to Y” (Buchanan, 2004, p. 145). One example is 
the (legal) human right to a democratic government. While a moral counterpart to this 
potential right is not straightforward, it has been argued that democracy might be 
recognised as a human right because it is the most reliable and effective way of ensuring 
that other established human rights are guaranteed (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 142-147; Caney, 
2005, pp. 75, 125, 185; Christiano, 2011; Sen, 1999, pp. 5, 51-53, 146-159, 178-188). 38 
While moral rights can have legal counterparts, neither their existence nor their validity 
depends on their recognition. Contrary to legal rights, moral rights exist independently of 
whether or not they are incorporated into legal systems (Buchanan, 2004, p. 145; 
Campbell, 2004, pp. 17, 30). Even in cases when certain rights are being systematically 
violated or lack any legal recognition, it does not mean that people do not have moral 
rights. Indeed, it is this independence that allows moral rights to serve as a benchmark 
for questioning and reforming legal rights (Buchanan, 2004, p. 119). 
 Human Rights, States and Non-State Actors 3.3.1.
 
The state has been traditionally considered to be the main, if not the only, duty-
bearer in relation to human rights (Griffin, 2004, p. 12; Lafont, 2010, p. 198; Seppala, 
2009, p. 402). The view that the state is the sole or main duty-bearer in relation to human 
rights can be traced, in large part, to the historical context in which the human rights 
regime was developed and by the configuration of the international legal system. The 
core of the current international human rights regime is embodied in the International 
                                                       
38 According to Buchanan (2004, pp. 143-144) and Sen (1999, p. 152), the accountability mechanisms present 
in democratic states tend to prevent persistent mismanagements of economic resources as well as violations 
of human rights. Given that democratic governments are subject to periodic democratic elections, they have 
high incentives to represent the actual interests of their citizens, which also allows them to have more moral 
weight in the international arena (Buchanan, 2004, p. 144; Sen, 1999, p. 152) 
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Bill of Human Rights,39 which as earlier mentioned, consists of three documents: the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948 by the United 
Nations General Assembly; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1976), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1976). 40 
These agreements were created in the aftermath of the two world wars, which 
were characterised by the brutality of some governments against their own populations 
and their colonial territories. Therefore, the primary focus of human rights was 
protecting individuals against the abuse of state power (Beitz, 2009, p. 44; Campbell, 
2004, pp. 12, 14; Cragg, 2000, p. 205; 2004, p. 105; De Brabandere, 2010, p. 74; Karp, 
2013, p. 21; McCorquodale & Simons, 2007, p. 599; Muchlinski, 2001, pp. 32-34; 
Reinisch, 2005, p. 38; Weissbrodt & Kruger, 2003, p. 901; Wettstein & Waddock, 2005, 
p. 305). While states were considered to be the main threat to these rights, they were also 
regarded as their guarantors, given that states have traditionally enjoyed superior powers 
and capacities compared to other actors (Buchanan & Decamp, 2006, p. 104; Wettstein 
& Waddock, 2005, p. 305). 
The state-centric approach to human rights is also consistent with the 
consideration of states as the only subjects of public international law,41 i.e., entities 
endowed with international legal personality, which can bear rights and duties under the 
international legal system (Cheng, 1991, p. 24; ICHRP, 2002, p. 2; Reinisch, 2005, p. 70; 
Wells & Elias, 2005, p. 145). This characteristic can be explained by the fact that modern 
                                                       
39 Other treaties are commonly cited as contributing to the core of international legal human rights: the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 1969), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1981), the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT, 1987), and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1990) (Campbell, 2004, p. 26). 
40  The Covenants are legally binding upon the states that have ratified them. All the United Nations 
members have ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights except for Belize, Comoros, 
Cuba, Palau, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, and the United States (United Nations, 1966b). China, 
Comoros, Cuba, Nauru, Palau, Sao Tome and Principe, and St. Lucia have not ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966a). 
41 Public international law should not be confused with private international law. The former is concerned 
with the relations among sovereign states while the latter addresses the problem of conflicting jurisdictions. 
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public international law was partly conceived to legitimise the nascent nation-state 
system after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Charney, 1983, pp. 758-759). Hence, 
public international law has been concerned with regulating the relations among states, 
while all other actors indirectly interact with it through their national governments and 
legislations (Charney, 1983, p. 753; Duruigbo, 2003, p. 192).  
Under the current structure of public international law, only states have 
responsibilities to protect human rights, including the obligation to protect against rights 
violations by non-state actors within their jurisdiction. 42  Several international 
conventions require states to sanction the behaviour of non-state actors via national 
legislation, particularly in sensitive areas such as transnational organised crime, bribery, 
terrorist financing and environmental damage43 (Murray, Kinley, & Pitts, 2011, p. 85). 
The responsibilities of non-state actors are considered essentially obligations of “[…] 
domestic civil or criminal law, backed by the international legal obligation of the state to 
ensure effective protection of the human rights of the individuals under its jurisdiction” 
(De Brabandere, 2010, p. 74). If states fail to provide reasonable mechanisms to prevent 
and redress human rights violations from non-state actors, they might be held responsible 
for violations even in cases in which no state officials were involved (McCorquodale & 
Forgia, 2001, pp. 198-199; Muchlinski, 2001, p. 32; ICHRP, 2002, pp. 51-54; 
McCorquodale & Simons, 2007, p. 599; McCorquodale, 2009, p. 387; Ruggie, 2013, p. 
84).  
The central idea of modern international human rights is that states must satisfy 
certain conditions in the treatment of their population (Beitz, 2009, p. 13). Therefore, 
legal and political studies of human rights had focused on discussing the identity of the 
                                                       
42  Frequently jurisdiction is considered very closely related to territory, however “territory” and 
“jurisdiction” are not synonym concepts (see McCorquodale & Simons, 2007, pp. 602-605). 
43 For example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women asks 
states “[…] to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise […]” (United Nations, 2009). Also, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination says that states should legislate to bring to an end “[…] 
racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization […]” (United Nations, 1965). 
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right-holders and the content of rights, while examining the identity of potential duty-
bearers, besides the state, has been largely neglected (De Brabandere, 2010; Kolstad, 
2008, p. 570; Kuper, 2005, p. ix; Lafont, 2010, p. 199; O'Neill, 2001, p. 183). However, 
since the beginning of the 21st century, the issue of human rights and non-state actors has 
been pushed to the forefront of legal and political debates44 (De Brabandere, 2010, p. 68; 
Sorell, 2004, p. 137). The blooming interest on the subject has partly emerged as a 
response to a perceived shift in the distribution of power between the states and non-state 
actors. The latter will be understood here as all those actors that are not states or their 
representatives, that operate at the international level and are consequential to 
international politics. Some examples would include international non-governmental 
organisations, transnational corporations and global social movements (O'Neill, 2001, p. 
191; Alston, 2005, pp. 14-16).  
It has become widely recognised that some non-state actors can rival the 
economic and organisational powers of states (Donaldson, 1989, p. 163; Cragg, 2004, p. 
106; Nussbaum, 2004, p. 4; Pariotti, 2008, pp. 140-141; Buhmann, 2009, p. 7; 
McCorquodale, 2009, p. 387; De Brabandere, 2010, p. 76), enabling them to interfere 
with the realisation of human rights, but also putting them in a position to play a role in 
protecting and fulfilling them (Wettstein & Waddock, 2005, p. 306; Lafont, 2010, p. 201). 
The next section will present the two main positions on the responsibilities of TNCs 
under international law. 
 
  
                                                       
44 An entire journal Non-State Actors and International Law, as well as book series such as Ashgate’s Non-State 
Actors in International Law, Politics and Governance have been devoted to examining this topic. In addition, 
some of the most important associations of Political Science and International Relations, the American 
Political Science Association (APSA), the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and the 
International Studies Association (ISA) have organised conferences and workshops on this topic. 
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 Holding Transnational Corporations Accountable Under 3.4.
International Law 
 
The first, which I will call the “statist legal approach”, conforms to the 
traditional conception of the state as the main duty-bearer in relation to human rights. It 
contends that while TNCs have significantly increased their power in recent years, their 
involvement in human rights violations can be explained to a large extent by the lack of 
enforceability of legal and coercive mechanisms that states have at their disposal to 
protect the rights of their populations. Thus, this view argues, in order to bridge the 
existing governance gap, it is necessary to address the responsibilities of home and host 
countries instead of just transposing their obligations to corporations (De Brabandere, 
2010, pp. 67, 76). 
This view informs some documents endorsed by the United Nations such as the 
Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (see Section 2.5.3) and the Maastricht 
Guidelines. Both documents emphasise the role of the state as the main entity 
responsible for protecting and guaranteeing the realisation of human rights. “The first 
pillar of the UN Framework is the state duty to protect against human rights abuses 
committed by third parties, including business, through appropriate policies, regulation 
and adjudication” (Ruggie, 2010b, p. 2). Similarly, the Maastricht Guidelines reaffirm 
that violations of rights are imputable to the state within whose jurisdiction they occur, 
and that in order to address them, it is necessary to deal with the accountability of 
governments for failing to meet their obligations (United Nations, 1997). According, to 
guideline 18,  
The obligation to protect includes the State's responsibility to ensure 
that private entities or individuals, including transnational corporations 
over which they exercise jurisdiction, do not deprive individuals of their 
economic, social and cultural rights. States are responsible for violations 
of economic, social and cultural rights that result from their failure to 
exercise due diligence in controlling the behaviour of such non-state 
actors (United Nations, 1997). 
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Part of the appeal of both documents is that they provide guidelines to address 
human rights violations that are consistent with the accepted principles of international 
law. However, they offer limited guidance in cases when host states do not have enough 
resources to fulfil their duties, leaving the rights of the affected population effectively 
unprotected and creating a perverse incentive for corporations to operate in parts of the 
world where governments lack enough capabilities. This is a relevant obstacle 
particularly within the extractive and labour intensive industries, because corporations 
tend to locate their operations in developing countries, some of which have limited 
organisational and economic capacities to oblige corporations to comply with existing 
laws. 
One of the proposed solutions to this problem is reframing the concept of 
jurisdiction. Instead of associating jurisdiction with the territory where a company 
operates, it could convey the notion of effective power, control or authority that the 
home state can exercise. This could open the possibility of applying the principle of 
extraterritoriality in cases of corporate abuse, allowing the allocation of some 
responsibilities to the home state for the conduct of their national corporations abroad 
(McCorquodale & Simons, 2007). Nonetheless, the prevailing notion of jurisdiction is 
still very closely associated with territory and thus, when a company abuses human rights, 
host states can be considered to be breaching their legal obligations if they fail to take 
appropriate steps to prevent or punish them (Ruggie, 2013, p. 84). 
The statist legal view thus ascribes to states the duties to protect, promote, and 
fulfil human rights, and to provide redress when harm has been done. This is 
summarised in the third pillar of the UN Framework, which states that “as part of their 
duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse, states must take appropriate 
steps within their territory and/or jurisdiction to ensure that when such abuses occur, 
those affected have access to effective remedy through judicial, administrative, legislative 
or other appropriate means” (Ruggie, 2010b, p. 3). This does not mean that corporations 
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do not have any duties towards human rights, but they are limited to avoiding “[…] 
infringing on the rights of other, and addressing harms that do occur” (Ruggie, 2010b, p. 
2). 
In contrast, what I call the “non-statist legal approach” argues that TNCs 
already enjoy certain legal personality, and therefore they can bear responsibilities 
directly under international law (Muchlinski, 2001; ICHRP, 2002, p. 57; Reinisch, 2005, 
pp. 42, 43, 74, 75; Wells & Elias, 2005, p. 145; Clapham, 2006, p. 28).  This approach 
proposes to stretch the concept of ‘subject of international law’ to include certain non-
state actors in order to enable international law to adapt to the complexity of the global 
arena, to respond to the raising power of entities such as TNCs, and to address cases of 
human rights harms involving parties subject to different jurisdictions. This approach 
contends that, while states have been traditionally considered the main bearers of human 
rights duties, there are no fundamental legal obstacles to the inclusion of other actors 
(Charney, 1983, p. 762; Duruigbo, 2003, p. 195). However, this does not mean that non-
state actors would be treated on par with the state, which has exclusive rights and 
privileges such as law-making power, the right to send and received diplomatic missions, 
to conclude agreements, to engage in armed conflicts, and to enjoy sovereign immunity 
within the jurisdiction of other state (Cheng, 1991, p. 38). Instead, this change would 
allow them to bear responsibilities directly under international law  (see Cheng, 1991, p. 
23; Duruigbo, 2003, p. 194; Alston, 2005, pp. 19-20; Reinisch, 2005, pp. 70-71; Wells & 
Elias, 2005, p. 150; Nolan & Taylor, 2009; Murray, Kinley, & Pitts, 2011, p. 85).  
According to the non-statist legal view, this is not an unreasonable stretch, given 
that corporations have been participating de facto in the international legal system through 
signing bilateral investment agreements with states (Charney, 1983, p. 762; Duruigbo, 
2003, pp. 198-199). Further, corporations have long enjoyed “international corporate 
human rights” aimed at protecting them against the abuses of the state (Muchlinski, 2001, 
pp. 32, 33; 2007, p. 506). For example, the European Court of Human Rights has heard 
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cases involving alleged violations of human rights against corporations. In addition, 
corporations have been held to possess several rights, including rights to a fair trial, to 
free speech and to privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
(Muchlinski, 2001, p. 33). Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR establishes that “every 
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions […]” 
(Council of Europe, 2010, p. 31), where the term ‘legal person’ includes corporations. 
The non-statist legal view thus argues that TNCs can be considered subjects of 
international law and can also bear responsibilities under it (see Reinisch, 2005, pp. 42-
43; Wells & Elias, 2005, p. 145). There are four main arguments to support this claim. 
First, while the state has been considered the main threat to human rights, non-state 
actors such as corporations, political party organisations and individuals have also been 
involved in human rights violations (Buchanan, 2004, p. 123; Murray, Kinley, & Pitts, 
2011, p. 85; Reinisch, 2005, p. 70; Weissbrodt, 2005, p. 58). Thus, if non-state actors 
have become capable of participating in violations of human rights, it is appropriate to 
allocate to them certain responsibilities similar to the state’s and to hold them 
accountable for their participation in human rights violations (Clapham, 2006, p. 28; 
ICHRP, 2002, p. 57; Reinisch, 2005, pp. 74-75). 
The second argument focuses on ways in which some international documents 
already attribute responsibilities to TNCs, 45  including the International Labour 
Organization’s Tripartite Declaration, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which in its preamble requires “every individual and organ of society” to 
promote respect for these rights and this includes corporations (Henkin, 1999, pp. 24-25; 
Mayer, 2009, p. 568; Muchlinski, 2001, p. 40; Weissbrodt, 2005, pp. 60-61; Wells & 
                                                       
45 However, critics maintain that these documents do not attribute responsibilities to corporations but to 
states to take measures to ensure liability of TNCs and criminalise certain behaviour (De Brabandere, 2010, 
p. 82). 
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Elias, 2005, p. 151; Wettstein, 2012a, p. 743). 46  A third argument rests on the 
consideration that the traditional private-public division has been blurred by the effective 
privatisation of some areas that were considered to be part of the public sector (Clapham, 
2006). According to this view, the involvement of non-state actors in functions that 
traditionally belonged exclusively to the state47 provides grounds to extrapolate human 
rights duties to the private sphere and apply them directly to corporations through 
instruments of public international law (Clapham, 2006, pp. 68-69).  
A fourth argument holds that there are strong precedents for attributing 
responsibilities to non-state actors under international law that date from the end of the 
Second World War. In the Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946), several German corporations 
were judged responsible in international military tribunals for their involvement in crimes 
against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes,48 the chemical company IG 
Farben49 being the most notorious case50 (Ishay, 2008, p. 218). In 1947, the United States 
                                                       
46 It has also been argued that even if the body of the Declaration is legally binding, the preamble of 
international legal documents is not. Hence, transnational corporations as “organs of society” do not bear 
international legal responsibilities under the Declaration (Ruggie, 2007a, p. 12). 
47  For example, the UK-based transnational corporation Serco participates in areas such as defence, 
immigration, education, transport, health, housing benefits and welfare services across the world (Serco, 
2012). Among its functions, the company trains UK’s national security personnel and provides armed forces 
as well as prisons and custodial services to a number of countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia and 
the United States. In the United Kingdom it manages the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), which is 
in charge of “[…] providing and maintaining the warheads for the country’s nuclear deterrent” (Atomic 
Weapons Establishment, 2012) and operates two immigration removal centres on behalf of the Home 
Office's UK Border Agency. Serco currently operates 7 immigration removal centres and 5 immigration 
detention centres in Australia. Other areas in which the company has participation are health and welfare 
systems. In the United Kingdom, Serco has taken over some of the NHS’s pathology laboratories and 
community hospitals and has gained participation managing the welfare system through programmes such as 
Flexible New Deal and The Work Programme. In the United States, Serco works with the Department of 
State for the provision of visas and with local and municipal governments for which it runs a range of 
services including transportation and traffic management, parking meter operations, driver licencing, road 
maintenance, street lighting and refuse collection (Serco, 2012). 
48 The crimes against peace included planning, initiation and waging of wars of aggression in violation of 
international treaties and agreements. Crimes against humanity included extermination, deportation and 
genocides; and war crimes referred to violations of the laws of war, a common plan to conspiracy to commit 
criminal acts against peace, against humanity and war crimes (Ishay, 2008, p. 218). 
49 The laboratories of IG Farben, with the participation of several prominent scientists provided to the Nazis 
oil, rubber, nitrates and fibres. They also produced vaccines, drugs such as aspirin, as well as poison gases 
and rocket fuels (Borkin, 1979, p. 5). 
50 Other German corporations included Krupp Steelworks and Flick Concern, a large group of industrial 
enterprises including coal and iron mines as well as steel plants. 
Chapter 3: The Legal Responsibilities of TNCs 
   
 
67 
filed an indictment against 24 of the highest executives51 of IG Farben for their direct and 
active collaboration with the Nazi regime (Borkin, 1979, p. 108). They faced charges of 
preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other countries, 
plunder and spoliation, as well as slavery and mass murder (Borkin, 1979, pp. 108-109, 
121-122). This case set an important precedent, namely that not only states but also non-
state actors can be subjects of international law and that corporations can be held liable 
for their complicity in human rights violations. Since then, responsibilities to non-state 
actors, particularly individuals, have been ascribed under international law, but only in 
cases of egregious human rights violations, for example, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 
and war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.52 The non-statist 
legal view nonetheless holds that it is possible to extend the attribution of legal duties to 
TNCs beyond egregious violations of human rights. 
The above should offer reason to believe that corporations are able to bear some 
responsibilities under international law. The next section will present the most recent 
debates regarding the specific content of such responsibilities. 
 The International Legal Responsibilities of TNCs  3.5.
 
While states and TNCs share some characteristics, it cannot be simply assumed 
that both bear the same legal duties. The responsibilities allocated to corporations need to 
reflect their distinct capacities, roles and purposes. Simply extending state duties to 
corporations effectively ignores the differences between the natures of both entities 
(Ratner, 2001, p. 493; Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 961; Zerk, 2006, pp. 79, 83). 
                                                       
51 The highest executives included the chairman of the supervisory board, the chairman of the managing 
board, 18 other members of the board and 4 officials. They received sentences that ranged from one and a 
half years to eight years in prison (Borkin, 1979, p. 108). 
52 Both the International Criminal Court of Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia were established to prosecute under international law those responsible individuals for the 
Rwandan Genocide of 1994 and war crimes that took case in the former territory of Yugoslavia during the 
1990s.  In the case of Yugoslavia, the Tribunal has been of the opinion that  “[…] guilt should be 
individualised [in order to protect] entire communities from being labelled as ‘collectively responsible’” 
(ICTY, 2013). 
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Determining the duties of corporations that reflect a balance between individual liberties 
and business interests has, however, proved challenging, leading two commentators to go 
so far as to say that, while it is possible to discern an international legal framework to 
hold corporations accountable, the content of the law is “wholly absent” (Kinley & 
Tadaki, 2004, p. 948).  
Nonetheless it is possible to provide some general principles regarding the 
content of the responsibilities that corporations can be attributed (see Kinley & Tadaki, 
2004; Ratner, 2001). It is generally accepted that TNCs bear at least negative duties to 
avoid violating human rights and avoid being complicit in their violation (Ratner, 2001, 
pp. 511-512). It is argued that some rights can only be infringed by the state, for example, 
the right of equality before the law, the right to nationality, the right to marry, the right to 
vote and run for public office.53 Therefore, they give precedence to complicity-based 
duties for corporations (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 967; Ratner, 2001, p. 512). However, 
the case of Chevron in Ecuador exemplifies that a corporation can directly infringe upon 
the right of equality before the law and the right to a fair trial. Since 1993, Chevron has 
been in court for its involvement in oil contamination in Ecuador that resulted in 
environmental pollution and related illness and deaths. Chevron has used many judicial 
and extra-judicial tactics to try to have the case dismissed. Many of these do not involve 
a relationship with government, e.g., public relations campaigns, legal suits in the United 
States to force Ecuador into binding arbitration, and counter-suits against claimants 
(ChevronToxico, 2013b) 
Corporations can, however, directly violate other rights, for example, the right 
to life, giving scope to other duties beyond avoiding complicity (Ratner, 2001, pp. 512-
513). In relation to these rights, corporations have at least a negative duty to avoid doing 
harm. This can then engender some derivative positive duties necessary for compliance 
                                                       
53 These rights correspond to those recognised on articles 7, 15, 16 and 21 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
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with the principal duty. For example, the right against torture may generate a derivative 
positive duty for corporations in the extractive industry to train their security personnel 
to prevent torture (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 966; Ratner, 2001, p. 516). They also may 
be required to ensure that third parties with whom they are associated do not violate 
rights (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 969). According to the typology proposed by Kinley 
and Tadaki, these duties arise from two distinctive categories of rights: core rights and 
direct impact rights (2004, p. 968). Core rights refer to “the most fundamental rights” 
that every person and collective entity must respect and protect; these are the rights to life, 
liberty and physical integrity. The second set of rights, the “direct impact rights” refer to 
those rights that fall squarely into the TNCs’ spheres of activity and influence, and which 
are more susceptible to corporate abuse. These include labour rights, environmental 
rights and rights of indigenous peoples (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 968).  
Positive duties may also arise from the proximity between the company and 
those affected by its operations. Therefore, it is possible to attribute to TNCs duties to 
protect the welfare of their employees and the members of nearby communities, and to 
ensure that other actors, including the state, do not violate their rights (ICHRP, 2002, p. 
138; Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 965). The closer the proximity between the corporation 
and those affected, the greater the duties towards them (Ratner, 2001, pp. 516-517; 
ICHRP, 2002, p. 136; Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, pp. 963-965;). Positive duties can also 
arise from the influence and leverage that the corporation has over third parties. 
Therefore, it is possible to require corporations to ensure that their business partners, 
subsidiaries, subcontractors and suppliers do not violate human rights. This duty is 
greater if companies have contractual relations that allow them some leverage to 
influence their conduct (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 965). Furthermore, in cases where 
companies have de facto replaced the government and have state-like functions, they can 
be allocated a wider range of responsibilities (ICHRP, 2002, p. 138). “In such situations, 
they effectively step into the shoes of governments and should be required to fulfil duties 
Chapter 3: The Legal Responsibilities of TNCs 
   
 
70 
more akin to those of states” (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 965). Thus, these duties do not 
arise from the company’s proximity to those affected or from their primary negative 
duties, but from the role that the company is playing within a particular context.  
Corporations have several mechanisms at their disposal to discharge their 
positive duties. For example, they can incorporate human rights principles in their 
contracts and monitor their compliance (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 972). They can 
contribute to protecting labour rights by providing workers and workers’ unions with 
access to information, encouraging the development of organised labour and proving 
means to secure children’s human rights (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, pp. 973-982). They can 
contribute to the protection of environmental rights by disclosing information about their 
activities that may adversely impact on the environment, allowing members of local 
communities to participate in environmental decision-making and refraining from 
impeding access to justice if they have caused environmental damage (Kinley & Tadaki, 
2004, pp. 985-986). Corporations can also contribute to the protection of the rights of 
indigenous populations by facilitating their engagement at all levels of corporate 
decision-making when they are affected, by ensuring equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from the utilisation of the indigenous knowledge and practices, and by ensuring 
adequate compensation in case of relocation (Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, pp. 990-993).  
Regarding the promotion of human rights, two views can be distinguished. One 
position argues that the state is the main actor responsible for promoting human rights, 
as that is one of its key purposes. The duty is seen as significantly attenuated for 
corporations, whose key purpose is generating profits. Thus, while encouraging 
corporations to promote human rights, especially when they operate in countries with 
poor human rights records, can be considered as a good policy, extending “[…] their 
duty away from a dictum of ‘doing no harm’ […] toward one of proactive steps to 
promote human rights outside their sphere of influence seems inconsistent with the 
reality of the corporate enterprise” (Ratner, 2001, p. 518). In contrast, the second view 
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holds that, even if a key purpose of the government is promoting human rights, “[…] 
there is simply no reason why TNCs should not be obliged to take steps […] to provide 
for and to promote human rights, when such steps are within their power and jurisdiction” 
(Kinley & Tadaki, 2004, p. 966). This view would see responsibility to promote human 
rights protections as arising directly from ability, with little attention given to the nature 
of the rights-promoting actor. 
In part in response to such discord on the perceived content of the duties that 
can be allocated to TNCs under international law, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General, John Ruggie, was mandated to identify and clarify the content of the 
responsibilities that corporations already bear under treaties, soft law instruments and 
voluntary initiatives of corporate social responsibility. 
 The Responsibilities of TNCs Under the Protect, Respect and 3.6.
Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights 
 
As a result of this process, in 2008, Ruggie proposed the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework. According to the three pillars of the Framework, corporations’ 
primary duties involve negative ones to respect human rights, i.e. avoid doing harm in 
the course of their activities and avoid being complicit in harms. This is consistent with 
the duties recognised in soft law mechanisms such as the OECD Guidelines noted in the 
previous chapter, and with the commitments corporations take on when joining the 
Global Compact54 (Ruggie, 2008, p. 8). The negative duties would involve not only 
refraining from causing harm, but they may also require from corporations acting in a 
certain way. For example, corporations may be required to practice due diligence in 
order to become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights impacts they may 
                                                       
54 In the letter of commitment corporations send to join the Global Compact, they commit to support its ten 
principles, including supporting and respecting the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights 
and ensuring that they are not complicit in human rights abuses (UNGC, 2013f).   
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cause, for example, by adopting a human rights policy tracking their performance 
according to it (Ruggie, 2008, pp. 17-19). On the other hand, the UN Framework rejects 
the notion that corporations may have strong positive duties to protect human rights, 
since under both treaty-based and customary human rights law, states are considered to 
be responsible to protect against third-party abuse (Ruggie, 2007a, pp. 11-14; 2007b, p. 
830; 2013, p. 84). Thus, the conclusions of the Framework align with the statist legal 
view, whose main tenets have been challenged with some success as described in Section 
3.4 above.  
Further, while a key purpose of the UN Framework was to provide an 
authoritative clarification of the duties that TNCs already bear in legal and quasi-legal 
instruments, it also offers some guidelines from moral or broader normative grounds. 
Corporate responsibility to respect is said to correspond not only to a legal duty, but to 
baseline expectations that society has for business, which Ruggie describes as “social 
norms” that 
 […] exist over and above compliance with laws and regulations. A 
social norm expresses a collective sense of ‘oughtness’ with regard to 
the expected conduct of social actors, distinguishing between 
permissible and impermissible acts in given circumstances; and it is 
accompanied by some probability that deviations from the norm will be 
socially stationed, even if only by widespread opprobrium (2013, pp. 91-
92). 
The compliance with social norms, Ruggie says, is additional to compliance 
with national laws, and failure to meet them could subject corporations “to the courts of 
public opinion” instead of, or in addition to, legal penalties (2008, pp. 16-17).  This, 
however, is a very limited application of moral grounds, focused on existing societal 
norms, and it can give only limited guidance on the content of TNC duties. We can note 
that the rights specified in the International Bill of Human Rights may be inconsistent 
with some local customs or social practices. Thus, at minimum, broader moral principles 
underpinning the legal rights must be considered as a means of adjudicating between 
legal rights and local norms. Overall, while TNCs and other actors certainly should be 
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cognisant of local practices and sensitive to local input, attention to such practices itself 
cannot provide an adequately comprehensive moral ground for the allocation of TNC 
duties correlative to human rights.  
Further, while the Framework establishes that in all situations corporations 
ought to respect human rights it is nonetheless unclear what this responsibility entails 
when states are unwilling or unable to create and enforce laws to protect human rights 
(Arnold, 2010, p. 382). This problem can be partly explained by the fact that the 
Framework largely draws from the existing instruments of international law, which are 
not sufficiently developed to deal with these issues. As Ruggie notes, “the human rights 
regime cannot function as intended in the unique circumstances of sporadic or sustained 
violence, governance breakdown and absence of the rule of law” (2008, p. 13). In less 
comprehensively conflictual situations also, poorer states may have weak capacity to 
actually promote and protect human rights.  Establishing what the duties of corporations 
entail in challenging contexts is crucial, precisely because in these contexts human rights 
are more at risk, and because many TNCs operate within poorer states. 
In such cases the Framework is vague and only recommends establishing 
“specific policy innovations” to prevent corporate abuse (Ruggie, 2008, p. 14). However, 
reliance on international law and policy innovations cannot take us very far as long as 
the duties of corporations are not clarified. The UN Framework tried to provide such 
clarification, but its reliance on the international law necessarily restrict their 
development because the principles of international law have been developed on the 
premise that states are the only relevant actors at the global level. The Framework tried 
to overcome this restriction by also providing moral grounds to such responsibility. 
However, by equating them to  “social expectations” the Special Representative obscured 
rather than clarified. 
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This chapter has presented some of the recent developments regarding the status 
of corporations in international law. This debate is crucial for the development of legal 
mechanisms to hold TNCs accountable and to provide practical outlets to solve some of 
the issues associated with the governance gap. Nonetheless, determining the content of 
the responsibilities that can be allocated to corporations is also key in order to provide 
substance to the demands that can be placed upon corporations and states. The UN 
Framework has tried to provide an authoritiative interpretation of the duties of 
corporations based on mechansisms of international law and voluntary initiatives. 
However, the existing legal mechanisms are helpful only up to a point because they are 
not sufficiently equipped to deal with situations where the state does not protect human 
rights, or is weakly empowered to do so.  
Noting this deficiency, the UN Framework has not only based its second pillar, 
the responsibility to respect, in legal but also moral grounds, which the Special 
Representative has identified as “social expectations.” While the legal foundations of the 
Framework have been consistently developed, the moral foundations have not. The next 
chapter will discuss the justifiability of allocating moral duties to TNCs. It will propose 
understanding corporate duties as essentially negative duties to respect human rights and 
will discuss some of the perceived shortcomings of alternative moral views on corporate 
duties.   
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Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no 





The previous chapter presented the main debates on the legal responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and highlighted how scholars have focused mainly on the 
mechanisms to hold corporations accountable at the international level on the content of 
such duties. The latter task is significant, however, in that ascribing specific 
responsibilities to TNCs will naturally require an analysis of the justifiability of the 
demands (Karp, 2009, p. 88). This chapter will work to provide such an analysis. It will 
begin by arguing that transnational corporations are appropriately seen as moral agents 
since they have a collective intention that is different from the intentions of their 
individual components, and they have capacities for moral deliberation and action.  
Then, it will present two contrasting approaches to attributing responsibilities to 
transnational corporations: the fiduciary duties approach and the positive duties 
approach. The former, prevalent in theories of Economics and Business Management, 
argues that TNCs bear mainly duties to their stockholders (Friedman, 1970; Henderson, 
2001a; The Economist, 2005b) and denies that they bear positive duties to protect and 
fulfil human rights. While this approach does not hold that corporations can indulge in 
harming human rights, it argues that respecting rights can largely be reduced to following 
the law. In contrast, the positive duties approach contends that corporations bear 
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negative duties to respect human rights, but also positive duties to protect and fulfil them. 
One strand of this approach, the conditional positive duties approach, holds that when 
the primary agents of justice, states, default on their responsibilities, corporations or 
other actors with the requisite capabilities may be required to act as primary agents of 
justice. In contrast, the non-conditional positive duties approach argues that even when 
the state acts as a primary agent of justice, corporations bear some positive duties. This is 
because 1) corporations have enough leverage, power and/or capabilities to protect and 
fulfil human rights, and 2) corporations act as de facto governance institutions and 
therefore, they can be attributed similar duties to the state.  
Then, the chapter discusses some principled and pragmatic grounds for 
questioning the positive duties approach. On one hand, it is unclear that leverage, power, 
capacities or governance capabilities are enough grounds to attribute positive duties to 
corporations. While having certain capabilities, leverage or power can be considered as 
necessary conditions to attribute duties, it is unclear if they are enough factors to do so. 
In other words, I contend, “can” does not necessarily imply “ought”. This is particularly 
true in the case of corporations, whose profit motive often clashes with the objectives of 
protecting and fulfilling human rights. Also, while most of the largest companies have 
committed to respecting human rights, they have tended to reject the idea that they also 
bear duties to protect and fulfil them, because these are regarded as duties of the state 
only. This does not mean that TNCs cannot be allocated positive duties, but instead it 
suggest that it is not feasible to expect that corporations would willingly discharge 
demanding positive duties simply because they can do so. In turn, compelling 
corporations to do something that they are largely reluctant to do could generate high 
transaction costs for those entities in charge of overseeing them, might leave some of the 
most vulnerable population effectively unprotected and, in short, may not contribute to 
realising human rights.  
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As an alternative, this chapter suggests following an institutional understanding 
of human rights, briefly sketched in Section 3.3.1, which conceptualises human rights as 
claims on coercive social institutions that generate negative duties for their participants to 
avoid collaborating in the imposition of an order that generates foreseeable human rights 
deficits. While it is not denied that corporations may bear some positive duties, it is 
argued that allocating mainly negative duties to TNCs can help overcome efficiency and 
compliance issues as well as more substantive criticisms raised against the justifiability of 
allocating strictly positive duties to corporations.  
 Corporations As Moral Agents 4.2.
 
One of the first points that must be discussed when attributing moral duties to 
TNCs is whether corporate actors have the ontological status necessary to be considered 
moral agents, and therefore whether they can be ascribed moral duties (Erskine, 2001, p. 
72). We can distinguish two main positions on this question: individualist and collectivist. 
Individualists oppose the idea of collective moral agency. They argue that human beings 
are the basic units of ethical reasoning and that intentional action –a fundamental 
criterion for determining moral agency– can only be found in an agent with mental and 
bodily unity, which corporations do not posses (Velasquez, 1983, p. 8). Therefore, for 
individualists, assigning duties to collective actors is at best just another way of referring 
to the actions of individual human beings, or at worst, mere nonsense (Moore, 1999, pp. 
335-338; Erskine, 2001, p. 69).   
Collectivists argue that some groups or institutions share with individuals certain 
relevant attributes that enable them to act and know in an analogous way to individuals, 
and therefore they can be considered as moral agents (French, 1979; 1984; 1999; Moore, 
1999; Corlett, 2001; Erskine, 2003; Arnold, 2006; Pettit, 2007). One of these elements is 
intention, understood as commitment to future action (French, 1979, pp. 211-215; 1996, 
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p. 147; Arnold, 2006). Corporations, it is argued, are capable of performing distinctive 
intentional actions through their internal decision structures, and this process is not 
always reducible to human intentions (French, 1996, pp. 147, 152; Arnold, 2013, p. 132).  
Corporate plans might defer from those that motivate the human 
persons who occupy corporate positions and whose bodily movements 
are necessary for the corporation to act […], we can, however, describe 
the concerted behaviour of those humans as corporate actions done 
with a corporate intention, to execute a corporate plan or as part of such 
a plan (French, 1996, p. 152).  
For example, it is possible to say that corporation X has plans to move somewhere or to 
open a new shop. This does not necessarily entail that existing employees, the ones who 
would have been involved in the planning process, will themselves move or take part in 
the opening (French, 1996, p. 152). Therefore, it is possible to see corporations as distinct 
from their human component parts, and to argue that corporations can have a collective 
intention distinct from the individual intentions of the individuals who constitute them.   
With French (1984) and Corlett (2001, p. 573), we can differentiate between 
‘aggregates’ and ‘conglomerates’, which is similar to the distinction between ‘associations’ 
and ‘institutions’ proposed by Arnold (2013, p. 132). Aggregates are formed by a random 
collection of people without collective purposive action or intention, such as mobs or 
crowds; they are no more than the sum of their parts and, they cannot therefore be 
considered moral agents (Pettit, 2007, p. 195). Conglomerates are organised groups that 
possess identity over time and see themselves as a unit. They have decision-making 
structures and therefore are capable of collective intent and action (Erskine, 2001, p. 72). 
Some examples are families, non-governmental organisations and political parties. A 
corporation can be said to be a collectivity voluntarily formed by individuals working 
together under a common corporate identity conferred by the brand, the company’s 
values, mission, etc. It also has a clear hierarchical structure that specifies the role, 
functions and responsibilities of each employee, and has a clear decisional structure. 
Decisions are taken in a rational manner, considering the purpose and interests of the 
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corporation as a single entity, including self-preservation, growth and continuity of 
operations over time.  
Another element to consider in determining whether a collectivity can be 
considered a moral agent is ‘value relevance’ (Pettit, 2007, p. 177), understood as the 
capability of the agent to act with a certain degree of autonomy when facing a significant 
moral choice. For a group, being autonomous means that it is able to make a judgment 
or form an attitude as a group, to have an identity that is more than the sum of those of 
its constitutive parts (Erskine, 2001, p. 72). A group may qualify as not autonomous by 
failing to be an agent distinct from the agents who are its members (Pettit, 2007, p. 180). 
Corporations in general can be considered to have some autonomy in relation to their 
members, since they incorporate rules that help to distinguish corporate from personal 
decisions of its members, and which are usually embedded in the mission, vision and 
values of the company (French, 1996, p. 151). 
Another requirement for moral agency is the capacity for moral deliberation 
(Erskine, 2001, p. 69) or ‘value judgement’ (Pettit, 2007, p. 177) understood as the 
capacity to access, understand and reflect upon moral requirements. One of the 
characteristics of conglomerates such as corporations is that they have a decision-making 
structure: they are able to gather information, process it, deliberate about it and act 
purposively on it (French, 1984, pp. 5, 10, 13, 46 in Erskine, 2001, p. 71; Green, 2005, p. 
123). It can be argued that corporations have a decision-making mechanism for 
presenting evaluative, option-related propositions for group consideration, for example 
during stockholders’ meetings.  
A further element is the capacity for moral action (Erskine, 2001, p. 69), or value 
sensitivity (Pettit, 2007, p. 177). This is the capacity to choose between moral options 
and act in ways that conform to moral requirements. Even though individuals perform 
the actions identified with the corporation, the collective agent can be considered 
responsible for coordinating individual actions and for ensuring that everyone plays their 
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role. Individuals are fit to be held responsible as enactors of the group’s plans, and 
responsibility can be attributed to them for what they do in the group’s name to the 
extent that they could have refused to play that part. However, the group can also be held 
responsible, in that its members combine to form a single unit capable of making a 
judgement (Pettit, 2007, p. 192).  
It can be concluded that, according to the presented criteria, transnational 
corporations are conglomerates or institutions able to have a distinctive intention 
different from their employees and stockholders, arguably guided by the company’s 
mission and values. They are also capable through internal decision-making mechanisms 
of evaluating different options and taking joint decisions. While corporations are 
constituted of individuals who perform the actions identified with the corporation, they 
comprise a coordinating structure capable of acting as a distinctive unit. The next 
sections will describe two of the main positions regarding the duties of transnational 
corporations.   
 Corporate Duties as Fiduciary Duties 4.3.
 
Theories from Economics and Business Management popularised in the 1960s 
and the 1970s have tended to conceptualise the corporation as an entity with the goal of 
maximising profits for its stockholders (Bernstein, 2001 in Stephen, 2002, p. 45; Falk, 
2004 pp. 20-21; The Economist, 2005b). They have been labelled as “hard libertarian” 
(Muchlinski, 2004) and “neo-conservative management” theories (Cragg, 2004, p. 109), 
and have been associated with the “neoclassical business model” (Wettstein, 2009, p. 
263). They place a strong value on individual freedom and property rights and tend to 
reduce the responsibilities of corporations to fiduciary duties to their stakeholders 
(Donaldson, 1989a, p. 172; Henderson, 2001a; 2001b; Falk, 2004, pp. 20-21). As Milton 
Friedman puts it,  
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[…] there is one and only one social responsibility of business –to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long 
as it stays with the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition without deception or fraud. […] Few trends could 
so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the 
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to 
make as much money for their stockholders as possible (1962, p. 133).  
This position thus presumes that the duties of corporations are confined to 
pursuing their main goal, i.e. maximising profits, while obeying the law. As long as the 
corporation operates according to these guidelines, it cannot be considered to be acting 
improperly (Hartmann, 2002, p. 23). It is argued further that, by acting in pursuit of their 
enlightened self-interest, corporations also benefit society at large. “The goal of a well-
run company may be to make profits for its shareholders, but merely in doing that […] 
the company, without even trying is doing good works” (The Economist, 2005a). This is 
because the invisible hand of the market will take care of punishing those corporations 
that do not create social good, “[…] as profits are a guide […] to the value that 
companies create in society” (The Economist, 2005b). The better the company is, 
according to this view, the more profitable it will be, creating a virtuous cycle from which 
both society and business can benefit.  
Corporate social responsibility or corporate ethics are regarded in such an 
approach as counterproductive for social welfare, as they allow anti-competitive practices 
and promote disinvestment from the developing countries that need it the most in the 
name of addressing poor labour or environmental standards. Thus, they distract attention 
from the real problems and create more in the process (The Economist, 2005c). While it 
is not claimed that corporations can indulge in human rights violations, pursuing other 
goals such as promoting human rights, it is argued, imposes illegitimate costs, as it 
diverts attention and resources, impairs performance and limits competition, affecting 
not only the corporation but also society at large (Henderson, 2001b, pp. 30-31; 
Wettstein, 2009, p. 264). The approach thus rejects claims that corporations have positive 
duties to act in the public interest or to protect the needy, as it is not their function; 
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indeed, it is argued, acting as moral arbiters in the communities where they operate 
might be perceived as unwelcome interference in domestic affairs.    
For this approach, corporate engagement with human rights has only an 
instrumental value and it is contingent on strategic concerns regarding corporate 
reputation and its relation to profits (Arnold, 2010, p. 383; Donaldson, 1989a, p. 172; 
Muchlinski, 2004, pp. 86, 90). Thus, the motivation for corporations to join voluntary 
initiatives or to adhere to unenforced laws in host countries can be largely explained by 
corporate enlightened self-interest: corporations are motivated to respect human rights to 
avert reputation and legal risks, and in doing so, they contribute to enhancing the welfare 
of their employees and surrounding communities, which in turn can be beneficial for 
business. While such a principle can certainly be appealing for corporations, its reach is 
nonetheless limited to cases where respecting human rights does not clash with the goal 
of generating profits.  
According to Cragg (2000, p. 206; 2004, p. 105), the development of this 
approach to the responsibilities of corporations can be partly explained by a de facto 
division of obligations following the enactment of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, in which it was assumed that the state would be responsible for protecting and 
fulfilling human rights, while the private sector would assume the primary responsibility 
for creating wealth. Indeed, according to Friedman (1970), part of the reason why 
managers should not engage in social purposes is because they would be effectively 
spending the shareholders’ money, and in any case, enhancing social welfare is the job of 
elected civil servants. 
This position thus assumes the existence of an effective division of 
responsibilities between the state and the business sector. It also tends to assume the 
existence of laws to protect human rights in host states as well as the capability and 
willingness of the governments to do so. Furthermore, it understands human rights 
narrowly, as legal human rights (Cragg, 2004, pp. 105-106). This, in turn, implies that 
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human rights at large are appropriately and comprehensively codified in the law, and it 
assumes that states have the willingness and ability to make other actors to comply with 
the law. It thus tends to ignore cases in which there are no laws to protect human rights 
and where the state does not act as primary agent of justice or actively violates the rights 
of its citizens. Furthermore, its overly optimistic view of a self-regulatory market that 
naturally rewards corporations that do good seems to be unable to account for cases 
where powerful and wealthy corporations are involved in human rights violations.  
While the fiduciary duties approach focuses on the corporate purpose of 
maximising profits and the purely instrumental value of human rights, it nonetheless 
seems to also imply some moral element when it requires corporations to obey by the law. 
It is true that respecting the law is in many cases a matter of prudence that can prevent 
corporations from incurring legal suits or fines, but it is also a matter of morality. If it 
were just a matter of prudence, corporations could follow the law only when the 
penalties were higher than the perceived gains. However, the decision not to break the 
law, even when it would enhance the financial bottom line, is a defensible managerial 
decision “[…] on the grounds that obeying the law is a fundamental corporate moral 
obligation” (Cragg, 2012, p. 27). Thus, while it is the case that corporations obey the law 
as a matter of self-interest, we can also see that there is some moral motivation to do so.  
 Corporate Duties as Positive Duties 4.4.
 
Political theorists and philosophers have called into question the main tenets of 
the fiduciary duties approach and the premise of a clear-cut division of labour between 
the public and private sectors upon which it rests. While literature on the moral duties of 
non-state actors has gained currency in the last ten years, the systematic discussion of the 
role of TNCs in relation to human rights started blossoming following the dismissal of 
the UN Norms in 2004 and the creation of Ruggie’s mandate (see Arnold & Bowi, 2003; 
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Cragg, 2004; Hsieh, 2004; 2006; 2009; Sorell, 2004; 2006; Wettstein, 2005; 2009; 2012a; 
2012b; Young, 2006; Kolstad, 2008; Arnold, 2010; 2013; Vandekerckhove, 2010; 
Macdonald, 2011; Wood, 2012). The idea that TNCs have at least negative duties to 
respect human rights is relatively uncontroversial, but the claim that they also bear some 
positive duties is not (Sorell, 2004, p. 129; Kolstad, 2008, p. 570; Maak, 2009, p. 367; 
Wettstein, 2009, p. 191; Arnold, Audi, & Zwolinski, 2010, p. 573).  
Nevertheless, a significant body of literature in political theory and philosophy 
has been dedicated to defending the idea that corporations do bear some significant 
positive duties to protect and realise human rights (see O'Neill, 2001; Robinson, 2003, p. 
10; Campbell, 2004; Nussbaum, 2004; Sen, 2004; Sorell, 2004; Kolstad, 2008; 
Vandekerckhove, 2010; Wettstein, 2012a; Wood, 2012). Within this literature, it is 
possible to distinguish three main concerns: 1) discussing morally relevant grounds for 
attributing positive duties to TNCs, 2) establishing the criteria for distributing positive 
duties among relevant moral actors, and 3) limiting the scope of these duties. 
 Conditional Positive Duties  4.4.1.
 
A significant part of the literature has focused on the attribution of positive 
duties to corporations in cases of non-ideal conditions, that is, when the state does not 
act as the primary agent of justice because it is either unwilling or unable to do so 
(O'Neill, 2001; Kolstad, 2008; Karp, forthcoming 2014). Primary agents of justice are 
considered to be those entities with capacities to determine how principles of justice are 
to be institutionalised within a specific domain. Secondary agents of justice, including 
transnational corporations, are seen as contributing to the realisation of justice mainly by 
meeting the demands of primary agents, for example, by following established legal 
requirements (O'Neill, 2001, pp. 181-182; Kolstad, 2008, pp. 571, 577).  
Primary agents of justice may construct other agents or agencies with 
specific competencies: they may assign powers to and build capacities in 
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individual agents, or they may build institutions –agencies– with certain 
powers and capacities to act. Sometimes they may, so to speak, build 
from scratch; more often they reassign or adjust tasks and 
responsibilities among existing agents and agencies, and control and 
limit the ways in which they may act without incurring sanctions. 
Primary agents of justice typically have some means of coercion, by 
which they at least partially control the action of other agents and 
agencies, which can therefore at most be secondary agents of justice 
(O'Neill, 2001, p. 181). 
While individuals or even groups with little formal structure can become 
primary agents of justice, in modern societies, the state has been assigned this role. In 
cases where it fails to act as the primary agent of justice, the distinction between primary 
and secondary agents is blurred, and the duties of secondary agents, including 
corporations, are no longer reduced to complying with the standards set by the primary 
agent (O'Neill, 2001, p. 181; Wettstein, 2009, p. 309). In cases when the state is unwilling 
to act as the primary agent of justice, corporations can be attributed a duty to exercise 
influence on the unjust or oppressive government. When the state deliberately abuses 
human rights, TNCs are said to bear a duty to protect human rights against the abuses of 
the government (Wettstein, 2009, p. 309). In these situations, the duties that are 
traditionally considered to fall upon the state must be addressed by the duty-bearer who 
is second most capable or efficient to discharge the duty in question, then the third, and 
so on (O'Neill, 2001, pp. 181-183; Kuper, 2005, p. x; Kolstad, 2008, pp. 572, 574; 
Wettstein, 2009, pp. 158-164). Even when non-state actors might not be equipped to fully 
substitute for the range of that contributions states can make to advance justice, they are 
seen as obliged to do what they can (O'Neill, 2001, p. 193; Kolstad, 2008, p. 578).  
This view is grounded on the idea that human rights are of the utmost 
importance, and therefore it is necessary to discuss who can protect and fulfil them 
beyond or even instead of the state. Corporations are considered to be candidates for 
inclusion in such an ordinal arrangement when they have sufficient capability to act as a 
primary agent of justice. This approach can be described as a forward-looking model of 
responsibility, as it discusses which actors are best placed to provide remedy, to protect 
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and fulfil human rights regardless of the casual connection they may have with the 
insecurity of rights in the situation (see Shue, 1988; Miller, 2001; O'Neill, 2001; 
Campbell, 2004; Sorell, 2004; Kolstad, 2008; Wettstein, 2009).  
 Non-Conditional Positive Duties  4.4.2.
 
Within the positive duties approach, other positions do not focus on attributing 
duties to corporations where the state has defaulted on duties. Instead, they argue that 
TNCs bear positive duties given their functions and some of these attributes are 
considered as morally significant for attributing duties to corporations.  
4.4.2.1. Allocation of Duties According to TNCs’ Governing Functions 
 
One strand of the non-conditional view develops from the observation that 
TNCs share with the state some characteristics that bestow on the latter positive duties to 
respect and promote human rights. The fact that human rights duties have been 
attributed to the state can be explained by several factors. The first one is the superior 
capacities of the state. As explained in Section 3.3, historically, the state has posed the 
greatest threat to the interests that human rights are designed to protect. However, it has 
become recognised that other actors besides the state have the capacity to violate human 
rights, and that such abuses can be comparable in range and severity to those that 
governments have perpetrated historically, particularly in weak states (Cragg, 2012, p. 
20; Karp, 2013, p. 21). In addition, corporations, like states, have the capacity to protect 
human rights, particularly where they are involved in the provision of public services 
such as health and education (Karp, 2013, p. 22) or in situations of emergency.  
Second, the state is seen as having the ability to institutionalise rules designed to 
ensure that the human rights of those falling within the ambit of its authority are 
respected (O'Neill, 2001, p. 182; Cragg, 2012, p. 19). This is a relevant factor, as to say 
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that someone has a right means that there exists the possibility to actuate or 
institutionalise the conditions necessary for that right to be respected. Furthermore, the 
state is considered to have the capacity to enforce the laws that it creates and 
institutionalises in order to curb its own human rights abuses as well as those committed 
by persons and collective entities over whom it exercises legitimate authority (Cragg, 
2012, pp. 19-20). Similar to the state, corporations have capacities to institutionalise 
respect for human rights within their area of operations, to set policies to govern their 
activities and relations with stakeholders and to “discipline” those with whom they enter 
contractual obligations by establishing penalties for non-compliance (Cragg, 2012, p. 20). 
Therefore, given that TNCs bear similar attributes –albeit to different degrees– they can 
be attributed comparable duties (Cragg, 2012, p. 22). 
A further factor in considering the state as a protector of human rights it its 
“publicness” related in part to its provision of public goods such as education, health and 
transportation (Karp, 2013, p. 21; forthcoming 2014). In a similar vein, Wettstein argues 
that corporations bear some positive duties because they are “quasi-governmental 
institutions” that take de facto governing roles, particularly after the wave of neoliberal 
policies of the 1980s and 1990s (2009, p. 169).  
The takeover of public sectors by private corporations […] at its core it 
means the partial replacement of governments by corporations for the 
fulfillment of genuine governmental functions [….]. Privatization is thus 
not simply an expansion of the private sector into the public realm but a 
transfer of public authority from governments to private corporations 
(Wettstein, 2009, p. 239). 
However, for Wettstein, the public role of the corporations goes beyond 
providing services that had been traditionally considered as public. TNCs, according to 
Wettstein, can nowadays be considered to de facto “govern people,” “govern governments” 
and “govern themselves” (2009, pp. 213-214). TNCs have become the dominant 
institution in the global production structure and key players in the economic 
organisation of states; they provide employment, produce economic goods, offer services 
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and can be an important source of tax revenues. Controlling access to the productive 
organisation of society is considered to be similar to controlling the livelihood of citizens, 
which in turns translates into the political power of corporations over citizens (Wettstein, 
2009, p. 214). This also means that a significant percentage of the global population has 
become dependent on corporations for their living, and as a result is willing to or must 
accept what corporate employers dictate “on almost any terms” (Wettstein, 2009, p. 214). 
An example is Bangladesh, the second largest exporter of apparel after China, 
where the minimum monthly wage is around US$37. The Bangladeshi garment industry 
has a significant influence over an important part of the country’s working population. 
Factory owners have around 10% of the total seats in Parliament, besides being major 
political donors and moving in recent years into ownership of newspapers and television 
stations (Yardley, 2012). Despite pressure from non-governmental organisations, the 
government has resisted expanding labour rights in order to maintain an “investment 
friendly” environment for foreign and domestic investors (Yardley, 2012). The power of 
corporations, nonetheless, does not refer only to employment. The increasing 
economisation of social and political life means that corporations also participate 
significantly in these areas. While corporations are regarded as private institutions, their 
actions are of the utmost public relevance, as they significantly affect society; thus their 
“publicness” increases along with the impact of their actions and policies on society 
(Wettstein, 2009, p. 182).  
The increased mobility of corporations and their power in economic structures 
has allowed them to enjoy significant leverage over states. TNCs are thus able to press 
governments for favourable conditions, confronting them with the so-called “exit threat” 
(Wettstein, 2009, p. 230). In turn, states are forced to compete against each other to 
attract and retain corporations and economic investment. Finally, corporations are also 
considered self-governing, due to the lack of regulation at the global level, which has 
created the governance gap described in Chapter 2. Given that TNCs are operating as 
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governance entities at different levels, it is argued that, “[…] their actions must be 
matched with corresponding moral obligations” (Wettstein, 2009, p. 146), similar to 
those commonly attributed to states as governance institutions.  
4.4.2.2.  Allocation of Duties According to TNCs’ Attributes  
 
Other authors, subscribing to a non-conditional positive duties approach, argue 
that TNCs bear positive duties even when the state acts as the primary agent of justice, 
because they have the capabilities and opportunities to do so. As Sorell argues, “even 
when one takes the class of democratically elected countries as the leading or sole 
custodians of human rights activity […] a role for businesses is not ruled out. Individual 
democratic countries can invite companies to co-operate with them in human rights work 
[…]” (2004, p. 142). This is because companies can significantly contribute to protecting 
and advancing human rights due to their local knowledge, expertise, infrastructure and 
efficiency in moving people and things (Sorell, 2004, pp. 142-143). Not attributing to 
them some positive duties in order to alleviate some of the most pressing social problems 
in the world is considered to signal a “spectacular” loss of opportunity (Shue, 1988, p. 
696).   
It has also been argued that particular attributes of corporations generate some 
positive duties. While there are several possible grounds on which to attribute positive 
duties to moral agents, perhaps the most fully explored is a capacity approach. This 
argues that the moral community of human beings is obligated to create and maintain 
conditions that are conducive to the protection and realisation of human rights. If the 
collective obligation is to carry weight, those with superior capabilities bear prima facie 
positive duties to protect and promote human rights (Shue, 1988; O'Neill, 2001; 
Campbell, 2004; Sen, 2004; Sorell, 2004; Kolstad, 2008, p. 570; Wettstein, 2009; 2012a, 
p. 754). Capability is thus considered “[…] a necessary and in some cases even a 
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sufficient condition for such obligations” (Wettstein, 2009, p. 139). Thus “[…] when 
businesses have the opportunity to promote or protect human rights where they operate, 
they are often also obliged to do so” (Sorell, 2004, p. 130).  
This is particularly true under certain conditions; for example, when the rights 
being violated are very basic, when the violations are systematic, and when the cost of 
helping is very small (Sorell, 2004, pp. 130,132). This claim is exemplified with a 
scenario in which a passing tourist witnesses an accident and is in position to help at a 
reasonable or low opportunity cost. Even if the person is alien to the community where 
the accident happened, if the main purpose of her visit was not to provide help, even if 
she do not have any relation to the person in need or is not responsible for the accident, 
she still has a duty to provide some help if she is in a position to do so (Sorell, 2004, p. 
130). This is similar to the famous Peter Singer example in which a child is drowning in a 
shallow pond. If one has the opportunity to help at a very low opportunity cost (ruining 
an expensive pair of shoes and arriving late to class), one has an obligation to help 
regardless of who the child is, our relationship with her and our lack of contribution to 
putting her in the pond (Singer, 1972). 
Contrary to the fiduciary duties approach, which stresses the distinct role and 
functions of the TNCs, the positive duties approach contends that the profiting motive of 
corporations does not constitute a fundamental impediment to attributing them positive 
duties. While the main corporate goal is generating profits, a company may also have 
other objectives, such as advancing the well-being of the communities where they operate, 
contributing to the realisation of human rights or raising the living standards of their 
employees (O'Neill, 2001, p. 192; Sorell, 2004, p. 130; Wood, 2012, p. 72). Furthermore, 
generating profits is not necessarily incompatible with other objectives. Corporations can 
pursue social justice without turning “[…] into non-businesses, forsaking commercial 
purposes and becoming full-time warriors in a moral crusade […]” (Sorell, 2004, p. 129). 
An example is the ‘B corps’ or benefit corporations, which take into consideration the 
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impact of their decisions on the environment, employees, nearby communities and other 
stakeholders, and which explicitly have generating a positive impact on society and the 
environment as part of their purposes (Howard, 2012). A significant number of these 
corporations comprise small local companies making ecological and organic products 
and consultancy services providers. However, some transnational corporations are also 
involved, such as the US premium ice-cream company Ben and Jerry’s. 
 Distribution of Duties 4.4.3.
 
While negative duties to respect fall upon everyone, positive duties to protect 
and fulfil human rights need to be distributed among duty-bearers according to defined 
criteria. A recurring question, then, has been how to determine an appropriate 
distribution of duties among those candidates which bear positive duties. Some of the 
proposed principles are capacities (Campbell, 2006, p. 261; Santoro, 2010), capabilities 
(Wettstein, 2009, pp. 135-139), leverage (Wood, 2012), efficiency (Kolstad, 2008, p. 587), 
influence (Kolstad, 2008, p. 581) opportunities (Sorell, 2004, p. 130; Campbell, 2006, p. 
261), benefit (Hsieh, 2004) and power (Wettstein, 2009, p. 141). The greater the level of 
these attributes that the corporations possess, the more extensive their duties are 
presumed to be. 
Note that while capacities and capabilities might imply the possession of 
monetary wealth or other resources, they can also depend on other factors. For instance, 
a small company may have the capacity to contribute to protecting and advancing 
human rights within the surrounding communities and its workforce. Other aspects, such 
as the location of the company or its reputation, may enable capability as well (Sorell, 
2004, p. 139). The capabilities of states and corporations might be different but no less 
important for the realisation of rights. While corporations may not be able to pass 
national laws or sign international treaties to prohibit or prevent violations of human 
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rights, this does not mean they do not have any influence over advancing them. The 
largest corporations would certainly have the means to promote human rights objectives 
and influence the conduct of governments in this regard. “Indeed, they may have many 
means at their disposal more effective than coercive law” (Campbell, 2004, p. 17).  
Other factors cited in distributing positive duties to TNCs include direct 
involvement in large-scale violations of rights (Kline, 2003, p. 22; Sorell, 2004, p. 133), 
the relationship between the company and the right-holder (Santoro, 2010, p. 292) and the 
connection between them (Miller, 2001, pp. 468-471). The closer the involvement and the 
relationship of the company, the stronger its duties. Wood (2012) provides several cases 
to illustrate the varying degrees of a company’s relations and how they alter its duties. 
For example, when public authorities interfere with employees’ rights to assembly, their 
employer has a stronger responsibility than a stranger does; where security forces use 
products from a company to commit human rights violations, the maker has a stronger 
responsibility than others that do not manufacture them; and when a company operates 
in a developing country, it has more responsibility for human rights there than elsewhere 
where it does not operate (Wood, 2012, p. 83). 
A related factor is the relevance that a right has to the company’s business 
(Sorell, 2004, p. 133; Wood, 2012, p. 83). In a situation where human rights are being 
violated, the closer the connection between the interest that is threatened and the 
company’s activities, products or services, the stronger the responsibility. For example, a 
pharmaceutical company operating in a country with limited access to medicines could 
have a stronger duty to do something to solve this problem than a company that 
manufactures furniture.  
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 Scope of Duties 4.4.4.
 
A final aspect of the positive duties approach that needs to be considered is 
delimiting the scope of duties. A starting point is the capacities of a moral agent. This 
principle recognises that the demands made upon an agent should be within the limits of 
their capacities if these duties are to carry any moral weight. It is necessary to establish 
boundaries on duties, within which capable agents are permitted to devote resources to 
themselves (Shue, 1988, p. 690). 
Following Rawls’ framework of The Law of Peoples (1999c), Hsieh proposes 
benefit as one of a few possible benchmarks to delimit the duties of TNCs (2009). Hsieh 
argues that there are two main types of societies: well-ordered and burdened societies, 
which he equates with developed and developing countries.55 Well-ordered societies are 
societies designed to advance the good of their members, they are effectively regulated by 
a public conception of justice and have basic social institutions that satisfy these 
principles (Rawls, 1999a, p. 197). Meanwhile, burdened societies lack the political and 
cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, the material and technological 
resources needed to be well ordered (Rawls, 1999c). Therefore, well-ordered societies 
normally have in place some institutional framework to protect their members against 
harms associated with market failures but burdened societies may not (De George, 1993, 
p. 48; Hsieh, 2009, p. 258). 
When corporations operate in burdened societies, frequently they obtain some 
benefit from the burdened conditions of these states and the lack of an institutional 
framework similar to the existent in well-ordered societies. For example, in burdened 
societies lax labour, fiscal and safety regulations may allow corporations to pay low 
                                                       
55 This however is not an accurate comparison as “not all [burdened] societies are poor, any more than all 
well-ordered societies are wealthy. A society with few natural resources and little wealth can be well-ordered 
if its political traditions, law, and property and class structure with their underlying religious and moral 
beliefs and culture are such as to sustain a liberal or decent society” (Rawls, 1999c, p. 110). 
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wages, pay little or no taxes and invest less in safety and environmental measures than in 
their home countries. While corporations may not be violating directly any rights, 
participating “[…] in a system profiting in which one's activities give rise to potential 
harms and persons subject to the possibility of harm lack protection and the basic means 
to seek redress […]” (Hsieh, 2009, p. 259) is nonetheless morally wrong. In such cases, if 
corporations want to fulfil their negative duty not to harm, they face two options: 
withdraw from the country altogether so they do not benefit from the market failures56 or 
promote the development of institutions similar to those of the well-ordered societies 
(Hsieh, 2009, pp. 258-259). However, the duties of benefiting corporations are limited. 
Hsieh (2004, p. 651; 2009, p. 264) argues that the duties of assistance of TNCs are limited 
by the benefit they obtained from the burdensome conditions of host countries and by 
what is required to avoid the harm that results from the lack of well-ordered institutions. 
However, promoting just institutions does not only conforms to the TNCs’ 
negative duty not to harm, but also to their duties of assistance. According to The Law of 
Peoples, well-ordered societies have some duties of assistance towards their burdened 
counterparts in order to bring them into the Society of well-ordered Peoples (Rawls, 
1999c, p. 110). Duties of assistance normally lay on governments of the well-ordered 
societies, or in this case, of economically developed countries. However, when they fail 
to discharge them, their national corporations operating abroad acquire these duties as an 
extension of their shareholders’ duties as citizens of well-ordered societies (Hsieh, 2004, 
pp. 649-651). This aspect also limits the duties that corporations acquire due to the 
unwillingness of their governments to discharge them. Transnational corporations are 
not expected to make inhabitants of burdened societies as well-off as possible (Hsieh, 
2004, p. 648). Instead, shareholders are obliged to contribute the same share that would 
                                                       
56 According to this account, corporations should also consider to withdraw from a country if it is unlikely 
they will promote fair institutions through their activities. For example, if they are operating in a country 
where the government violates the human rights of its citizens, as long as the TNC continues to pay taxes to 
the rogue government of the host country, it is contributing to the continuation of that regime (Hsieh, 2009, p. 
265).   
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have been required as citizens of well-ordered societies if their governments had fulfilled 
their duties of assistance. Thus, the sum of the shareholders’ obligations would indicate 
the maximum amount that a TNC is obliged to contribute to fulfil their governments’ 
duties of assistance (Hsieh, 2004, p. 651). 
Another criterion seen as limiting the duties of TNCs is that of proximity. 
Specifically, the term “sphere of influence” introduced by the Global Compact depicts an 
image of concentric circles, with the companies’ operations at the core, moving outwards 
according to physical proximity to the company, to suppliers, community and society as 
a whole. The further the circle from the centre, the less the influence and responsibility it 
has. This approach has been criticised because, while useful in many cases, it ignores the 
fact that companies might also endanger the human rights of end users who are 
physically distant from the company, as in the case of Internet service providers. A case 
in point is the involvement of US-based Internet provider Yahoo! in the arrest and 
sentencing of Shi Tao, a Beijing-based journalist, in 2005. The previous year, Shi Tao 
had used his Yahoo! email account to send an article to a pro-democratic publication in 
New York in which he summarised a government order directing media organisations in 
China to downplay the upcoming commemoration of the Tiananmen Square protests. 
After investigations were conducted, it was discovered that Yahoo! provided to the 
Chinese government information that lead to the arrest of the journalist (Ruggie, 2013, 
pp. 14-15, 50). This case sparked international controversy about the business practices of 
some Internet providers and highlighted the fact that corporations can also inflict harm at 
a distance.  
 Problems of Attributing Positive Duties to TNCs 4.5.
 
The previous sections presented some of the main arguments for attributing 
positive duties to transnational corporations. While this thesis does not reject the idea 
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that TNCs may be allocated some positive duties in relation to human rights, it is 
possible to offer some principled as well as pragmatic grounds for questioning such 
approach. One of these principled grounds refers to the fact that TNCs’ main goal is 
maximising profits and that, unlike states, they do not have as their constitutive aims 
protecting and promoting human rights. In addition, maximising profits and protecting 
human rights is not always compatible, which may constrain what legitimately can be 
required from corporations. While some authors have argued that TNCs can be allocated 
duties similar to those of the states’ because they provide public goods or have de facto 
governing functions, corporations and states have significantly different functions, 
purposes and incentives, which might call this argument into question.  
Further objections can be raised against the idea that companies can be 
attributed positive duties to protect and promote human rights because they can do so. 
While it can be said that having sufficient capabilities is a necessary criterion for 
considering a moral agent a candidate for bearing positive duties, that does not in itself 
demonstrate that it is also sufficient. Mainly focusing on the capabilities of moral actors 
to protect human rights can lead to a possible unprincipled attribution of duties by 
unduly burdening the most capable actors while letting off the hook the legitimate 
bearers of positive duties, i.e. states. This, in turn, may create some perverse incentives 
for corporations to hide or minimise their capabilities in order to reduce their moral 
burden.  
The positive duties approach also leads to some efficiency problems. Very 
demanding or continuous positive duties are often in tension with the TNCs’ primary 
role and organisational purpose. Therefore, it is unlikely to expect that companies will 
willingly discharge them, as illustrated by the opposition of TNCs to accept stringent 
responsibilities prior to the 1990s. In turn, this might generate large transaction costs for 
governments and other authorities to ensure that companies actually discharge their 
allocated duties. Such objections may be more a practical than normative reasons to limit 
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duties, but reasonable costs provisos are standard in formulations of positive duties, and 
more straightforward efficiency of human rights provision or protection would likely be 
sub-optimal if non-protective organisations such as TNCs were expected to continuously 
play the protective role of states.  
While such shortcomings do not demonstrate that corporations bear no positive 
duties at all they nonetheless suggest that allocating stringent positive duties to TNCs is 
not necessarily defensible and may not ultimately contribute as significantly as expected 
to the realisation of rights. A more defensible alternative will be to conceptualise the 
duties of corporations as essentially negative duties. This approach, it is argued, can 
contribute to overcoming some of the substantive and efficiency-related shortcomings of 
the positive duties approach and also can better take into account the impact 
corporations may have over human rights at a distance. The following sections will 
elaborate in more detail the perceived shortcomings of the positive duties approach.  
 The Profit Motive 4.5.1.
 
We can presume again that the main goal of TNCs is generating profits for their 
stockholders. While they may have other goals, such as generating value for society or 
contributing to the welfare of their employees, those objectives are subordinated to the 
generation and increase of profits (except in particular cases such as B corporations and 
L3C corporations earlier mentioned). This again has important implications for 
expectations of actual compliance with human rights standards, and ultimately with the 
conceptualisation of TNC duties. It is plausible to expect companies to respect human 
rights when doing so aligns with maximising their profits. The picture is more mixed 
when it does not so align. While some corporations may choose to continue to protect 
human rights, even if it means sacrificing a portion of their profits, others may choose to 
maximise their profits, even when this means violating their minimal duties to avoid 
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doing harm. Choices in favour of profit maximisation are visible, for example, in the 
employment of sweatshop labour, transference of earnings to low-tax nations or other 
mechanisms of tax avoidance.  
A paradigmatic example is the case of the Ford Pinto. In 1968, the Ford Motor 
Company started producing the Pinto model at an accelerated pace, but the results of 
crash tests soon revealed a problem with the car fuel system’s design which made it 
vulnerable to exploding in cases of rear-end collisions (Dowie, 1977; Leggett, 1999). 
According to a cost-benefit analysis legally required by the US National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, Ford calculated that implementing a mechanism to prevent this 
vulnerability would cost the company approximately USD$11 per car. Multiplied by the 
12.5 million cars planned for production, this would total USD$137.5 million. Ford also 
calculated the expected cost in litigation and legal judgments from burn deaths, injuries 
and burned-out vehicles. That total was USD$49.53 million –almost USD$90 million 
less than the amount it would have had to pay to fix the faulty mechanism (Leggett, 
1999). Eventually, Ford decided not to implement the change in the design of the Pinto 
and to continue with the production of the car as planned. This case illustrates the 
utilitarian responses of some corporations when faced with conflicting goals, even 
sometimes at the expense of human lives.  
Further, while some companies may choose to support human rights, they may 
do so for its instrumental value, i.e., as a public relations strategy, an advertising tool to 
promote the company’s brand, as a mechanism to increase the company’s visibility and 
to improve employee morale, or as a way to avoid reputational risks (Porter & Kramer, 
2002, p. 57; Cragg, 2004, p. 126). Here it could be argued that the motivation behind 
corporate activity is irrelevant as long as companies behave well. For example, O’Neill 
argues, 
in many cases it may be a moot point whether their motivation in 
supporting greater justice is a concern for justice, a concern to avoid the 
reputational disadvantages of condoning or inflicting injustice, or a 
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concern for the bottom line simpliciter. However, unclarity about the 
motivation of TNCs does not matter much, given that we have few 
practical reasons for trying to assess the quality of TNC motivation. 
What does matter is what TNCs can and cannot do, the capabilities that 
they can and cannot develop (2001, p. 193). 
Nevertheless, it seems that assessing the motivation of companies may be 
relevant, because it can affect their behaviour and thus the likelihood of corporations 
actually discharging their assigned duties. If the only motive a company has to protect 
human rights is enhancing its public image in order to guard its bottom line, it cannot be 
expected to engage in sincere efforts to advance human rights when its reputation is not 
at risk. This could help to explain why most of the largest corporations of the world have 
stated that they adhere to respecting and sometimes even protecting human rights, while 
at the same time engaging in harmful but less publicly visible practices such as tax 
avoidance schemes. This particular practice is so widespread that more than 50% of the 
largest companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange have admitted to using “novel 
tax planning ideas” in order to reduce the taxes they pay in every jurisdiction where they 
operate (Christensen & Murphy, 2004, pp. 38-39). Therefore, focusing on the capabilities 
of corporations seems to be too optimistic a reading of what TNCs can actually be 
expected to do efficiently without significant oversight. This, in fact, was the point that 
NGOs made in the 1990s when they fervently advocated for firm corporate 
accountability, instead of a weaker corporate responsibility approach, after realising that 
the voluntary commitments that corporations had taken upon themselves made little 
difference in practice (see Chapter 2).  
Another challenge in assigning positive duties to transnational corporations is 
the significant leverage they have to decide by which means they will discharge their 
duties and to what extent. For example, BP understands its own contribution to human 
rights as lying in “helping meet the world’s energy needs.” In doing so, they argue, “we 
make a significant contribution to human welfare and development: by fuelling heat, 
light, and mobility; by paying taxes that support public services; and by creating 
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economic opportunities through direct employment and our value chain” (BP, 2005). 
Exxon Mobil, on the other hand, considers that employee training, meetings, 
conferences and publications on critical human rights issues are helpful for addressing 
the human rights challenges faced by the communities in which they operate (2009). 
Thus, without a strict specification of what the duties to protect entail, it can be expected 
that corporations will interpret them according to their needs.  
 Possible Unprincipled Attribution of Duties 4.5.2.
 
One strand of the conditional positive duties approach argues that, under ideal 
conditions, states as the primary agents of justice bear positive duties to protect and fulfil 
the human rights of their populations. Other actors are said to normally bear negative 
duties to respect human rights, which can be largely reduced to obeying the laws 
imposed by the state and not curtailing its capacities to discharge its duties. When the 
state defaults on its responsibilities, however, other agents with sufficient capabilities to 
provide for human rights can become candidates for acting as primary agents of justice. 
Yet, it is unclear under what circumstances corporations can transition from candidates 
to actual primary agents of justice. The ordinal arrangement of secondary agents to act as 
primary agents of justice thus needs to be clarified (Kolstad, 2008; Wettstein, 2009, ch. 4). 
This is particularly necessary when there are other capable agents that, unlike 
corporations, have as one of their constitutive purpose advancing human rights, for 
example, certain NGOs and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations. 
Therefore, if it is accepted that all secondary agents of justice may intervene if the state 
defaults on its duties, it seems necessary to discuss some possible principles for 
attributing duties among them, instead of automatically attributing positive duties to 
TNCs just because they have the capacity.  
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As argued in previous sections, some scholars in the positive duties approach 
have contended that TNCs can be attributed some positive duties on the basis of their 
capabilities. However, I argue, capabilities alone are not sufficient grounds to attribute 
corporations positive duties. “Merely pointing out that the institution could provide X –
or even showing that it is the only existing institution that can do so– is not sufficient to 
show that it has a duty of justice or any duty at all to provide X” (Buchanan & Keohane, 
2006, p. 421). For example, it could be argued that some of the largest drug cartels have 
enough capabilities to provide human rights because they have considerable monetary 
resources as well as significant organisational capacities. Nevertheless, it would be 
difficult to argue that drug cartels bear positive duties in relation to human rights, even 
when there is evidence of their involvement in providing public services in some 
countries (see Skaperdas, 2001, p. 186). Such difficulty in allocating positive duties to 
drug cartels might stem, for example, from their illegal nature, from their participation in 
undermining their capacities of the state, etc. Therefore, it is possible to argue that having 
sufficient capabilities is not sufficient rationale for allocating positive duties to individual 
and collective entities. Instead, there would be additional requirements, such as being a 
legal entity or having constitutive aims compatible with advancing human rights.  
Ultimately, there is a danger here of “duty dumping”, or “[…] arbitrarily 
assuming that some particular institution has a duty simply because it has the resources 
to fulfil it and no other actor is doing so” (Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, pp. 420-421). 
This is particularly worrying in the case of TNCs, as a significant part of the literature 
seems to advocate simply transferring the positive duties of states to corporations in order 
to fill a vacancy wrongly left by governments with little regard for the justifiability of 
such decisions. The problem with duty dumping is that it can lead to incorrectly 
assigning duties to institutions without offering adequate justification for why particular 
responsibilities should be imposed, distracting attention from the task of determining a 
justifiable allocation (Buchanan & Decamp, 2006, p. 96; Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 
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421). In turn, this can serve as a mechanism for the legitimate duty-bearer to evade its 
responsibilities.  
In the policy arena, TNCs have been concerned that being allocated positive 
duties on the basis of their superior capabilities could wrongly incentivise governments 
to“[…] deliberately fail to perform [their] duties in the hope or expectation that a 
company will yield to social pressures to promote or fulfil certain rights […]” (Ruggie, 
2008, p. 20). Such a practice could generate perverse incentives for corporations. If the 
attribution and extent of duties are positively related to the capabilities of TNCs, 
corporations may be inclined to misrepresent them in order to reduce their moral burden. 
A comparable case is the engagement of corporations in tax avoidance schemes, which 
allow corporations to misrepresent their operations and earnings in order to reduce their 
tax burdens. Thus, if discharging positive duties is perceived to interfere with the goal of 
profit maximisation, it can be expected that corporations would systematically evade 
such responsibility.  
 Adoption of the Approach 4.5.3.
 
One of the issues of the positive duties approach relates to the fact that while 
transnational corporations have tended to accept that they bear negative duties to respect 
human rights, they have been reluctant to accept that they also bear positive duties to 
protect and fulfil them, considering that they are against their perceived interests. This 
can be illustrated, for example, by the dismissal of the UN Norms, which placed 
significant positive duties on corporations. In contrast, home states and TNCs have 
widely embraced the UN Framework and the Guiding Principles, which have limited the 
duties of corporations to respect human rights, as well as other initiatives such as the 
Global Compact, which despite attributing some positive duties to them, in practice 
require a minimal voluntary commitment. 
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The fact that corporations do not accept for themselves duties to protect and 
fulfil human rights again does not mean that they cannot be ascribed some positive duties. 
Instead, what I try to highlight is the practical point that if corporations reject the 
principle that they bear non-discretionary positive duties, it is unlikely that they will act 
to protect human rights, and instead will try to avoid doing so. The fact that corporations 
do not currently embrace the idea that they should play a role in protecting and 
promoting human rights does not mean that this perception cannot change over time. As 
described in Chapter 2, before the early 1990s, discussion of the duties of TNCs in 
relation to human rights was almost non-existent in the global agenda. Before that, it was 
widely accepted that companies had the goal of increasing profits within the limits of law. 
Prominent NGOs’ campaigns and awareness-raising on the issues of business and human 
rights have contributed to mainstreaming the idea that TNCs must at least respect human 
rights. While companies bore moral negative duties prior to the 1990s, significant social 
changes were necessary in order for corporations to start committing to discharging such 
duties and implementing practical measures to deliver on them. Further changes were 
also necessary in order for companies to admit that such duties had to be extended to at 
least some of their business relations.    
Thus, even if in the future companies become less reluctant to accept that they 
do not only bear negative duties to respect, but also positive duties to protect and fulfil 
human rights, this thesis proposes an account that builds upon the duties that TNCs have 
already accepted for themselves. Such a procedure might thus contribute to advancing 
the discussion on the moral duties of transnational corporations by overcoming some of 
the obstacles posed by the positive duties approach. 
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 Corporate Duties As Moral Negative Duties  4.6.
 
Most of the accounts identified with the positive duties approach have tended to 
follow an interactional conception of human rights that regards them as a set of 
entitlements held by all human beings by virtue of their humanity, and which assigns 
responsibility for rights fulfilment directly to individual and collective agents. This 
conception has at least two different implications, as illustrated by the two main strands 
identified within the positive duties approach. The responsibility to fulfil human rights 
can give raise to a hierarchy or ordinal arrangement of duty-bearers in charge of 
protecting human rights and ensuring that other actors respect them. Another implication 
is that positive duties to protect human rights are shared among all capable moral agents, 
whose degree of responsibility may vary according to their resources, capacities, leverage, 
etc. In any case, the main concern is to ensure that human rights are protected and 
fulfilled, thus emphasising the positive duties of the duty-bearers.   
However, as explained in Chapter 3, there is also an institutional conception of 
human rights, primarily as claims on coercive social institutions and secondarily as 
claims against those who uphold such institutions, including individual but also 
collective moral agents such as transnational corporations. This means that “a human 
right to X entails the demand that, insofar as reasonably possible, any coercive institution 
be so designed that all human beings affected by them have secure access to X” (Pogge, 
2008, p. 52). In this view, therefore, the responsibility of individual and collective moral 
agents is an indirect shared responsibility for the justice of any practice that they help to 
impose. Such a conception thus entails at least “[…] not to cooperate in the imposition of 
a coercive institutional order that avoidably leaves human rights unfulfilled […]” (Pogge, 
2008, p. 176). Thus, unlike the interactional conception of human rights that stresses the 
positive duties of capable agents, the institutional approach constructs human rights 
demands mainly as negative duties. While both approaches subscribe to different 
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conceptions of human rights and the duties they entail, they can be compatible and can 
complement each other, as will be further explored in Section 5.2. So, while this work 
does not reject the idea that TNCs may bear positive duties, it argues that conceiving 
corporate duties as essentially negative duties, as argued by the institutional approach, is 
a more robust theoretical framework that could contribute to overcoming some of the 
efficiency problems of the positive duties approach outlined in the preceding sections.   
It has been argued that one of the problems of the positive duties approach is 
that companies tend to reject them, and therefore, this could impair the chances of other 
proposed approaches being incorporated at the policy level, thus constraining their 
contribution to realising human rights. In contrast, the conception of the moral duties of 
companies as essentially negative duties to respect has found wide acceptance at the 
policy level, as illustrated by the reception of the UN Framework by companies and 
home countries. This can be explained because first, in general, negative duties tend to be 
less demanding than positive duties and are considered less burdensome (Shue, 1988, p. 
690). Positive duties are considered as a greater constraint on the pursuit of one’s goals, 
whereas negative duties limit responsibility such that the duty-bearers have considerable 
discretion in the way in which they choose to lead their lives and allocate their resources 
(Scheffler, 1995, p. 225). This is a significant aspect for contemporary corporations which, 
as they tend to value freedom to pursue their own interests, largely oppose policies or 
practices that might constrain it.   
Another issue with the positive duties approach was the possible unprincipled 
attribution of duties to TNCs on the basis of their superior capabilities. While it is 
necessary to discuss the principles for allocating positive duties among capable moral 
actors, negative duties to respect are nonetheless borne by all moral agents, irrespective 
of their capabilities or any other attributes and regardless of whether other moral agents 
discharge their own duties. Thus, affirming that corporations have at least negative duties 
to respect is not susceptible to the criticism that companies are unfairly burdened with 
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responsibilities that legitimately belong to the state. Even the fiduciary duties approach 
concedes that corporations bear at least negative duties to respect the law.  
Furthermore, this approach also has significance for the discussion of the moral 
duties of TNCs, namely that negative duties are owed to all right-holders regardless of 
proximity. Negative duties are universal, which means that we have a duty not to harm 
foreigners and people with whom we have a limited relation, as much as we have a duty 
not to harm our compatriots and neighbours. In Pogge’s terms, “[…] the strength of an 
agent’s moral reason not to harm another unduly does not vary with the potential 
victim’s relational closeness to the agent […]” (2008, p. 138). On the other hand, positive 
duties to protect or realise human rights can vary in strength according to the physical 
proximity of the right-holder to the duty-bearer, as embodied in the concept “sphere of 
influence”. However, such a presumption proves to have limited applicability in the case 
of TNCs, as their influence is geographically spread and is not always exercised directly 
through the company’s operations but also through institutional channels. Take, for 
example, a TNC based in Germany that manufactures its products through casual 
subcontractors in China and Bangladesh, where it does not have a physical presence. The 
positive duties approach might have a limited standing to convincingly attribute some 
positive duties to TNCs towards the people who manufacture the company’s products in 
China or Bangladesh on the basis of proximity or relation. In contrast, it can be argued 
that the corporation has as much responsibility to avoid doing harm in the communities 
near their operations in Germany as it has in China and Bangladesh, and therefore has to 
take proactive steps to ensure that it is not violating rights, regardless of the proximity. 
 Conclusion 4.7.
 
This chapter presented a summary of the positions prevalent in political theory 
and philosophy on the moral duties of transnational corporations in relation to human 
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rights. It discussed recent literature exploring ways in which TNCs can be said to bear 
negative duties to respect and also positive duties to protect and fulfil human rights. 
While some agree that corporations acquire some positive duties when the state is unable 
to fulfil its role as the primary agent of justice, others contend that corporations do not 
only bear stringent positive duties in such cases, but also when the state can act as the 
primary agent of justice, because of some of their attributes or their de facto governing 
roles.  
The second part of the chapter highlighted some principled and pragmatic 
grounds for questioning the positive duties approach and proposed as an alternative 
conceptualising the duties of corporations as essentially negative duties to respect. Such 
approach does not allocate to corporations positive duties on the basis of their 
capabilities, but on the harm they may cause or contribute to produce, thus avoiding 
some of the principled objection against the positive duties approach. In addition, it also 
overcomes some of its efficiency-related problems, as it builds upon the duties to respect 
human rights that companies have already accepted for themselves. Such negative duties, 
however, this thesis proposes, should not only be understood as duties to refrain from 
doing harm through their direct operations. Instead, they should be broadly understood 
in order to encompass the participation of companies in the creation of structures that 




. An Institutional Chapter 5
Approach to Allocating Moral 
Responsibility to TNCs 
 
 
In this point of the case the question is distinctly presented whether the 
people of the United States are to govern through representatives chosen 
by their unbiased suffrages or whether the money and power of a great 
corporation are to be secretly exerted to influence their judgment and 
control their decisions. 




Thus far this thesis has argued that corporations bear primarily moral negative 
duties to respect human rights and has indicated some problems of allocating them prima 
facie positive duties to protect and fulfil them. This chapter will focus on exploring what 
the negative duty to respect human rights implies. Recent guidelines for corporate 
responsibility, most notably the UN Framework, have tended to follow an interactional 
view of harm, where harm is viewed as resulting directly from the actions of an agent. 
This understanding, however, is very restricted, as it does not take account of the harms 
that corporations contribute via institutional channels. As a result, contemporary 
accounts of corporate responsibility have attributed responsibility to corporations only on 
the basis of their direct impact on human rights, which refer to direct causation and 
contribution to human rights harms. This chapter will propose a more comprehensive 
understanding of the possible negative duties of transnational corporations, one that 
takes into consideration their institutionally mediated contributions to human rights 
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deficits. This understanding will also emphasize duties not to cooperate in the imposition 
of a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably causes human rights harms.  
The discussion of the chapter is structured as follows. First, it will give an 
overview of both the interactional and the institutional moral approaches in order to 
establish a framework against which accounts of responsibility can be evaluated. Then, it 
will show why current approaches to corporate responsibility can be regarded as 
interactional accounts. While they are appropriate to analyse most of corporate 
wrongdoings, they are limited insofar as they do not reflect the complex network of 
institutions within which corporations operate. While this deficiency has been noted in 
recent literature (see Macdonald, 2009; 2011; Young, 2004), proposed alternatives 
remain too limited, as they tend to focus only on specific institutional channels through 
which corporations can exert harm, such as business networks and supply chains. In 
contrast, this chapter will argue that some responsibility should also be attributed to 
corporations for the human rights outcomes to which they contribute by shaping and 
supporting a global institutional order that foreseeably and routinely leads to human 
rights deficits. To support this claim, this chapter will provide some empirical evidence 
on how corporations contribute to the global institutional order by acting both in the 
political and the private spheres. If it is true that corporations contribute to harm through 
the global institutional order, the responsibility attributed to them should be considerably 
expanded, and we should also take account of some derivative obligations, as will be 
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 Interactional and Institutional Moral Approaches 5.2.
 
An influential frame for allocating duties in cosmopolitan political theory57 has 
been to draw distinctions between the ‘interactional’58 and the ‘institutional’ moral 
approaches (Follesdal & Pogge, 2005, p. 2; Pogge, 2010a, pp. 14-15). In the interactional 
approach, social phenomena are considered to be the effects of the conduct of agents 
(Follesdal & Pogge, 2005, pp. 2-3; Pogge, 2010a, p. 14); therefore social phenomena can 
be traced back to specific collective or individual entities. This approach involves 
questioning whether the agents involved could have foreseen their actions would lead to 
a regrettable outcome, and whether they could have acted differently without substantial 
costs to themselves or to anyone else (Pogge, 2010a, p. 15). “For example, the fact that 
some particular child suffers from malnutrition, that some woman is unemployed, or that 
a man was hurt in a traffic accident. We can causally trace such events back to the 
conduct of individual and collective agents, including the person who is suffering the 
harm” (Follesdal & Pogge, 2005, p. 2; Pogge, 2010a, p. 15). The interactional approach 
sees principles of distributive justice applying directly to the conduct of moral agents. 
Therefore, a person’s rights generate duties on all others regardless of the existence of 
common social institutions (Pogge, 1992a, pp. 50-51). 
In contrast, the institutional approach sees social phenomena as effects of the 
institutional structure in place, of how our social world is shaped (Pogge, 1995, p. 241; 
2010a, pp. 14-15). The institutional account recognises that while certain events can be 
                                                       
57 Contemporary cosmopolitan theories share three main elements, 1) individualism: they consider that 
human beings are the ultimate units of concern; 2) universality: the status of unit of moral concern is 
attached equally to every human being; and 3) generality: persons are units of moral concern for everyone 
and not just to particular groups, such as fellow compatriots (Pogge, 1992a, pp. 48-49; see also Caney, 2010). 
58 It is important to distinguish between the term “interactional” and “interactionist” found in Buchanan 
(2004, pp. 83-85). The latter refers to a position that supports the idea that justice is a morally obligatory goal 
of the international legal system based on three premises: 1) there is a global basic structure that has effects 
on individuals, 2) because of the pervasive effects of the structural arrangement, it is subject to assessment 
from the standpoint of justice, and 3) justice ought to be the goal of the institutional arrangement. Therefore, 
while Thomas Pogge does not develop an interactional approach, he offers a “special version of the 
interactionist approach, one that relies on the general moral obligation not to harm other persons” 
(Buchanan, 2004, p. 85).  
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seen as the result of particular agents’ conduct, some of them can also be traced back to 
the standing features of the social system in which they occur (Pogge, 2010a, p. 15), 
which include schemes of trade, property, money, markets, governments, laws, 
conventions, etc. (Pogge, 1992, p. 51; 1998, p. 263; 2010 p. 15; Caney, 2005, p. 106). It 
requires making counterfactual statements about how such outcomes would have been 
different if the social rules had been different (Follesdal & Pogge, 2005, p. 3; Pogge, 
2010a, p. 15). “In this vein, one might causally trace child malnutrition back to high 
import duties on foodstuffs, unemployment to a restrictive monetary policy, and traffic 
accidents to the lack of regular motor vehicle safety inspection” (Pogge, 2010a, p. 15).  
 For the institutional approach, individuals’ membership in an institutional 
scheme is morally relevant, as it is presumed that the pervasive nature of social 
institutions has impact on most aspects of their members’ lives and interests. “The moral 
importance [of institutions] stems, then, from the extent to which they affect people’s 
ability to further their interests and to exercise their abilities and pursue their conception 
of the good” (Caney, 2005, p. 112). Principles of distributive justice are seen as applying 
to institutions, and the main concern is how to design or choose the institutions that 
mediate the distribution of resources (Pogge, 1992a, p. 56). For principles of justice to 
apply, it is presumed that some common institutional scheme must be in place. Thus, for 
this view, the existence of cosmopolitan principles of justice is contingent on the 
existence of a common global institutional scheme (Caney, 2005, p. 106). If we lived in a 
world of autarkic states, distributive justice would be limited to the domestic sphere. 
Given, however, that current institutions which shape the distribution of resources such 
as property and trade have a global impact, they activate cosmopolitan principles of 
justice. Responsibility is thus attributed to moral agents in function of the institutional 
schemes they establish and support (Pogge, 1992a, p. 50).  
Criticisms against the institutional account indicate apparent contradictions on 
attaching moral significance to the institutional order. Cosmopolitans –including 
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institutionalists– tend to argue that morally arbitrary facts, such as place of birth, should 
not affect one life’s prospects. At the same time, the institutional approach attaches 
moral significance to the institutional order in which people are born, which is also 
arbitrary. “If someone is born into an impoverished system that has no links with the rest 
of the world, a wholly institutional account59 must maintain that members of the latter 
have no duties of justice to the former –thereby penalizing them, depriving them of the 
very means to live, simply because of their ‘place of birth’” (Caney, 2007, p. 283). A 
wholly institutional perspective is also seen as creating perverse incentives for the better-
off to disassociate themselves from the disadvantaged in order to avoid being bound by 
the duties generated from sharing an institutional order (Caney, 2007, pp. 284-286). 
Further, a wholly institutional approach seems to presume that only institutions can have 
impact on their members’ lives or at least that the most significant constraints to 
someone’s choices and interests come from the social institutional arrangement to which 
they belong. Therefore, it fails to consider the possibility that other actors outside the 
institutional system may also exert considerable influence (Caney, 2005, p. 112).  
Such criticisms, however, may have little practical relevance in the current 
globalised world. Arguably, nowadays virtually every person across the globe lives under 
a common institutional order that has impact on the configuration of national 
institutions, and ultimately shapes opportunities for all persons. Thus, criticisms based in 
the exclusion of some persons would lose force, as would those about dissociation, given 
the extent of global institutional interdependence and a plausible presumption that full 
dissociation simply would not be possible (see Pogge 1992a, p.51).  
The contrasting views on the moral relevance of institutions between the two 
approaches also generate different interpretations of human rights. For the interactional 
                                                       
59 Caney makes a distinction between what he calls the “wholly institutional approach” and the “partial 
institutional approach”. The former contends that duties of justice are owed only fellow members of one’s 
institutional schemes; whereas the latter argues that some, but not all, of the duties of justice one has are 
owed to fellow members of the scheme. Therefore, the partial institutional approach allows that one may 
have duties of justice to people outside one’s own scheme (Caney, 2007, p. 281).  
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account, human rights are moral demands made by each human being against all others, 
whereas for the institutional account, human rights are primarily claims on social 
institutions and secondarily, claims against those who uphold those institutions (Pogge, 
2008, pp. 50-51). As human rights impose constraints on shared practices, they are 
contingent to the existence of such practices. While everyone has a duty not to uphold a 
harmful institutional scheme against everyone else, human rights-based obligations are 
only owed to fellow participants in the scheme (Pogge, 1992a, p. 51). Therefore, what 
counts as a human right violation for each approach is different (Pogge, 1992a, pp. 50-
55). For example, it could be said that a just institutional scheme would protect a right 
against unjust discrimination; however it cannot be reasonably expected that an 
institutional arrangement will reduce the incidence of discrimination to zero. The 
institutional account would see a right against unjust discrimination as satisfied if the 
institutional order reasonably secures this right for its participants, by for example, 
imposing and enforcing penalties for those who violate the rights. If, under this order, 
some person were discriminated against, the interactional approach would count it as a 
human rights violation. The institutional approach would not necessarily register a single 
instance of discrimination as a violation because the order provided reasonable 
protection for that right. In contrast, if the institutional order provided inadequate 
protection against discrimination, the institutional approach would regard it as a human 
rights violation even if the interactional view did not, e.g., in the case that those 
insufficiently protected persons were not facing active discrimination. The prospect that 
they would face such discrimination because of inadequate protections would be seen as 
a violation in the institutional approach (see Pogge, 1992, p. 55).  
Naturally, the two approaches lead to different descriptions, explanations and 
moral assessments of social phenomena (Follesdal & Pogge, 2005, p. 2; Pogge, 1995, p. 
241). However, despite the differences, both views are not necessarily incompatible; 
rather they can complement each other (Pogge, 1992a, p. 50; Shue, 1996, p. 225; see 
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Caney, 2007 for an hybrid account). The interactional approach can be seen as offering a 
“microexplanation” of a social phenomenon or salient event, while the institutional 
approach provides a “macroexplanation” (Pogge, 1989, p. 273) that considers the general 
context and the structural constraints. As an example, the incidence of human rights 
violations by corporations in developing countries can be explained by the institutional 
approach as a matter of global exploitation and unequal division of labour between the 
global North and the South. However, this explanation may not be necessarily true for 
each particular case, where the interactional approach may offer a better analytical tool.  
 TNCs Responsibility Under the UN Framework: An Interactional 5.3.
Approach 
 
The dominant current approaches to ascribing human rights responsibilities to 
transnational corporations are interactional. The UN Framework and the OECD 
Guidelines tend to see TNCs as harming human rights or having negative impact on 
them 60 directly through their conduct, business decisions and operations. In these 
approaches, impact is assessed on the basis of the outcomes a corporation has generated 
or contributed to generating through its independent decisions and actions. It does not 
include those outcomes in which TNCs indirectly participated or that have been 
mediated by institutional structures. In fact, in one of his early reports as Special 
Representative on the Issue of Business and Human Rights, Ruggie rejected the use of 
the concept ‘sphere of influence’ to describe the contribution of TNCs to human rights 
outcomes. He based his decision on the lack of “legal pedigree” of the term (Ruggie, 
2007a, p. 24), but also on the fact that at least one of its possible meanings did not follow 
the interactional notion of impact and responsibility. As he explains: 
                                                       
60 In line with the usage of the Special Representative, “harm” and “impact” will be used as synonyms (see 
for example, Ruggie, 2008; 2011). 
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[the term] sphere of influence conflates two very different meanings of 
influence: one is impact, where the company’s activities or relationships 
are causing human rights harm; the other is whatever leverage a 
company may have over actors that are causing harm. […] Anchoring 
corporate responsibility in the second meaning of influence requires 
assuming, […] that ‘can implies ought’. But companies cannot be held 
responsible for the human rights impacts of every entity over which they 
may have some influence, because this would include cases in which 
they were not a causal agent, direct or indirect, of the harm in question 
[…]. Asking companies to support human rights voluntarily where they 
have influence is one thing; but attributing responsibility to them on that 
basis alone is quite another (Ruggie, 2008, p. 19). 
 The Special Representative makes a sharp distinction between “influence” and 
“impact”. While he recognises that companies may have some influence in cases where 
they were not direct or indirect causal agents of harm, it is not enough for attributing 
responsibility. In contrast, he accepts the idea of determining responsibility on the basis 
of the impact corporations may exert on human rights. Here, the defining characteristic 
of impact seems to lie on the exercise of unmediated agency and the somewhat direct 
contribution to human rights harms through their activities and relations.  
Similar considerations of impact and responsibility tied to unmediated agency 
can be found in the 2011 edition of the OECD Guidelines. They ask corporations to 
“[…] address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved […], within the 
context of their own activities, avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts […and] provide for or co-operate through legitimate processes in the 
remediation of adverse human rights impacts where they identify that they have caused 
or contributed to these impacts” (OECD, 2011b, p. 31). As can be observed, the 
Guidelines have a similar approach to the UN Framework, which they have expressly 
endorsed. Responsibility is attributed in function of the impacts they caused or 
contributed to cause, while the involvement of corporations on human rights harms is 
limited to “the contexts of their own activities”. 
The extended usage of such approaches, which directly link unmediated agency-
impact-responsibility, seems to partly respond to certain appealing theoretical features 
and their adequacy to explaining most of the current cases involving TNCs in human 
rights harms. Such approaches seem to command certain “naturalness” attributable to its 
relation with the “phenomenology of agency” that is “[…] a characteristic way of 
experiencing ourselves as agents with casual powers” (Scheffler, 1995, p. 227). According 
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to this orientation, agents perceive their own agency as more implicated the closer the 
effects of their actions are felt, when such effects are produced individually rather than 
collectively, and if they are caused by actions rather than by omissions. The 
attractiveness of these interactional approaches also “[…] can be understood in part as 
resulting from its normative grounding in a set of individualist normative assumptions 
that command a reasonably broad-based consensus across a range of political and 
ideological positions […]” (Macdonald, 2011, p. 551). The extended acceptance of the 
liberal understanding of individuals as the ultimate right-holders and duty-bearers make 
this approach appealing to global regulatory efforts insofar as it offers a common ground 
to discuss this topic across a diversity of actors. 
In fact, it seems that corporations embrace the idea that their responsibility is 
limited by the impact they may exert, which in turn is confined to cases when they 
exercise unmediated agency. For example, the German sportswear company, Adidas, 
says it focuses its human rights efforts on areas within its own direct influence “[…] by 
safeguarding the rights of [its] employees and those of the workers who manufacture [its] 
products through direct supplier relations” (2011, p. 4). Similarly, the American software 
corporation, Microsoft, notes its “[…] commitment to respect fundamental human rights 
of  [its] employees, people working for [its] suppliers, and [its] customers” (2012) and 
delineates four key areas in which it can exert impact: products and partnerships, 
employees, suppliers and communities in which it has some non-for-profit programmes. 
Meanwhile, the American consumer goods company, Procter & Gamble, maintains that 
the company “[…] is committed to universal human rights, particularly those of 
employees, communities in which [it] operate[s], and parties with whom [it does] 
business” (2009). As can be observed in these examples, the particular areas in which 
corporations recognise they bear responsibility are those in which they can exercise direct 
agency and are close to their operations such as employees, customers, suppliers and 
nearby communities. 
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Such accounts of responsibility also seem to be widely developed due to their 
effectiveness in analysing most cases involving corporations in violations of human rights. 
In many of them the relationship between the corporation and the population affected is 
proximate in time and space and attributable in very direct ways to the agency of the 
corporation involved (Macdonald, 2011, p. 552). Examples include Shell dumping toxics 
into the Niger Delta and oil trader Trafigura unloading toxic waste, causing 
environmental and health problems to the nearby communities. In these cases 
corporations contributed to harm through their direct actions and the regretful outcomes 
can be traced to an identifiable source. Thus in a large proportion of cases of corporate 
misconduct, interactional accounts seem to be the most appropriate approach to 
determining impact and attributing responsibility. 
 Limitations of the Interactional Approach 5.3.1.
 
While interactional accounts of responsibility have certain attractive features 
and are able to account for many cases involving TNCs in human rights harms, they 
have an important deficiency: “this is that [they are] based on the conception of 
corporate agency that does not take sufficiently seriously the significance of social 
institutions as mediating channels between the exercise of corporate agency and resulting 
human rights outcomes” (Macdonald, 2011, p. 552). These approaches tend to rely on an 
artificial image of the world, where the conduct of agents generates social phenomena 
that, in turn, are traceable to specific agents. As a result, these accounts tend to be 
suitable for analysing specific cases in which corporate wrongdoing is confined within 
narrow geographical and temporal boundaries.  
Approaches consistent with the interactional account can acknowledge that an 
agent’s conduct may have long-term and spatially distant implications. They tend, 
however, to focus on proximal outcomes. The attribution of responsibility relies on 
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tracing the causal relation between the agent’s conduct and the effects to which it 
contributed, and such relations tend to be more clearly identifiable in proximity. Also, 
agency tends to be perceived as implicated to a larger extent when it affects local 
surroundings in the present and near future (Scheffler, 1995, p. 228). Such a conception 
thus tends to ignore the rising importance of global actors and their profound effects over 
international rules and practices, as well as over national policies (Pogge, 2010a, p. 17). It 
also tends to overlook the fact that the political and economic developments in one part 
of the world can have dramatic effects on people in other places and epochs (Scheffler, 
1995, p. 229).  
These agent-related accounts of responsibility have generally identified corporate 
harm with direct harm, which means that corporations might not be considered to have 
impact on human rights in cases when the harms are not directly linked to the 
corporation’s operations and activities, even if it has reaped the benefits or contributed to 
producing harm through complex institutional channels. Another limit of analysing 
complex social phenomena like poverty or human rights violations exclusively through 
the interactional approach is that the resulting explanations might be at best misleading 
or incomplete. Furthermore, considering exclusively direct impacts from TNCs creates 
perverse incentives for corporations to obscure their involvement in negative human 
rights outcomes. For instance, in the 1990s, major retailers and brands in the garment 
industry, as well as coffee roasting companies, responded to anti-corporate campaigns by 
pointing to long chains of subcontracting and outsourcing as evidence that violations of 
human rights in factories and farms were beyond their control (Young, 2004, p. 367; 
Macdonald & Macdonald, 2010, p. 34). Still nowadays, corporations across 
manufacturing industries opt for a distant relation with their supply chains instead of 
keeping them under direct control, in part as a way to avoid legal responsibility in host 
countries (Wells & Elias, 2005, p. 150). 
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 Macdonald (2009; 2011) has indicated such crucial shortcoming of the current 
approaches and in turn has proposed the Spheres of Responsibility Framework. This is a 
multilevel account of corporate responsibility that takes into consideration the 
participation of corporations in several institutional channels through which they can 
influence human rights outcomes, such as business networks and supply chains 
(Macdonald, 2011, p. 553). The next section will present the Spheres of Responsibility 
Framework.  
 The Spheres of Responsibility Framework 5.4.
 
As discussed in the previous sections, most accounts have tended to attribute 
responsibility to TNCs on the basis of their negative impact on human rights, which in 
turn is closely related to exercise of unmediated agency thus ignoring harms which TNCs 
produce or contribute to produce via institutional channels. However, it has also been 
argued that institutions and institutional channels are relevant factors to consider in the 
conceptualisation of the impact corporations may have on human rights and on the 
allocation of moral responsibility, given that they may enable or constrain the exercise of 
corporate agency (Macdonald, 2011, p. 552). 
The Spheres of Responsibility Framework suggests the use of the concept 
“complex negative duties”, encompassing both what Macdonald calls “distributed 
negative duties” and “derivative positive duties” (2011, p. 557). The concept of 
‘distributed negative duties’ refers to the “[…] distribution of responsibility between 
multiple actors contributing to complex processes of human rights harm” (Macdonald, 
2011, p. 557). It acknowledges that human rights are being affected by decisions made 
through institutional arrangements such as supply chains. Here, she proposes to 
disaggregate responsibilities among the decision makers. Such a measure seems to be 
particularly relevant in certain industries. For example, in the case of commodity grade 
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coffee in Nicaragua, the state is allocated the responsibility under existing guidelines to 
look after the well-being of workers and producers. In fact, the control of some of the 
decisions that affect such individuals are distributed across a range of state and non-state 
decision makers across the whole supply chain (Macdonald, 2007, p. 796). She also 
proposes attributing some derivative positive duties to such decision-makers in order to 
avoid participating in collective practices that will foreseeably produce harm (Macdonald, 
2011, p. 558).  
The Spheres of Responsibility Framework captures more accurately the way in 
which TNCs operate within an arrangement of institutions through which they may 
produce or contribute to produce harm. This is an important development in the 
direction of a more precise attribution of responsibility, and it rightly highlights some 
relevant mechanisms through which TNCs can contribute to human rights violations, 
which have tended to be ignored by recent accounts of corporate responsibility. 
Nonetheless, this framework is still limited, as it overlooks at least one other possible 
way in which corporations can also contribute to human rights harms: by helping to 
shape and maintain a global institutional order that engenders human rights deficits. 
 The Global Institutional Order and Its Impact on Human Rights 5.5.
 
The global institutional order has been described as a scheme of globally shared 
institutions, where the term ‘institution’ refers to 
[…] a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with 
their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules 
specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden; and 
they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when 
violations occur […]. An institution exists at a certain time and place 
when the actions specified by it are regularly carried out in accordance 
with a public understanding that the system of rules defining the 
institution is to be followed (Muchlinski, 2007, pp. 47-48). 
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This order includes schemes of trade, property, money, markets, governments, 
borders, treaties, diplomacy, communications, laws, and conventions (Pogge, 1989, pp. 
263, 276; 2010, p. 15; Buchanan, 2004, p. 85; Caney, 2005, p. 106;). Such institutions 
define and regulate property, the division of labour, political and economic competition 
and how institutions themselves can be established, modified, revised and enforced 
(Pogge, 2008, p. 37). According to the institutional approach, institutions and the 
institutional order are crucial factors to understand social phenomena, as they create 
expectations, encourage some forms of behaviour and discourage others, define and 
install core norms, identities, capabilities, purposes and relationships and also act as 
constraints of agency (Macdonald, 2011, p. 552).  
This institutional order has increasingly profound effects over the domestic lives 
of nations (Pogge, 1992a, p. 51; 2010a, p. 17). As the interaction across traditional 
borders expands, so does the necessity to establish common transnational, regional and 
global institutions in more areas. While these institutions are developed at a macro-level, 
the design of the global institutional order has impact upon national policies and the 
conditions of life experienced worldwide (Pogge, 2010a, p. 19). For example, global rules 
of trade and investment may require countries to modify domestic laws, while rules on 
intellectual property may alter the way in which they organise their education, healthcare 
system or agricultural sector. For example, under the agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), implemented with the World Trade 
Organisation’s launch in 1994, South Korea was required to restrict the copying of 
textbooks and software, which was common practice in education provision until 1987 
(Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002, pp. 19-20). That is not to say that clear violations of 
human rights ensued. Rather, it demonstrates the pervasiveness of the current global 
institutional order. Global institutions can have impact on the lives of billions of people 
across space and time, even if they had little or no input in the design of such 
arrangement. 
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It has been argued that the design of the current global institutional order 
foreseeably and avoidably engenders human rights harms including severe poverty and 
radical inequality (Pogge, 1992, p. 56; 2000; 2002; 2005c, 47-50; 2005d, p. 55; 2008, esp. 
ch. 4; 2010a, esp. ch.2). This is reflected, for example, in the 20 million people who die 
every year of poverty-related causes and the fact that the bottom half of the world 
population shares only 1.1% of the global private wealth, while the top 10% enjoys 
85.1% (Pogge, 1992a, p. 62; 2010a, pp. 4-5). An institutional order can be judged as 
harmful by the incentives and penalties it has in place, which make an outcome more or 
less likely to occur. Thus, while it is true that we may not foresee the exact effects of a 
particular institution, we can evaluate the likelihood of certain outcomes, given the 
structures in place. While we cannot know the exact outcomes an institution will 
produce, we can reasonably expect, for example, that increased patent protection of 
medicines will result in higher prices, thereby affecting the access of the poorest people to 
patented drugs. Therefore, it can be argued that the harmful features of the order could 
arguably be averted by taking reasonable measures. For instance, Pogge has proposed an 
alternative system for drug pricing that gives incentives to corporations to make 
affordable drugs for treatable diseases with disproportionate incidence in developing 
countries (see Pogge, 2009). Thus the harm the current global order produces can be 
described as being easily avoidably insofar as there exist at least one feasible alternative, 
which adoption entails reasonable costs.   
The current global order is not a natural but a socially constructed arrangement 
in which some of its wealthiest members have played a dominant role in its design 
(Pogge, 2008, p. 178; 2010a, p. 21). They have done this, for instance, by establishing 
organisations that represent their own interests, sometimes at the expense of the poorest 
countries. For example, the World Trade Organisation has faced many criticisms for its 
double standards regarding open markets in detriment of the global poor. Developed 
countries have systematically imposed many protectionist measures in sectors in which 
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developing countries have a competitive advantage such as agriculture and textiles in 
order to protect themselves from cheap imports (Jones, 2004, pp. 155-157; Pogge, 2007, p. 
34; 2010a, p. 18). They also have proposed and achieved the passage of agreements such 
as TRIPS which benefit industries that are disproportionately concentrated in their 
territories, e.g., software, entertainment, pharmaceutical and agribusiness (Drahos & 
Braithwaite, 2002, p. 11; Pogge, 2009a, p. 197).  
Another way in which the wealthiest countries contribute to shaping the global 
order, and arguably contributing to harm through it is by the imposition of rules that 
contribute to engender human rights deficits instead of alleviating them. An example is 
the structural adjustment programs of the International Monetary Fund. These are 
imposed on developing countries, which have had to resort to IMF lending to address 
balance of payments crises. The conditionalities, or strings attached to such loans have 
been criticized as one-size-fits-all, and for causing avoidably high levels of dislocation 
harm in terms of increased unemployment and poverty in regions such as Latin America 
and South East Asia, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. The outcomes, as 
economist Joseph Stiglitz notes, are closely related to institutional power structures and 
the predominance of richer states: 
Underlying the problems of the IMF and the other international 
economic institutions is the problem of governance: who decides what 
they do. The institutions are dominated not just by the wealthiest 
industrial countries but by commercial and financial interests in those 
countries, and the policies of the institutions naturally reflect this. The 
choice of heads for these institutions symbolizes the institutions’ 
problem, and too often has contributed to their dysfunction. While 
almost all of the activities of the IMF and the World Bank today are in 
the developing world (certainly, all of their lending), they are led by 
representatives from the industrialized nations […]. The problems also 
arise from who speaks for the country. At the IMF, it is the finance 
ministers and the central bank governors. At the WTO, it is the trade 
ministers. Each of these ministers is closely aligned with particular 
constituencies within their countries. The trade ministries reflect the 
concerns of the business community […]  (emphasis original) (Stiglitz, 
2002, p. 19). 
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The existing design of the global institutional order thus reinforces the very inequality 
that enables the representative of the wealthiest countries to impose such a skewed design 
in the first place (Pogge, 2010a, p. 35).  
An institutional approach, then, would ascribe some responsibility to those 
agents who have shaped and maintained a global order that foreseeably and avoidably 
engenders human rights deficits. Given that the G761 countries are reasonably democratic, 
their citizens are seen as sharing this responsibility (Pogge, 2005d 58; 2010, esp. Ch. 1 & 
2). While it is true that the present citizens of affluent countries cannot be held 
responsible for the initial creation of such an order, they are seen as liable for its recent 
design and for supporting its continuance (Pogge, 2005d, p. 55). These citizens have 
enough information to know what is happening in other parts of the world that they 
could thus require their governments to re-shape some of the institutions of the global 
order.   
Some have seen the approach proposed by Pogge as overwhelmingly state-
centric. It gives strong emphasis to states as actors in the global arena, in particular on 
the richer, more powerful states (Gould, 2007, p. 388). The responsibility of individuals 
is ascribed only on the basis of their state membership. Yet, we can note that most 
individuals have very limited power to influence international institutions, albeit with 
few exceptions such as extremely wealthy individuals like Warren Buffet or Bill Gates, 
whose business choices might have significant impact on entire national economies. In 
the vast majority of cases, citizens’ influence on the global sphere is mediated by their 
states. Also, while the emergence of a “post-Wesphalian order” has been discussed and 
non-state actors have increased their participation in the global arena, the state still holds 
unique prerogatives such as signing treaties, creating domestic laws or being a full 
member of international organisations such as the United Nations. Also, given the 
                                                       
61 The Group of 7 is composed by some of the wealthiest nations in the world: Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom.  
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original configuration of these organisations, most of the decisions taken tend to be 
formulated on state level. For example, in the case of the IMF, its lending policies are 
targeted to member states, not to citizens or other groups.  
If we only consider individual and state influence, however, we overlook the fact 
that international non-state actors can also exert considerable influence in the shape and 
maintenance of the global institutional order. Unlike citizens, their actions are not 
bounded by membership in a state community. This, in fact, constitutes one of the main 
factors in the existence of the governance gap, as argued in Chapter 2. As even Pogge 
admits, “[…] the traditional conception of the world of international relations as 
inhabited only by states is rapidly losing its explanatory adequacy –through the […] 
creation and increasing stature on the international stage of non-state actors, such as 
multinational corporations, international agencies, regional organizations, and NGOs” 
(Pogge, 2010a, p. 17). Moreover, even when states have a privileged position in 
governmental organisations, other entities such as NGOs and TNCs have an input in the 
states’ decisions, but also beyond them.  
At the same time, the participation of transnational corporations in the 
configuration of a global institutional order seems to be different from the participation of 
individual agents. In Pogge’s account, the input from citizens is confined to their actions 
as public individuals and their participation in the political life of their national states. 
Thus, there appears to be a clear distinction between the public and private participation 
of the individual. In fact he uses the term “citizens” instead of “nationals”, “inhabitants” 
or “individuals”, emphasising the public role of the these actors. Although in the 
conceptualisation of global institutions Pogge mentions “social practices”, which might 
also be influenced or modified through the actions of individuals as private actors, he 
does not acknowledge it or at least he does not allocate duties to citizens for their actions 
in the private arena. For him, “[…] all these institutional schemes are shaped and 
reshaped though political struggles” (Pogge, 2010a, p. 4). 
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Corporations, in contrast to individuals, do not influence the global institutional 
order only via national governments. Some of the largest corporations or corporate 
associations can also directly participate in international organisations and forums. 
Furthermore, unlike ordinary individuals, corporations’ economic power, size and high 
mobility allow them exert considerable influence when they are performing in the private 
sphere. For example, Wal-Mart’s purchasing power and its market share allow the 
company to exert influence across several economic sectors. Although companies might 
make decisions that are essentially of private nature, such as what to buy and sell and at 
what price, they can also exert some influence over the configuration of the global order. 
Transnational corporations, therefore, influence the global institutional order through 
their actions in the political but also in the private arenas. 
In the next section, the role of corporations in the political and private spheres 
will be reviewed in more detail. For purposes of clarity, I will present them as separate. 
However, it is important to note that the impact of TNCs in the private sphere can have 
important public consequences. 
 Transnational Corporations in the Political Sphere 5.6.
 
Transnational corporations can be considered private entities representing private 
interests, but their significant power and participation in several aspects of the public life 
allow them to have impact on public interests. “In a market-controlled society the 
institutions that shape and dominate the global economic sphere inevitably turn into 
major political forces that affect the organization of society as a whole” (Wettstein, 2009, 
p. 180). Corporations can engage in the political sphere by participating in national or 
international forums, by supporting political campaigns, by lobbying national legislators, 
by normalising rules and practices or even by engaging in illegal activities such as bribery 
of government officials in order to incentivise or deter legislations.  
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One of the mechanisms by which TNCs can influence the deliberation and 
establishment of legal rules is the practice of lobbying. The most evident case is the 
United States, where corporations and other collective groups are allowed to indirectly 
participate in the policy-making process and decisions to represent their interests 
(Wettstein, 2009, p. 240).  With the increasing “marketisation of politics”, political 
campaigns, candidates and parties have become more dependent on the financial 
contributions from corporations (Wettstein, 2009, p. 240).  As a result, it is possible to 
observe “regulatory capture”, which refers to the process through which corporations end 
up influencing the government agencies that were supposed to regulate them (Dal Bó, 
2006, p. 203). This means that public interests, which were supposed to be represented by 
democratic governments, are in effect subordinated to private interest.  
 The impact of lobbying is not confined to national boundaries. Economic 
interests increasingly drive relationships among states, and given the pervasive role of 
corporations in the economy, they, along with industry associations have earned a 
prominent place in deliberating foreign policy in the capacity of experts or advisors 
(Wettstein, 2009, p. 241). A consequence is that corporations have become able to exert 
significant pressure and influence on governments to curb regulations or to design them 
to protect their private interests. Such regulations, even if they are of domestic nature, 
can have significant consequences for global structures. An example can be found in the 
financial sector. In 1999, the United States Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited 
commercial banks from engaging in the investment business was repealed. One year later, 
US President Bill Clinton signed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which 
effectively allowed unregulated trading of financial derivatives and put them beyond the 
reach of federal regulators. This arguably played a key role in the 2008 financial crisis 
(Corn, 2008; Topham, 2011, p. 134). The Modernization Act also made possible the 
entry of commercial banks into markets of derivatives based on food commodities. This 
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is seen as playing a critical role in the soaring prices of food since around 2005, 
threatening food security across the developing world (De Schutter, 2013, pp. 2-3; 2012).  
There is evidence that some of the largest financial corporations exerted 
significant influence in passing the Modernization Act (Corn, 2008; Harper, Leising, & 
Harrington, 2009; Lipton, 2008; Martinelli, 2012, p. 36). It has been estimated that large 
Wall Street banks spent more than US$5 billion from 1998 to 2000 to lobby to pass it and 
overhaul the Glass-Steagall Act (Topham, 2011, p. 142). Evidence of corporate influence 
on the Modernization Act can also be found in a legal provision requested by the former 
US energy company Enron, the so called “Enron Loophole”, which exempts crucial 
energy commodities from government oversight (Corn, 2008; Lipton, 2008; Martinelli, 
2012, p. 36). “Even though it is difficult to link certain policy changes to a specific donor 
company, the general correlation between industry donations and the number of votes in 
Congress in favor of the respective industries leaves no doubt about the success of such 
corporate political strategies” (Wettstein, 2009, p. 240). Thus, by “feeding the political 
carrousel”, corporations ensure their interest are represented in the political arena, and in 
turn, political processes become a reflection of corporate interests and a manifestation of 
corporate authority (Wettstein, 2009, pp. 240-241). While corporations were able to exert 
significant influence on national scale, the Modernization Act had significant 
consequences in the configuration of financial instruments and institutions, an important 
part of the global institutional order, whose effect in the international prices of basic 
commodities has an impact well beyond the United States’ borders.  
Another example can be found in the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement 
within the WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. The TRIPS 
requires all WTO members to establish minimum standards for protecting and enforcing 
intellectual property rights, including patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs. The 
consequences of adopting the TRIPS have been particularly negative for developing 
countries, as patents tend to increase prices of drugs, effectively limiting the access of the 
Chapter 5: Institutional Responsibility of TNCs 
    
 
129 
poorest people to even essential medicines. There is ample evidence that some of the 
largest TNCs in intellectual property related industries, e.g. film, chemical, 
pharmaceutical, software and publishing, heavily invested to push for an agreement to 
protect their perceived interests (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002, p. 12; Novogrodsky, 2010, 
p. 346). “[…] Transnational corporations […] leveraged their relationship with state 
officials to shape trade law and influence the robust expansion of intellectual property 
rights into previously unreached markets” (Novogrodsky, 2010, p. 347).  
Further, we can note the earlier Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), created 
in 1986. It was an ad hoc agreement of 13 major US corporations62 dedicated to negotiate 
a comprehensive agreement on intellectual property in the GATT. One of the activities 
of the CEOs of these US-based companies was contacting their counterparts in Europe 
and Japan and urging them to pressure their national governments to support the 
inclusion of intellectual property in the forthcoming GATT’s Uruguay Round. 
Corporations played a direct role in the international negotiations. While much of the 
work of the IPC was lobbying national governments, some of its members accompanied 
the United States delegation to the GATT Ministerial Conference in an advisory capacity 
and some even participated as negotiators, trying to secure the support of other 
delegations of developing countries (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002, p. 118).  
The cases presented on financial derivatives and the TRIPS are representative of 
the US political system, however, similar cases can be found in other regions. In Europe, 
for example, large corporations are believed to spend up to €1 billion on lobbying yearly 
(Wettstein, 2009, p. 242). Large industrial groups such as the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT 63) and the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations 
                                                       
62 Bristol-Myers, DuPont, FMC Corporation, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, 
Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Pfizer, Rockwell International and Warner Communications. 
63 The ERT, founded in 1983, is a group of up to “[…] 50 chief executives and chairmen of major 
multinational companies of European parentage […]” (ERT, 2012). It was born out of the preoccupation of 
the lack of competitiveness of the European Union, symptom of the so-called ‘eurosclerosis’. Companies 
currently represented in the ERT include: the Swedish technology company Ericsson, the German electronic 
and engineering conglomerate Siemens, the German chemical company BASF, the British-Dutch oil 
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(UNICE) are considered to have an important input on the decision making processes in 
Europe (Balanya, Doherty, Hoedeman, Ma'anit, & Wessel, 2003). While there is no 
consensus on the level of influence of these groups in shaping European law, it is widely 
acknowledged that they had active involvement in the enactment of the 1989 Single 
European Act, the legal framework of the European Single Market. Some argue that 
TNCs business groups were decisive sources of the single market initiative (Balanya, 
Doherty, Hoedeman, Ma'anit, & Wessel, 2003, pp. 5,6,21). According to this account, 
the document Completing the Internal Market, which became the basis of the 1989 Single 
European Act, was almost identical to the document Europe 1990: An Agenda for Action 
presented in 1985 by Wisse Dekker, the ERT’s chairman. However, others consider that 
this claim exaggerates the role of corporate groups, which only reacted to initiatives that 
were proposed by governments or the European Commission and the Parliament 
(Moravcsik, 1998, p. 356). Whatever the ultimate demonstrable impact of such groups in 
the creation of the Act, what is clear is the existence of a close relationship between 
industrial leaders and government officials (Balanya, Doherty, Hoedeman, Ma'anit, & 
Wessel, 2003, pp. 5-6).   
 The Revolving Door Phenomenon 5.6.2.
 
In both the United States and European countries it is not uncommon to find 
cases that illustrate the revolving door phenomenon, which refers to the movement of 
personnel between roles as public servants and employees in the private sector – 
including corporations, lobbying groups, business networks and councils, chambers of 
commerce, and trade associations (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002, p. 70). A prominent 
example is Dick Cheney, who after serving as CEO of the oil company Halliburton 
                                                                                                                                                              
company Royal Dutch Shell, the British energy company E.ON, the Italian oil and gas company Eni, the 
German automaker BMW, the French oil and gas company Total, the British-Australian mining company 
Rio Tinto, the Swiss food and beverage company Nestlé, the Italian automaker Fiat, the Finish 
communication company Nokia, the Spanish clothing company Inditex and the British telecommunications 
company Vodafone. 
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became vice-president of the United States in 2001. Other cases include senior figures in 
Pfizer such as former CEO Edmund Pratt who later joined the US Advisory Committee 
on Trade Negotiations and Gerald Laubach, former president of Pfizer who later became 
part of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and the Council of 
Competitiveness (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002, p. 69). In Europe, this phenomenon is 
also observable among members of the European Commission, which have later joined 
boards of large transnational corporations. For example, Peter Sutherland, who served as 
European Commissioner from 1985 to 1989, later became Director General of GATT 
and Group Secretary and General Counsel of WTO from 1993 to 1995, and since then 
has been part of the advisory boards and has occupied senior positions in several TNCs64 
(Bloomberg Businessweek, 2013b). Another example is Étienne Davignon, who served 
as European Commissioner from 1977 to 1984 and later held senior positions in 
European and American TNCs in a range of industries, from energy to hotels 65 
(Bloomberg Businessweek, 2013a).  
While the precise impact of the revolving door phenomenon is still discussed, 
there are elements to argue that it may bias regulators in favour of business. Having a 
background in the industry may influence politicians to make pro-industry decisions, 
either because they become biased partisans of business interests or because they become 
more sensitive, receptive or aware of the concerns of business (Dal Bó, 2006, p. 214). On 
                                                       
64 Sutherland has been Chairman of the British oil and gas company, BP, and of the Allied Irish Bank. He 
has also been Director of the BW Group, a Bermuda-based company that provides maritime transportation 
services for energy and Non-Executive Director of the Swedish multinational technology company, Ericsson. 
He has had similar posts in the Royal Bank Of Scotland and on the UK-based National Westminster Bank 
(Natwest). He has served on the board of the German financial services provider, Allianz, and of Turkey’s 
top industrial conglomerate, Koç Holding. He has also been member of the advisory boards of China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation and the American pharmaceutical Eli Lilly. Currently, he is Chairman of 
the Board and Managing Director of Goldman Sachs International, UN Special Representative for 
Migration and Development and Member of Foundation Board of World Economic Forum (Bloomberg 
Businessweek, 2013b).  
65 He has hold senior positions in several Belgian TNCs including Compagnie Maritime Belge (maritime 
group), Recticel (plastics), Brussels Airlines, Fortis (insurance, banking and investment) Umicore 
(technology materials), Ageas (insurance), Sofina (holding company) Compagnie de Wagons Lits (hotels and 
travel), Sibeka (mining), Petrofina (oil), Tractebel (energy), Solvay (chemicals). He has also hold positions in 
the French hotel group Accor, the French electric utility company GDF Suez, the American biotechnology 
company Gilead Sciences, the British mining company Anglo American, the Canadian mining company Rio 
Tinto Alcan, and BASF, the largest chemical company in the world, headquartered in Germany. 
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the other hand, the possibility of future employment in the industry may bias decisions of 
politicians, who may act in accordance to enhancing their change of future employment 
in a company (Dal Bó, 2006, p. 214). Furthermore, the employment of former 
government officials by lobby groups allow them to have privileged access to legislators, 
which in turn, can generate favourable legislative outcomes for companies (Blanes i Vidal, 
Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012).  
 Other Practices 5.6.3.
 
Corporations can influence policy-making not only through lobbying or by 
participating in international negotiations, but also by setting the agenda of public 
discussion. While the issue of property rights had been widely discussed in national and 
international forums, from the early 1980s some companies had begun to exert public 
pressure to turn intellectual property into a trade issue at the global level. The World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) was publicly criticised by senior members of 
corporations for its weak approach to standards of intellectual property protection. 
Drahos & Braithwaite (2002, p. 27) highlight the prominent role of corporations of 
certain industries –including computer, pharmaceutical and chemical– to bring the topic 
into the national discussion and to influence public opinion on this issue by linking 
copyright violation to organised crime.  
A similar approach has been found in the biotechnology industry, where some 
corporations have tried to promote genetically modified food (GM) by changing the 
public perception about this technology through a rhetoric that has appealed to the end of 
world hunger, food security and environmental sustainability (see Williams, 2009). 
Overall, in the early 2000s, the top 200 TNCs held 90% of the world patents, while in the 
biotechnology industry only 5 companies controlled 95% of the gene-related patents 
(Wettstein, 2009 p. 202). Corporations thus can act in the political arena through formal 
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national and international political channels, but also through informal means to 
influence the perception of a particular issue by exerting discursive power. 
Companies also can influence the political arena by participating in political and 
social activism. An example is the UK cosmetics company, The Body Shop, which has 
been continuously involved in social campaigns in the areas of human rights, 
environment, animal cruelty, etc. and explicitly cites as one of its core values defending 
human rights (The Body Shop, 2013). In 1998 the company partnered with Amnesty 
International and the Dalai Lama in the “Make Your Mark” campaign to mark the 40th 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It became one of the largest, 
if not “[…] the largest corporate-NGO collaborative campaign in support of human 
rights ever conducted” (Fabig & Boele, 2003, p. 276). 
So far I have presented examples regarding the influence of TNCs on national 
and international legislation; however, institutionalised practices are also an important 
element of the global order. An example is the international borrowing privilege that 
refers to the accepted principle that whoever rules a country –regardless how she seized 
power– can borrow funds in the name of the whole country, which has foreseeable 
harmful effects especially on countries ruled by dictators (Pogge, 2000, p. 57; 2005c, p. 
49). In a similar vein, corporations uphold and normalise international practices 
particularly harmful for developing countries. For instance, some corporations have been 
actively involved in the exploitation of minerals in countries in conflict, making available 
financial resources to rebel groups and aiding the transfer of illicit funds thus 
incentivising the emergence of illegal networks and fuelling conflict66 (UNSC, 2001, pp. 3, 
37). 
                                                       
66  There are many notorious cases of corporate involvement in the exploitation of minerals such as 
diamonds, coltan, cassiterite, cobalt, cooper and gold in African countries, particularly in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leona and Zimbabwe. In an extensive report on the 
situation in the DRC, the UN Security Council denounces the participation of many TNCs based in Western 
countries and concludes that their role has been vital in the continuation of exploitation and conflict (2001, p. 
37). Among the companies mentioned are Citibank, which aided financial transfers of illicit funds as a 
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Another example is the imposition of stabilization clauses from corporations to 
signing countries in investment agreements. These clauses aim at protecting foreign 
investors against political risks by dictating how future changes in the law are to be 
treated and the extent to which they may modify the rights and obligations of foreign 
investors. For example, they can fix the term of applicable legislation thus insuring 
investors against future modifications of national laws; they can also bind the signing 
government to indemnify the investor for the costs of complying with new laws. While 
these clauses may intend to give confidence to foreign investors, they have tended to be 
detrimental for host countries, as they curtail the freedom of the government to improve 
social or environmental standards and its ability to discharge its human rights duties 
(Ruggie, 2009, p. 12). 
An example of arguably more directly harmful practices in which TNCs actively 
partake is bank secrecy in places such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, the City of London, 
Singapore and the US state of Delaware (IBAHRI, 2013, p. 57). This system has 
facilitated money laundering of groups linked with narcotics and terrorism (IBAHRI, 
2013, pp. 70-71), as well as plundering and embezzlement by public officials of 
developing countries, including Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Ferdinand Marcos in the 
Philippines and Sani Abacha in Nigeria, all of who had large bank accounts in secrecy 
jurisdictions.  Such systems incentivise the continuation of harmful practices, undermine 
domestic processes in developing countries, and also deprive them from substantial 
resources that could be invested in policies and programmes to eradicate poverty, reduce 
inequality and fulfil human rights. It has been estimated that between 2001 and 2010, 
developing countries lost US$5.86 trillion to illicit financial flows, from which corporate 
tax abuses accounted for 80 per cent of those outflows (IBAHRI, 2013, p. 7). 
                                                                                                                                                              
correspondent bank of the Banque de Commerce, du Développement et d’Industrie; Belgian airline Sabena 
and French Bollore group for transporting coltan, and many mineral importers based in Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, and Canada (UN Security Council, 2001). 
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Thus it is possible to argue that TNCs contribute to the establishment and 
support of harmful rules that form part of the global institutional order through their 
relation with government authorities and political channels. They can do this, for 
example, by influencing their national governments to support certain national rules with 
a broad impact or to represent their interest at the global level, either through legitimate 
or illegal mechanisms such as bribing. However, TNCs can also participate in the global 
institutional order by supporting and normalising rules and practices that predictably and 
avoidably contribute to human rights deficits. 
 Transnational Corporations in the Private Sphere 5.7.
 
Transnational corporations can also contribute to shaping the global institutional 
order within the private sphere, which refers to the domain out of the reach of the 
government in which they enjoy certain leverage to conduct their day-do-day operations 
and to take decisions than mostly affect their business. Here, corporations may use 
particular attributes such as purchasing power, reputation, established networks and size 
to influence common practices, conventions and industry standards. They can do this 
through several mechanisms including establishing a corporate culture, launching 
voluntary initiatives, funding think-tanks, preventing or enabling technology transfer, etc.  
One example can be found in the global food system, which is currently 
dominated by just a handful of TNCs that control the whole food process from 
production to distribution and retail (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009, p. 1; Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & 
Arentsen, 2009, p. 31). In the case of the agri-food industry, only five companies share 
90% of the world grain trade, and just six (Syngenta, Bayer, Monsanto, BASF, Dow and 
DuPont) accounted for the 85% of the total sales of pesticides in 2006 (Madley, 2008, p. 
39). This large concentration of power has allowed corporations to significantly influence 
the rules that govern the global food system by creating a sort of price-fixing cartel 
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(ActionAid, 2005, p. 4; Madley, 2008, p. 28; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009, pp. 1-2; Fuchs, 
Kalfagianni, & Arentsen, 2009, pp. 33-34). Corporations can also make use of their 
leverage by creating and modifying standards of conduct, environment, welfare, quality 
and safety. While corporations need to comply with minimal legal standards, they 
nonetheless have significant leverage in certain areas, such as in their supply chains. 
They have the capacity in these chains to require and comply with higher standards. 
Many supermarkets now have, for example, their own supplementary quality assurance 
and safety standards or they endorse some common collective standards such as the 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), the International Food Standard (IFS) or the 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Arentsen, 2009, p. 35).67  
The privileged position of at least the largest TNCs allow them to improve 
standards within an industry but also to maintain and normalise existent practices. For 
example, before the OECD adopted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions in 1997, bribery was a highly 
widespread phenomenon across international business transactions (OECD, 2011a, p. 6). 
Indeed, prior to the Convention, in some countries including Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, New Zealand and Switzerland, 
bribes to foreign government officials were tax deductible as business expenses (Milliet-
Einbinder, 1997). This case exemplifies how commonly accepted and extended 
behaviours of corporations that mostly belong to the private realm can affect expectations, 
influence public perception of key issues and normalise practices at the international level. 
In this case, although bribery to foreign officials was a legalised practice in the 
aforementioned countries, corporations as private actors had the choice to comply with 
minimal standards or to set higher standards to end this common practice.  
                                                       
67Some authors are critical of these private standards, noting that they can improve aspects of a particular 
industry, but they can also serve as instruments to discriminate against certain companies in favour of others 
in order to preserve the status quo (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009, pp. 14-15; Fuchs, Kalfagianni, & Arentsen, 2009, 
pp. 30, 34).  
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Mainstream accounts consistent with the interactional moral approach have 
tended to treat transnational corporations and their impact on human rights as 
independent from institutions and the global institutional order in place. However, such 
an approach is very limited insofar as human rights harms cannot always be traced back 
to the conduct of identifiable agents, but to the configuration of the features of the 
institutional order in place (Pogge, 2010a, p. 15). Therefore, it tends to exclude the role 
of institutions and institutional channels as mediators between corporate conduct and the 
resulting human rights outcomes, as well as the impacts over human rights to which 
corporations contribute by supporting an institutional order that contributes to human 
rights harms. In turn, these omissions can lead to underestimating the real impacts of 
transnational corporations on human rights, and therefore to a flawed attribution of 
responsibility.  
The incorporation of both an interactional and institutional dimension of 
corporate responsibility has two significant consequences. Recognising that corporations 
can contribute to human rights harms not only through their operations but also by 
shaping and supporting a global institutional order provides a more accurate picture of 
the way in which corporations operate. It also provides a more adequate and complete 
understanding of what the duties for corporations to respect human rights entail: to avoid 
doing harm, both directly through their operations and via institutional channels. More 
specifically, corporations can be ascribed a negative duty not to contribute without 
compensation to the shape and maintenance of a global institutional order that 
foreseeably produces human rights harms. They also can be ascribed some responsibility 
for such negative human rights outcomes. The implications of this more comprehensive 








He who has the gold makes the rules. 




During the mid-1990s and early 2000s the issue of corporate involvement in 
human rights violations received significant attention after some notorious cases of 
misconduct involving well-known transnational corporations in the extractive sector and 
apparel industry, as explained in Chapter 2. A growing awareness of the poor conditions 
in which garments were produced in developing countries led to the emergence of social 
movements in some of the countries where those companies were headquartered, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. The anti-sweatshop 
movement aimed to attract the attention of consumers to put pressure on TNCs to 
change the working conditions in which their products were manufactured. While 
activists believed that people in developed nations had a moral responsibility for the poor 
working conditions overseas, others were sceptical of the attempts to regulate and modify 
them. Iris Marion Young summarises the arguments of the opponents of the anti-
sweatshop movement: 
We are not the cause of the injustice the workers suffer, and we do not 
control those who are. The owners and managers of the factories clearly 
have a primary responsibility for the treatment workers receive, the 
hours they are required to work, their wages and benefits, and the safety 
of the work environment. They make specific cost minimization 
decisions that result in sweatshop conditions, they make the rules that 
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prohibit bathroom breaks or days off, they lock the doors and verbally 
abuse the workers, they or those they hire threaten and beat workers 
who try to organize unions. If there are any agents to blame for the 
plight of these workers, surely the owners and managers must be first in 
line […]. We who go to work and school here in Chicago have no 
connection to workers in Bangkok or Manila or Tegucigalpa. However 
awful the conditions under which they work, we have not caused them, 
and we are not in control of the factors that would remedy them (2004, 
pp. 365-367). 
This chapter will argue that, while in most cases owners and managers of 
factories have direct responsibility for the harms that workers suffer there, this does not 
mean that no one else bears any responsibilities for such conditions, or that the 
responsibility of the factories only arise from the harm they directly inflict. In the case 
presented above, students and workers in Chicago, as well as corporations of other 
sectors, may not be directly exploiting child labour in a sweatshop in Tegucigalpa, but 
they can be allocated some responsibility for the human rights harms suffered there. Such 
responsibility does not only arise from their decisions and actions as consumers or as 
sellers of such products, as the activists stressed, but also from their support for a global 
institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably produces human rights deficits, as 
argued in Chapter 5. This chapter will introduce supplementary grounds for allocating 
moral responsibility to TNCs, namely, actively benefiting from harm.      
In the broader literature, the central presuppositions of the global institutional 
approach have been subject to intense scrutiny and have given rise to several objections. 
For example, criticisms have focused on the moral significance the approach attaches to 
the membership in an institutional order, its focus on negative duties, as well as its 
proposition that non-elites as well as elites can be ascribed responsibility for 
institutionally mediated harms. This chapter will argue that even though the current 
framework shares some propositions with the global institutional approach, it is not 
subject to the same objections, at least not to the same extent. Given that TNCs can be 
considered as elites with significant capabilities to impact on the institutional order, 
either directly or through national governments, their connection to the harms 
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engendered is much clearer. In addition, the fact that by definition TNCs exist and 
operate within a global institutional order contributes to clarifying why the institutional 
order should be ascribed moral significance.   
 Benefiting as Additional Grounds to Allocating Moral 6.2.
Responsibility to Transnational Corporations 
 
In previous chapters it was noted that several recent accounts allocate moral 
responsibilities to TNCs according to an interactional notion of impact, i.e., according to 
corporations’ direct causation of and contribution to human rights harms. This 
grounding is relatively unproblematic for the allocation of moral responsibility as “[…] 
the question of responsibility in a certain unjust situation is commonly answered simply 
by asking who caused the outcome” (Wettstein, 2009, p. 135). However, this thesis has 
contended that such notions of impact should be expanded to encompass the 
contribution of corporations to the shape and maintenance to the global institutional 
order, which foreseeably and avoidably engenders human rights harms.  
Further, there is at least one other significant grounding to be used in allocating 
duties to TNCs: actively benefiting (or profiting68) from injustice (Pogge, 2008, p. 203). It 
is possible to make a distinction between two types of benefits: ‘active benefiting’ and 
‘being passively benefited by’ (Anwander, 2005, p. 43). Active benefiting refers to the 
                                                       
68 Profit and benefit are two concepts that are commonly used interchangeably (Anwander, 2005, p. 39), 
however this chapter will only use the term ‘benefit’ so as not to confuse it with the Marxist definition of 
profit –although it is clear that Pogge does not refer to this meaning. According to Marxist political 
economy, the owners of the means of production profit by extracting surplus value from the labour power of 
members of the proletariat. In turn, surplus value can only be generated by exploitation: paying to the 
workers less than the value of what they produce. For example, it could be argued that companies like 
Kodak, which provide X-ray products and services, have indirectly benefitted from the Hiroshima bombing 
in the Second World War. However, the company is not profiting (in the Marxist sense) from the technical 
discoveries but from the surplus value extracted from exploited workers, and the products they sell are simply 
means to conduct economic exchange. Therefore, unlike people who receive radiation and who might be 
said to passively being benefited by injustice, companies are actively benefiting from wrongdoing and 
contributing to maintaining a capitalist system that by definition reproduces injustice. From a Marxist 
perspective, profiting always contributes to producing some harm as exploitation necessarily takes place in 
capitalism. The purpose of this section however is not to discuss the creation of profit but to establish 
grounds to allocate responsibility. Therefore, this chapter will only refer to benefit without equating it with 
profit understood as the direct result of exploitation.   
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cases in which one seeks to take advantage of injustice, to reap a benefit at the expense of 
someone else. In contrast, one may passively be benefited by harm even if one did not 
participate in producing it, if one does not seek to perpetuate it and if one contributes to 
mitigating its consequences. Examples include employees of poverty relief organisations 
and academics who write about poverty. Although they are being benefited in some way 
by the existence of misery, they do not actively seek to perpetuate it or actively benefit 
from distress (Anwander, 2005, p. 43).  
However, this sort of passive benefiting is relatively rare in cases involving 
TNCs and human rights deficits; instead, active benefiting is much more frequent. For 
example, in the case of the anti-sweatshop movement, the activists acknowledged they 
were benefiting from the exploitation of workers abroad by having access to an 
abundance of cheap clothes. Here, one could argue that they passively were being 
benefited by the cheaper prices engendered from the differential in wages and the current 
global division of labour. While it might be true that consumers in developed nations 
have little direct control over the conditions of sweatshops, by buying cheap clothes 
manufactured in such places they are in fact actively taking advantage of injustice as they 
reap a benefit at the expense of the sweatshop workers (Pogge, 2005d, p. 72). Likewise, 
the clothing retailers who use sweatshops can be said to actively take advantage of 
injustice insofar as they are making use of the established division of labour, which 
foreseeably engenders human rights deficits for a large part of the global population. 
Seeking to follow the lowest environmental standards or paying low wages means that 
they are benefiting at the expense of someone else’s income, health, welfare, etc.  
Contributing and benefiting from injustice tend to be closely related. They are, 
however, independent grounds for allocating responsibility. Benefiting from injustice 
does not necessarily entail that the beneficiary is contributing to or causing injustice, and 
vice versa. Anwander (2005, p. 40) provides the example of benefiting from the nuclear 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War. Most of the 
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current safety data used to set radiation doses in medical practice can be directly traced 
back to events which many have seen as disproportionate and otherwise unjust use of 
force against civilian populations (Lackey, 2003; Rawls, 1999b). Therefore, it might be 
argued that any person who has had an X-ray or had undergone radiotherapy has 
indirectly been benefitted by the harms inflicted on the people in Hiroshima. However, 
they cannot be as easily charged with causing or contributing to the injustice suffered 
there.  
While contributing to injustice does not necessarily entail benefiting from it, 
most of the times it does, particularly in cases involving TNCs and human rights 
violations. It is unlikely that a company would willingly and knowingly cause or 
contribute to injustice unless it received some benefit or the costs of halting its 
contributions were high. Paying low wages to manufacturing workers and avoiding 
implementing health and safety measures means that companies can cut costs to offer 
low prices, thus remaining competitive and generating profits. In turn, the cases in which 
the people who benefit do not have any connection or do not contribute in any way to 
injustice are very rare in the real world (Anwander, 2005, p. 40). 
Although the proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework draws on 
Pogge’s institutional account, it recognises that the stringency of the moral responsibility 
of corporations and the wrongness of benefiting from injustice are significantly different 
from those that Pogge attributes to ordinary citizens of affluent countries. Given that the 
governments of affluent democracies are elected by their citizens, respond to their 
interests and benefit them, those citizens are said to share a responsibility for the human 
rights deficits engendered by the structural design their national governments uphold and 
contribute to shaping (Pogge, 2008, pp. 27-28). They can thus be ascribed negative duties 
not to uphold or participate in a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably 
leads to human rights deficits. In order to discharge their duties, such citizens can opt to 
stop participating in the institutional order by not paying taxes or migrating to an 
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impoverished country. However, given that such options are unreasonably onerous, 
citizens of affluent countries can instead opt to make compensation for their 
contributions to the global order. They can do so, for example, by advocating for 
institutional reform or by supporting poverty-relief organisations and making 
contributions as a form of compensation for harm (Pogge, 2008, p. 26). Nonetheless 
what they can do to discharge their duties is limited by their powers as citizens. Ordinary 
citizens cannot do much more than writing letters to their government, voting for a 
government more committed to fight for social justice, engaging in political debates, etc.  
The alternatives corporations have at their disposal to discharge their duties not 
to contribute to a harmful global order are considerably different from those of citizens of 
affluent countries. Nor are corporations in a wholly analogous position to individual 
citizens. Take for example, a large British bank that trades in the food commodities 
market. If such bank decided to establish its headquarters outside the United Kingdom 
and stopped paying taxes to the British government, it would not necessarily mean that 
the company would have stopped contributing to injustice via the global institutional 
order. Even if it moved to an impoverished country, implying that it is a state which does 
not have a prominent role in the maintenance and shape of the current arrangement, the 
bank could still contribute to and uphold the existing institutional system by continuing 
participating in food speculation, or by lobbying to prevent the restriction of such 
practice. For corporations then, the option of emigrating would not mean they have 
stopped upholding unjust global institutions. Furthermore, given that TNCs can operate 
in different countries at the same time, even if a corporation ceased operations in one 
country it could still contribute significantly to harm in or from another.  
The differences between the mechanisms available to citizens and companies to 
discharge their duties also should alter the perceived wrongness of benefiting from 
injustice. Pogge (2005b) and Anwander (2005) argue that it is not always wrong to 
benefit from injustice as long as certain conditions are met. Pogge again argues that 
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contributing to injustice or benefiting from it is not always wrong as long as we 
compensate the victims “[…] by making as much of an effort, aimed at protecting the 
victims of injustice or at institutional reform, as would suffice to eradicate the harms, if 
others followed suit” (2005d, p. 70). In turn, Anwander (2005, p. 46) argues that 
benefiting from injustice is not always wrong as long as we do not also contribute to 
unjust harm. While he does not claim that benefiting from injustice is not wrong per se, 
he acknowledges that the close relation between benefiting and contributing to injustice 
may lead to confusing cases where someone is merely benefiting instead of contributing 
and benefiting. Thus, he notes “[…] relevant actions are wrong not in virtue of benefiting 
from injustice but on account of some other factor, most plausibly that we are contributing 
to unjust harm” (emphasis original) (Anwander, 2005, p. 41). 
Pogge argues that consumers of products manufactured in sweatshops do not 
necessarily do wrong by buying such things; what is wrong is to pocket the gain of 
unjustly low prices, which are a reflection of the externalisation of costs (2005d, p. 72). 
As an alternative, people in developed countries can buy fair-trade products or make 
donations to an antipoverty organisation such as Oxfam, in order to compensate for the 
harm they indirectly inflict by sustaining clothing production in sweatshops (Pogge, 
2005d, p. 72). Here, it would seem as if Pogge suggests that it is not all that bad to benefit 
from child labour by buying cheap clothes so long as those who buy them make some 
sort of compensation. This, I believe, could lead us to think about the poor as a pool of 
people rather than as individuals, as giving money to Oxfam would not guarantee that 
those affected by our decisions as consumers will be compensated. However, I think that 
what Pogge has in mind is that given that the global institutional order engenders 
injustice, it is not morally relevant where we direct our efforts to reform the institutional 
order as in the long run everyone would be able to enjoy the benefits of a fairer system.  
Reading Pogge’s account one could also be led to believe one can “offset” 
injustice in general by providing some sort of compensation. For instance, he argues that 
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negative duties not to collaborate and not to benefit from injustice “[…] do not make it 
wrong to contribute to, or to profit from, a collective injustice when one makes 
compensating protection and reform efforts for its victims […]” (Pogge, 2005d, p. 69). 
This could potentially lead to perverse incentives, as corporations may think they could 
get away with contributing to injustice as long as they provide compensation. However, 
it is important to note that Pogge does not argue that any harm or injustice is necessarily 
acceptable so long as we provide redress. It is only given that it would be unreasonable 
and very onerous –if not impossible– for a person to stop participating in an order that is 
collectively maintained, that it is possible to discharge such negative duties by 
compensating the victims of harm.  
My Institutional Responsibilities Framework for TNCs holds a similar position 
insofar as it does not require corporations not to benefit from harm at all. However, it 
contends that the duties placed upon corporations can be more demanding than those 
expected of citizens. The wrongness of benefiting in a global institutional system is 
“offset” if citizens of affluent countries make some compensation for such injustice, 
because the alternative is unreasonable and perhaps impossible to realise. In contrast, the 
case of corporations is different, as they have more alternatives available to discharge 
their moral duties and they have significantly more influence on the configuration of the 
global institutional order, not only via national governments but also by participating in 
international negotiations or by acting within the private sphere, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. What TNCs can do to help shape the global order so as to honour their 
negative duties is considerably greater, particularly in the case of large and wealthy 
transnational corporations.  
One example is the requirement of government of the United States to Internet 
service providers such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo! to disclose information about 
their users to the US National Security Agency (NSA), which has been perceived as 
threat to the right to privacy and freedom of expression. These companies have had to 
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comply to maintain the secrecy of the agency’s requests as revealing such information is 
considered as revealing government secrets and committing treason against the United 
States, which means that their executives could face jail penalties. However, they have 
pushed for the right to be allowed to publish the number of requests they receive from the 
agency and Yahoo! has (unsuccessfully) sued the foreign intelligence surveillance  court, 
which provides the legal framework for NSA surveillance (Rushe, 2013). Similar cases 
can be found in China, where companies such as Google and the micro-blogging service, 
Twitter, are required to limit the information its citizens can access as a form of control, 
and arguably, in detriment of freedom of speech. While these companies have to follow 
the law in order to continue operating in China and thus can be accused of being 
complicit in human rights violations, they have tried to implement some (modest) 
measures to avoid participating in such harmful practices. For example, Google suggests 
to their Chinese users alternative keywords to those banned by the government and also, 
from 2010, it began redirecting mainland China users to its Hong Kong site after 
concerns over censorship and hacking (UNGC, 2013d). Similarly, Twitter, announced 
that it is developing technology with the aim of preventing repressive governments from 
being able to censor its users (UNGC, 2013d). While these companies might not be 
doing enough to “offset” the harms to which they contribute, these cases exemplify that 
corporations have some resources at their disposal to try to challenge some harmful laws 
and institutions.  
Thus, the cases in which TNCs’ contributions to injustice can be “offset” by 
compensating the victims should be limited to those in which the injustice can be traced 
back to features of the global institutional order which they have limited opportunity to 
affect. Otherwise, they should be expected to halt harmful practices. For example, labour 
is one of the areas in which corporations have considerable influence. The benefit they 
get from the poor economic and labour conditions of sweatshops should not be allowed 
to be offset by simply giving some monetary compensation to victims of injustice or 
Chapter 6: The Institutional Responsibilities Framework 
 
147 
charitable contributions. They can have a significant impact on changing harmful labour 
conditions, including implementing and complying with high standards of health and 
safety for their employees, paying living wages and allowing labour unions. While 
“business enterprises may undertake other commitments or activities to support and 
promote human rights, which may contribute to the enjoyment of rights […] this does 
not offset a failure to respect human rights throughout their operations” (Ruggie, 2011, p. 
13).  
Here it might be objected that sweatshops, factories in export processing zones 
(EPZs) and overall poor labour standards exist as a strategy for some countries to attract 
foreign investment. While this might be true, nonetheless this does not exempt 
corporations from their duties not to benefit from injustice if they can clearly avoid doing 
so. In contrast to ordinary citizens, corporations have several options available to avoid 
benefiting from injustice such as not using sweatshops, coordinating with other 
companies and setting industry-wide standards to improve labour conditions in their 
factories. A further objection, in line with the opponents of the anti-sweatshop movement, 
could be that if clothing retailers want to stay competitive they must make cost 
minimisation decisions that result in sweatshop conditions. However, while cutting 
labour costs is one of the possible routes to remain competitive, it is certainly not the 
only one. For instance, some of the largest and most financially successful companies 
have opted for adopting ethical standards in their operations. An example is the largest 
Spanish clothing distributor Inditex Group, which has brands such as Zara, Massimo 
Dutti, Pull & Bear and Bershka. It is not only financially very successful, but it also has 
been regarded as one of the most ethical business in the apparel industry; it is one of the 
few companies that have committed to ensuring freedom of association and that a living 
wage is delivered through its supply chain (Labour Behind the Label, 2011, p. 33).  
For corporations, it is not enough to claim that the global division of labour has 
been established and they are just reaping some of the benefits of the differential of 
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labour prices, producing cheaply and selling at a high profit. TNCs, unlike citizens, can 
do more to alleviate injustice and change the structures that contribute to systematic 
harm. This further restriction is also true as some of the harms inflicted cannot be truly 
compensated post hoc, as in the case of destruction of ecosystem or deaths. Note, however, 
that in contrast to the positive duties approach, the Institutional Responsibilities 
Framework does not attribute positive duties to corporations based on their resources or 
capabilities. Instead it claims that corporations bear negative duties to respect human 
rights, and in order to fulfil them corporations should avoid benefiting from, contributing 
to and upholding institutions that foreseeably engender human rights deficits. Fulfilling 
their negative duties entails some derivative positive duties. Those are the subject of the 
next chapter. 
So, to this point, this thesis has argued that it is possible to ascribe moral 
responsibilities to corporations on the basis of their direct and indirect impacts on human 
rights, including their participation in a global order that foreseeably and avoidably 
engender human rights deficits. This chapter has highlighted another route to allocating 
responsibilities to TNCs, on the grounds of the benefits they can actively reap from 
injustice. Introducing the additional sources of responsibility does add complexities in 
allocating specific responsibilities, however, as discussed in the next section.  
 Allocation of Responsibility 6.3.
 
Approaches associated with the interactional moral account such as the UN 
Framework tend to focus on tracing human rights harms to identifiable sources, to the 
actions and decisions of particular agents. Therefore, attributing and allocating moral 
responsibility in many cases can be reduced to asking who produced or contributed to 
causing harm. In contrast, in the institutional account, responsibility is attributed on the 
basis of the contribution of individual or collective agents to the existence of a harmful 
Chapter 6: The Institutional Responsibilities Framework 
 
149 
institutional order. It requires asking who is participating in the design and maintenance 
of the global order and how they are ding so. Therefore, individual contributions are 
harder to identify, and consequently, responsibilities are much harder to allocate and 
distribute. It is possible, however, to identify some ways in which this can be done. 
One possibility would be allocating responsibilities according to the marginal 
contribution of each company to producing harm. This is problematic, however, as it is 
impossible to know precisely which effects can be attributed to the conduct and decisions 
of specific corporations. As corporations’ decisions reverberate around the world, their 
effects intermingle with the billions of decisions made by other corporations and 
individuals, making it impossible to disentangle the impacts of individual decisions 
(Pogge, 2007, p. 17). For instance, while it could be argued that a giant retailer that uses 
sweatshop labour has contributed more than a small firm to the continuation of the 
current division of labour, it is not possible to assess each one’s marginal contribution. 
Furthermore, the indirect effects of each company’s decisions are not only too numerous 
to trace, but they are also impossible to estimate because it cannot be accurately deduced 
how one decision of a company affected the decisions others later took (Pogge, 2007, p. 
17).  
Another option is allocating responsibilities according to the benefits a company 
is reaping from the current shape of the global institutional order, measured against a 
fairer and feasible alternative: the larger the benefit, the more responsibility. Thus, even if 
it is not possible to establish the exact contribution of pharmaceutical companies to the 
creation of the TRIPS Agreement, it is possible to roughly calculate how much more 
each company is actively benefiting from the protection of intellectual property than it 
would in a scenario where the agreement did not exist. The advantages the company 
enjoys as a result of the shape of global institutions and the global institutional order 
could serve as a benchmark for distributing responsibilities. This could be a more feasible 
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alternative insofar as in several cases it is possible to assess some of the benefits 
companies are reaping from the existence of a harmful institutional order. 
This proposition, nonetheless, also has some limitations. For instance, the 
benefits that can be quantified might not reflect the actual contribution of companies to 
the production of harm. A company that significantly contributed to the adoption, shape 
and maintenance of an institution, but which did not then reap significant benefits, might 
seem to hold less responsibility than others that contributed equally but benefitted more. 
As noted, however, those most frequently contributing to and benefiting from harm are 
generally related.  Thus, the benefit a company is reaping from a harmful situation could 
be a good reflection of its contribution to harm. The second shortcoming of this approach 
is in setting a baseline to determine what the company’s situation would be without the 
harmful institution in place. In the example of TRIPS, while it could be possible to 
calculate the portion of a corporation’s earnings that come from patented drugs, is not 
possible to know whether or not those earnings only correspond to the fact that such 
medicines are protected under an international agreement.  
A third possibility is distributing responsibilities according to special attributes 
such as capabilities or power: the greater these attributes, the greater the responsibility. 
“While everyone in the system of structural and institutional relations stands in 
circumstances of justice that give them obligations with respect to all the others, those 
institutionally and materially situated to be able to do more to affect the conditions of 
vulnerability have greater obligations” (Young, 2004, p. 371). Note that in comparison to 
the positive duties approach, duties are not being allocated to corporations as a function 
of specific attributes and regardless of their connection with the harm in question. What 
is proposed in this approach is that once it has been established that TNCs bear some 
responsibility for harms they inflicted directly or contributed to inflicting via the global 
institutional order, responsibility can be allocated among them according to special traits 
or privileged position. Thus, a powerful company with significant leverage to influence 
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the shape of the global institutional order may be allocated more responsibility even 
when it has not benefitted as much as another one, which has comparatively less 
capabilities to influence the shape of the global order.  
These three proposed criteria to allocate responsibilities are, in fact, related. 
Powerful corporations frequently benefit more than small companies from the 
established global institutional order, which arguably has allowed them to amass 
significant power in the first place. Given that part of their power comes from the current 
shape of the global order, they have incentives to contribute to its maintenance and may 
have significantly more resources at their disposal to do so. Despite the fact that 
allocating responsibilities among corporations is necessary to operationalise the proposed 
Institutional Responsibilities Framework, its most important contribution is not offering 
ways to quantify the responsibilities of corporations (see Young 2004, 379).  Rather, the 
main contribution is highlighting the participation of transnational corporations in social 
processes that have some unjust outcomes, for which they can be ascribed moral 
responsibility. Realising that corporations can have negative impacts on human rights 
both directly and by participating in structural processes serves as a basis to require 
corporations to contribute to change the global order to avoid or reduce injustice, not as a 
matter of benevolence or charity, but because they bear a stringent moral responsibility to 
do so. This assertion starkly contrast with the traditional view on corporate responsibility, 
which has been regarded as largely philanthropic and subjective (Robinson, 2003, p. 9).  
 Possible Objections to the Proposed Approach 6.4.
 
As noted, Pogge’s approach has been subject to rigorous analyses and several of 
its assumptions and implications have been subject to criticism (see Anwander, 2005; 
Chandhoke, 2010; Cohen, 2010; Cruft, 2005; Gilabert, 2005; Patten, 2005; Risse, 2005a; 
Satz, 2005; Steinhoff, 2012; Tan, 2010). This section details further ways in which, while 
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the Institutional Responsibilities Framework draws on Pogge’s account it is not subject to 
the same criticisms. The fact that it focuses on a defined set of moral agents with certain 
qualities (i.e. transnational corporations), as opposed to ‘citizens of affluent countries’, 
allows it to overcome some of the weaknesses identified in the global institutional 
approach. Furthermore, the proposed approach can complement the diagnosis it makes 
about the configuration of the global institutional order and therefore, the allocation of 
responsibility to moral agents. This section will introduce some of the more frequent and 
stronger objections to the global institutional approach and will test their validity for the 
Institutional Responsibilities Framework.  
 Objection 1: Human Rights as Claims Against Those Who Share 6.4.1.
an Institutional Order  
 
One of the main criticisms against Pogge’s approach is its particular conception 
of human rights, as claims against those who share a global institutional order, as 
opposed to claims from all human beings against all others (Caney, 2007; Tan, 2010, p. 
48). Limiting human rights protection to only those subject to a common institutional 
order, it is argued, “removes protection from the most vulnerable”, since frequently the 
most defenceless are precisely those considered as non-members of a given social order, 
as in the case of colonialism (Tan, 2010, p. 50). However, as Pogge has clarified, the 
institutional conception of human rights does not imply that the members of an 
institutional order do not have any duties towards non-members. “[…] Our human 
rights-based obligations are indeed limited in scope to those relevantly affected by 
institutional arrangements we contribute to upholding. But our human rights-based 
duties are universal” (Pogge, 2010b, p. 197). This means that members of an institutional 
order have a universal duty to avoid doing harm to members and non-members of such 
arrangement, just as we may have a universal duty to keep a promise or not to kill. 
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However, our human rights-based obligations are activated by particular empirical 
circumstances, such as sharing an institutional order or making a promise.  
A more fundamental objection has pointed to the moral significance that is 
attached to the institutional order of which one is member (Caney, 2007; Chandhoke, 
2010). “If someone is born into an impoverished system that has no links with the rest of 
the world, a wholly institutional approach69 must maintain that members of the latter 
have no duties of justice to the former […]” (Caney, 2007, p. 283). Attaching moral 
significance to a shared institutional order in practice penalises people for their 
membership to a particular scheme, which is as arbitrary as birthplace (Caney, 2007, p. 
283). The distinction between members and non-members of an institutional order has 
theoretical importance, because individuals can exist outside an institutional order or 
even without it. In contrast, transnational corporations by definition can only exist 
within a shared transnational institutional order that includes some economic rules, trade 
agreements and international legal norms.  
Furthermore, the institutional approach has significantly different implications 
for the discussion of the responsibilities of TNCs than it has for the responsibilities of 
individuals. The interactional conception of human rights argues that such rights are 
entitlements every person can claim against all others on the basis of humanity. Thus a 
“weak connection” such as humanity is enough for generating human rights obligations 
against all other human beings. In contrast, the institutional approach argues that for 
human rights obligations to arise, a stronger connection is necessary between right-
holders and duty-bearers, namely, a shared institutional order.70 Recent accounts of 
corporate responsibility suggest that TNCs have duties in relation human rights that arise 
from a strong connection with the duty-bearers. Advocates of the positive duties 
approach frequently relate this strong connection to a shared geographical space between 
                                                       
69 See supra note 62. 
70 Here I am describing humanity as a “weak connection” in comparison to a global institutional order 
because the former is shared by more individuals than the latter. 
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the company and the right-holders, which is as indicated by the term ‘sphere of influence’ 
that we previously saw critiqued by Ruggie.  
In this context, Sorell argues that “[…] when businesses have the opportunity to 
promote or protect human rights where they operate, they are often also obliged to do so” 
(2004, p. 130). Similarly, Kolstad contends that “[…] duties to secure human rights can 
[…] be quite extensive and demanding in certain situations. Multinational corporations 
operating in poor and/or undemocratic countries may face particularly extensive 
obligations” (2008, p. 581). In a similar vein, Wettstein adds that “[…] the positive duty 
to protect is tied more closely to a corporation’s capabilities. Because the capability of a 
corporation to protect human beings from human rights violations is dependent on its 
proximity to the potential perpetrator, it is closely related to the concept of complicity in 
general […]” (2009, p. 305). This strong connection is not only present in the attribution 
of positive, but also of negative duties. For example, the UN Framework considers that 
corporations may negatively impact on the human rights of those with whom they share 
some strong connection, such as a contractual agreement or a business relation (Ruggie, 
2008, p. 17). 
The Institutional Responsibilities Framework, however, holds that even when 
the company does not share a geographical space or does not have a strong and direct 
connection to the right-holder, it can be allocated stringent moral duties that arise from a 
shared institutional order. Thus, while the institutional approach narrows the set of 
human beings towards whom we have human rights obligations, it enlarges the group of 
those to whom transnational corporations are presumed to bear moral duties. For the 
Institutional Responsibilities Framework, connections are still important to give raise to 
human rights obligations; however, it holds that “weaker” connections than a shared 
geographical space or contractual relations are morally significant.  
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 Objection 2: The Role of the Global Institutional Order 6.4.2.
 
The global institutional approach argues that the current institutional order is 
harmful as it foreseeably and avoidably engenders human rights deficits, including severe 
poverty. In contrast, it has been objected that the global order does not harm the poor 
and in fact, it benefits them thanks to the “miraculous” economic progress of the past 200 
years (Risse, 2005, p. 12). Moreover, it has been argued, the institutional order has 
created conditions for countries to economically develop, as in the cases of China and 
India (Cohen, 2010, p. 32). However, the baseline against which the institutional 
approach compares the current order is not an historical one. Instead, it is defined in 
terms of a just regime feasible at the time in question. “An institutional order harms 
people when its design can be shown to be unjust by reference to a feasible alternative 
design” (Pogge, 2008, p. 25).  
Nonetheless, even when one accepts this assertion, it is unclear that most human 
rights deficits can be attributed to the global order. While it is true that not all human 
rights deficits can be traced to national factors, not all human rights deficits can be 
explained as a function of the configuration of the global institutional order. The purpose 
of the proposed framework nonetheless is to emphasise the harms the institutional order 
engenders. This is because the domestic factors of harm, such as the complicity of 
corporations with corrupt governments, have received much of the attention. In contrast, 
the contributions of corporations to the structures that create incentives for the 
continuation of such behaviour are much less explored. The Institutional Responsibilities 
Framework does not deny the importance of domestic factors for the explanation of 
human rights deficits, but it considers necessary to also include in the analyses structural 
harms and the contribution of TNCs to them.  
A further objection is that even when it is accepted that the global order inflicts 
harm, this does not mean that some relatively small changes in global rules will suffice to 
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overcome most of the current deficits (Wenar, 2010, p. 127). For instance, Wenar argues 
that it is not realistic or feasible to expect to completely abolish the ‘international 
resource privilege’ –the international recognition conferred on anyone who exercises 
effective power to claim legal ownership over the natural resources of the country in 
question– given the high economic and political stakes involved (Wenar, 2010, p. 133).  
Oil companies are very powerful transnational actors. Four of the top 
five, and seven of the top ten, largest privately traded corporations in 
the world are oil companies. Their priorities are to locate as much as 
they can, extract as much as they can, and send as much as they can on 
to consumers. […] The resource privilege, so deeply implicated in how 
rich countries get their most vital resources, will not be easily 
restructured (Wenar, 2010, p. 134).  
Note that part of the difficulty Wenar finds for changing the system relates to the 
interests of transnational corporations, which along with those who sell the natural 
resources and the countries who enable conditions to store and transfer these funds, are 
the major components of this problem. If citizens of affluent countries were considered 
responsible for this harmful institution as in Pogge’s approach, reforming it would be 
predictably a difficult and slow process. However, transnational corporations have 
significantly more power and capabilities to challenge and modify this system. While it is 
true that the current order creates incentives for corporations to preserve the status quo, 
this does not negate a compelling moral responsibility for them to avoid doing so.  
 Objection 3: Negative Duties Are Not Necessarily More 6.4.3.
Stringent 
 
 The global institutional approach argues that the global rich should make some 
efforts to modify the current global order, but not on the basis that such changes will 
clearly alleviate human rights deficits. Instead, it is argued, such efforts are required if 
people want to discharge their negative duties to avoid doing harm without adequate 
compensation. However, the idea that the duty not to do harm is more compelling than 
the moral injunction to alleviate suffering or ensure full justice has been questioned 
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(Cohen, 2010, p. 28). In response to this objection Pogge has argued persuasively that 
one of the purposes of appealing to negative duties is to make the argument more 
compelling to citizens of affluent countries and more effective for the alleviation of 
harmful conditions, particularly world poverty (Pogge, 2008, pp. 176-177). Frequently, 
citizens of affluent countries feel they are not responsible for such conditions because 
they are geographically distant or because they attribute them to the corrupt and 
ineffective institutions of developing countries. In unveiling the connections that people 
of developed countries have to the preservation of the institutional order, Pogge aims to 
demonstrate how ordinary citizens of affluent countries are implicated in such harms, 
and therefore bear some moral responsibility for them.  
Similarly, the purpose of developing a framework on the grounds that TNCs 
bear stringent negative duties is twofold: reconciling the moral demands of TNCs with 
their profits goal and making the duties more compelling to companies. As argued in 
Chapter 4, allocating prima facie positive duties to transnational corporations is hard to 
reconcile with their main purpose. While it is true that TNCs frequently have more 
capabilities than many states, this is not a sufficient condition to transfer to them the 
duties that have traditionally belonged to the state. Transnational corporations have also 
tended to reject the claim that they have positive duties of justice on the basis of their 
capabilities. Instead, they seem to regard them as discretionary duties of beneficence. 
However, TNCs have tended to accept that they bear negative duties to avoid doing 
harm, which has been reflected in the favourable reception of the UN Framework and 
the Guiding Principles within business circles. Thus the Institutional Responsibilities 
Framework builds upon this accepted principle, but it adds that the negative duties to 
avoid doing harm must include the participation of corporations in the global order. 
Showing that corporations have some connection to the harmful conditions suffered 
abroad and appealing to their accepted negative duties may have considerably better 
prospects for acceptance, as developments discussed in the next chapter seem to indicate. 
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 Objection 4: Privileged Agents as Duty-Bearers  6.4.4.
 
Some commentators have objected to the leap the global institutional approach 
makes from attributing responsibility to affluent countries to concluding that their 
citizens should be held responsible for the harms the global institutional order engenders 
(see Steinhoff, 2012; Satz, 2005). In his account, Pogge seems to assume that the citizens 
of affluent countries exert considerable influence on their governments’ decisions and 
their foreign policy. Thus it seems that Pogge is equating the citizens of affluent countries 
with citizens of democracies. Indeed he has referred to this group as the “privileged 
citizens of the rich democracies” (Pogge, 2005c, p. 45). Nonetheless, not all the 
wealthiest countries have this political system. For example, China can increasingly be 
regarded as an “affluent country” in terms of macroeconomic indicators such as its GDP 
and annual growth. It is the country with the third largest nominal GDP, after only the 
United States and Japan, and it is one of the fastest growing economies of the last decade. 
Yet, given that China is a non-democratic country, it is questionable that its citizens can 
exert considerable influence on their government’s behaviour. 
 Even in democratic states, the ascription of stringent responsibilities to citizens 
may be problematic. It has been questioned whether non-elites, and especially the worse-
off citizens of affluent countries can plausibly be assigned stringent responsibilities for 
harmful conditions abroad only on the basis of their membership in a nation-state (Satz, 
2005, p. 51). Questions also have been raised around whether those such as young 
children who cannot be said to have contributed to imposing the global institutional 
order should be held accountable for it (Cabrera, 2010, p. 91). The implausibility of 
holding citizens accountable for all of their governments’ decisions has also been noted, 
as many decisions salient to the present discussion are not subject to democratic 
deliberation and scrutiny (Satz, 2005, p. 50; Steinhoff, 2012, pp. 132-135). Pogge has 
partly addressed these objections. He has argued that while citizens of affluent countries 
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bear responsibilities for the harms the global order engenders, those who have more 
capabilities, privileges and influence bear more responsibility for their country’s policies 
than fellow citizens with the opposite characteristics (Pogge, 2005d, p. 80). Also, he 
asserts that, while many political decisions are made behind closed doors, it is the 
responsibility of citizens to insist on transparency and accountability (Pogge, 2005d, p. 
79). 
The issue of the responsibilities of non-elites and non-contributors is significantly 
less problematic in the case of transnational corporations. This is because TNCs can be 
regarded as economic elites which are clearly contributing to and benefiting more from 
the institutional order than unprivileged citizens of affluent countries. Furthermore, in 
contrast to ordinary citizens, corporations have comparatively more access to 
information through their connection with political figures, as exemplified by the 
revolving door phenomenon described in Section 5.6.2. They also often have privileged 
access to national and international policy-makers, forums and negotiations.  
The global institutional approach sees individuals as contributing to shaping and 
maintaining the global institutional order through their governments. The Institutional 
Responsibilities Framework recognises that transnational corporations may contribute in 
the configuration of the global institutional order through governmental channels and 
outside them. Therefore, it does not solely ascribe duties to corporations of developed 
countries, but to TNCs in general. While the bulk of the largest transnational 
corporations are headquartered in developed countries, there are also many TNCs from 
emerging economies, which can considerably contribute to shaping and maintaining the 
global institutional order within the political and private spheres.  
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 Objection 5: The Approach Is Very Demanding 6.4.5.
 
Another common objection to the allocation of responsibility within the global 
institutional approach is its excessive demandingness upon individuals (Ci, 2010, p. 86; 
Steinhoff, 2012, p. 124). It has been argued that the institutional approach exaggerates 
the input of average citizens, which according to some is “at least infinitesimally close to 
zero” and it is compensated by even small contributions to development aid or charities 
(Steinhoff, 2012, p. 124). However, while the individual contribution of individuals to 
the shape and maintenance of the global institutional order may be considered as 
negligible, the contribution of TNCs, especially the largest and most powerful ones, is 
not. While most common citizens must act collectively to generate substantive changes, 
and their success partly depends on the action of their fellow citizens, large transnational 
corporations can significantly accomplish more change even if they act singlehandedly, 
especially where they are leaders of their industries.  
 Conclusion 6.5.
 
This chapter proposed a distinction between actively benefiting from harm and 
being passively benefited by it, and argued that the former can be considered a morally 
significant ground for allocating responsibilities to transnational corporations. Pogge’s 
institutional approach holds that it is not always wrong to contribute to or to benefit from 
injustice as long as there is some compensation to the victims. The possibility of 
“offsetting” the wrongness of harms seems to be at least partly allowed due to the limited 
power of individual citizens; if the person does the most she can as a citizen to change 
such conditions of injustice and she is not successful, the benefit she obtains from harm 
can be somewhat dispensed by compensating the victims. In contrast, at least the largest 
TNCs can have significantly more impact on the configuration of the global institutional 
order and therefore, the ‘compensation clause’ should only be applied when they cannot 
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plausibly be expected do more to avoid actively benefiting from and contributing to harm. 
The proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework thus allocates significantly more 
responsibilities to corporations than those that Pogge attributes to citizens of affluent 
countries.  
Besides detailing the grounds for attributing responsibilities to transnational 
corporations, this chapter also discussed some possibilities for allocating responsibilities 
among corporations and argued that, even when it is difficult to calculate the individual 
contributions of each company to the global institutional order, it does not mean that 
they do not have a relation of responsibility to the process that produces harm (Young, 
2004, p. 372).  While this discussion is significant, the purpose of the proposed 
Framework is not to establish the exact responsibilities of every corporation, but to bring 
to attention the institutional channels through which corporations can contribute to 
inflicting harm.  
Finally, the chapter addressed some of the strongest criticisms of the global 
institutional approach and evaluated their validity for the proposed framework. It argued 
that even when both approaches share similar principles, the Institutional 
Responsibilities Framework is not susceptible to the same objections, or at least not to 
the same extent. This is because, in contrast to citizens of affluent countries, 
transnational corporations have significantly more leverage to impact the global 
institutional order. Furthermore, unlike citizens, corporations by definition operate 








In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced 
power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this 
combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should 
take nothing for granted. 




This chapter will present an overview of some of the theoretical and practical 
implications of the proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework. As argued in 
Chapter 4, the moral duties of TNCs can be mainly understood as negative duties to 
avoid doing harm. While most of the recent approaches to corporate responsibility tend 
to focus solely on the harm corporations directly inflict, Chapter 5 argued that it is 
possible to allocate responsibilities to corporations according to their contributions to a 
harmful institutional order. Chapter 6 added that actively benefiting from harm is also a 
morally relevant ground for attributing responsibilities to transnational corporations. 
While TNCs bear primarily negative duties, in order to fulfil them, corporations are 
required to also discharge a set of positive duties, including duties of due diligence, duties 
of coordination, duties to strengthen the capabilities of the nation-state, duties to 
promote institutional change, and duties of accountability.  There is, however, another 
set of duties that do not derive from their negative duties to respect: duties of rescue. 




TNCs are compelled to discharge them in certain extraordinary situations, even if they 
did not contribute to bringing about a regretful outcome and are not actively benefiting 
from it. These duties will be discussed in this chapter. 
The proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework also has some important 
implications for the UN Framework. The latter attributes negative duties to TNCs to 
avoid doing harm on the grounds of their recognition in mechanisms of soft law, on the 
expectations that society has for business, and on enlightened self-interest. Such grounds 
are nonetheless insufficient to advance human rights, because they are susceptible to 
changing social practices and the interests of TNCs. Incorporating the proposed 
Institutional Responsibilities Framework would give more coherence to the UN 
Framework by explicitly allocating duties of justice to corporations. While both 
frameworks develop from the premise that TNCs bear mainly negative duties to avoid 
doing harm, the contribution of companies to shaping and upholding a global 
institutional order requires expanding the UN Framework’s notion of impact, and 
therefore the scope of corporate responsibility. 
Finally, the chapter will discuss some of the implications of the proposed 
framework for the global institutional approach to allocating moral duties. Both stress 
that human rights harms come about as a result of the configuration of the global 
institutional order. However, the Institutional Responsibilities Framework has argued 
that some TNCs can have similar, if not superior capabilities to states in shaping the 
global institutional order by participating in the political and private spheres. Therefore, 
if TNCs can be seen as independent and powerful actors in the global arena, it is 
necessary to re-evaluate the moral responsibilities Pogge allocates to citizens of affluent 
states for their part in helping to shape the global institutional order.   
 




 Derivative Positive Duties 7.2.
 
Frequently, discharging a negative duty requires a moral agent to avoid doing 
something. For example, a negative duty not to kill an innocent person requires that one 
refrains from doing so. However, sometimes to fulfil a negative duty one must actively 
do something. The duty not to break one’s promises requires an action, for example, that 
one repays the debts which one has incurred (Pogge, 2010b, p. 193). Thus it can be said 
that a debtor has an obligation to pay debts, which derives from an original negative duty 
not to break promises. While all TNCs, large or small, of any industry may bear negative 
duties to respect human rights, what is required from them to fulfil such duties may vary. 
For example, a big retailer such as Wal-Mart can be said to bear the same duty to respect 
human rights as a small company, but what it is required from both of them can be 
significantly different depending on the possible impacts they may have on human rights. 
The following sections will outline some of the derivative positive duties that can be 
attributed to corporations.  
 Duties of Due Diligence  7.2.1.
 
Transnational corporations have negative duties to avoid inflicting, contributing 
to and actively benefiting from harm, both directly and through the global institutional 
order. “To discharge the responsibility to respect requires due diligence. This concept 
describes the steps a company must take to become aware of, prevent and address 
adverse human rights impacts” (Ruggie, 2008, p. 17). As has been argued in previous 
chapters, the UN Framework tends to link impact to unmediated corporate agency, and 
therefore the areas in which it specifies that TNCs may contribute to or cause harm are 
significantly limited. However, the UN Guiding Principles extended the scope and stated 
that human rights due diligence “[…] should cover adverse human rights impacts that the 
business enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may 




be directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationships” 
(Ruggie, 2011, p. 17). In addition, the Spheres of Responsibility Framework (see Section 
5.4) argues that in order to address indirect harm, it needs to broaden due diligence 
obligations to include looser contractual and networked relationships within supply 
chains (Macdonald, 2011, p. 558). Recent developments have demonstrated that the 
most progressive corporations have started to include in their due diligence processes 
value-chains, joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions and disposals, suppliers and service 
providers, licensing and franchising, and direct customers and investor-state relationships 
(IHBR & GBI, 2012, p. 24). 
In order to survey the instances in which TNCs may also inflict institutionally 
mediated harm, their participation in the global institutional order should be included in 
due diligence processes. As a result, the areas that corporations include in their 
assessments should be considerably widened. For instance, according to the Institutional 
Responsibilities Framework, corporations would be required to consider foreseeable 
long-term consequences of policies, organisations and agreements that they support, of 
shared practices they can incite, perpetuate and normalise, etc. While it would certainly 
be difficult to predict all the potential implications of a particular policy, norm or 
agreement, it is possible to foresee some outcomes, and these are the only ones that 
corporations may be held accountable for. A paradigmatic example is the TRIPS 
Agreement that some industrial sectors supported (see Chapter 5). Before it became 
effective on January 1st 1996, several commentators noted that increasing the patent 
protection of drugs would be detrimental for developing countries (Dhar & Rao, 1992). 
In spite of objections raised before the implementation of the agreement and the 
demonstrably harmful effects of the agreement, it has been systematically implemented 
(Correa, 2000; Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002). While several mechanisms to overcome 
some of the harmful effects of the TRIPS Agreement have been proposed –such as tiered 
pricing based on a country’s ability to pay– “all of these proposals have been resisted by 




the international branded pharmaceutical industry, by the U.S. government, and, to a 
lesser degree, by other developed countries” (Harris & Siplon, 2001, p. 35). Thus 
according to the proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework, corporations could 
be held liable for the predictable human rights harm to which they have contributed by 
supporting the TRIPS Agreement. 
We can note that an essential prerequisite for the attribution of responsibility in 
the proposed framework is the predictability of human rights deficits that might arise in 
the current global institutional order. While a specific agreement might not foreseeably 
give rise to human rights deficits by itself, it might do so by the context in which it 
operates. It can be argued that protecting intellectual property is something desirable to 
economically incentivise corporations to create new medicines, and that the purpose of 
the TRIPS Agreement did not include preventing access to essential medicines. While it 
is true that TRIPS does not explicitly ban access to certain types of medicine, in a world 
where most states are poor, the agreement contributes to an affordability gap for such 
goods. The possible consequences of a particular agreement or law must therefore be 
assessed whilst considering existing structural conditions or institutional arrangements. 
While the agreement does not establish, that is, mandate or authorise limiting access to 
essential medicines and food, it nonetheless engenders these deprivations (Pogge, 2008, p. 
179). Thus, the moral assessment of these agreements is not limited to the harm it causes 
within a particular arrangement but also includes contributions to the continuation of a 
harmful arrangement. 
 Duties of Coordination  7.2.2.
 
Frequently, corporations can fulfil their negative duties by refraining from acting 
in a particular way that would contribute to the maintenance of a harmful institutional 
order. At other times they may be required to coordinate with parts of their supply chain 




or other companies in order to avoid doing harm or to actively benefit from it. An 
example can be found in the apparel industry. If clothing retailers want to discharge their 
negative duties it is not enough that the parts of their business operations that they 
directly control respect human rights. They also bear stringent duties to coordinate with 
the different parties to the business process in order to ensure that independent decision-
making does not cause or contribute to negative human rights outcomes. For example, 
corporations may engage in multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Fair Labour 
Association (FLA) and the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI). The FLA conducts external 
audits and holds their members accountable for implementing the FLA’s code of conduct 
across their supply chains (Fair Labor Association, 2011). Similarly, the ETI acts as a 
coordinating mechanism among retailers, brands and suppliers to improve the working 
conditions of those involved in the manufacturing process (Ethical Trading Initiative, 
2013).   
In the past, corporations have been reluctant to acknowledging such duties. 
During the 1990s major retailers and brands in the garment industry responded to anti-
corporate campaigns by pointing to long chains of subcontracting and outsourcing as 
evidence that violations of human rights in factories were beyond their control 
(Macdonald & Macdonald, 2010, p. 34; Young, 2004, p. 367). Even today, many 
corporations opt for a distant relationship with their supply chains as a way to avoid legal 
responsibility in host countries (Wells & Elias, 2005, p. 150). However, it has been 
increasingly difficult for companies to distance themselves from the harmful conditions 
prevalent across parts of their business processes. For example, in 2012, the electronics 
company Apple was subject to intense criticism following a case of mass suicides in some 
factories operated by its Chinese subcontractor Foxconn, the world’s largest electronics 
manufacturer. While Apple is not in direct control of Foxconn, it became the main target 
of complaints about the poor labour conditions there (China Labor Watch, 2012; Kan, 
2012a). Contrary to the reaction of the clothing retailers in 1990s, Apple partnered with 




the FLA and committed itself to improving workers’ conditions in subcontracted 
factories (Kan, 2012b). As reflected in the UN Guiding Principles, there has been an 
increasing acceptance of the idea that TNCs bear some responsibility for what happens 
within their supply chain and business relations, and they can be held accountable for it.  
Duties of coordination may also require companies to harmonise efforts to 
improve prevailing practices within a given industry. For example, corporations are 
likely to oppose adopting stringent environmental policies or high labour standards if 
they perceive those will hinder their competitive edge. Therefore, they have little 
incentive to unilaterally adopt them. Further, if one company decided to adopt these 
measures, it could make little difference if the others continued in their harmful practices. 
This, however, does not mean that companies are obliged to act only if the others follow 
suit. Rather, in such cases, coordinated action among the members of the same industry 
might be necessary to eliminate extending harmful practices. The demandingness of such 
duties would be partly determined by the capabilities of corporations and their position 
within an industry. A company that has a large share of the market and can set standards 
for the whole industry will have significantly more responsibility to do something to 
change the system than a small company with little leverage.  
 Duties Not to Undermine the Capabilities of the State and to 7.2.3.
Strengthen Its Capabilities to Discharge Positive Duties 
 
Duties to protect and fulfil human rights have been traditionally allocated to the 
state, which has been considered the most capable and suitable actor to discharge them. 
This traditional view is reflected in instruments of international law such as treaties and 
covenants, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in whose drafting 
process states’ delegates assumed such responsibility for themselves (Ruggie, 2007b, p. 
819; 2008). This consideration assumes a robust institutional framework within which 
corporations operate (Hsieh, 2009, p. 251) as well as the existence of a division of labour 




where states are actually able to protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of the 
people under their jurisdiction. However, for such a division of moral labour to be 
effective, it must be respected by non-state agents (Kolstad, 2008, p. 573). Therefore, 
corporations need to respect the division of labour and refrain from undermining the 
ability of states to discharge their duties through harmful practices such as bribery, 
corruption or aggressive lobbying to obtain private gains that foreseeably undermine 
human rights (Kolstad, 2008, p. 576).  
It must be acknowledged, however, that an image of the world where states are 
able and willing to protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of their populations is 
not always accurate (Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006, p. 508). Even when other 
agents respect the moral division of labour, governments may lack the capability to 
discharge their full range of duties, as in the case of failed, weak and quasi-states. In these 
cases, states might be unable to regulate TNCs operating within their territory. Further, 
they may be unable to protect their population against the activities of other non-state 
actors, or provide effective mechanisms for redressing grievances. In this scenario, a 
possible way to deal with the inability of the state to discharge its role could be 
attributing to corporations –or in fact any other entity with superior capabilities– some of 
the duties of the state. This can be an appropriate response in situations of genuine 
emergency, where the state is temporary unable to discharge some of its duties. This is 
not, however, a satisfactory solution where the inoperability of the state is long-lasting. In 
these circumstances, it would be necessary to re-evaluate the role of the state, and non-
state actors in relation to human rights, taking into consideration their functions and 
purposes. For instance, even if certain TNCs operating in Somalia were the most capable 
actors in terms of fulfilling human rights of the people in that country, that does not 
mean that they should be expected to replicate the role of the government wholesale, 
especially in the longer term.  




TNCs operating in such contexts do bear more duties than if they operated in 
conditions where states acted as primary and generally effective agents of justice. 
Corporations operating in countries where governments are unable to fulfil their range of 
duties may acquire further derivative positive duties, including contributing to restoring 
the capacity of the state to discharge the full range of its duties. This is comparable to the 
duty of TNCs to promote just background institutions in the countries where they 
operate, proposed by authors such as Hsieh (2009) and De George (1993, pp. 54-56). 
Such a duty is grounded in broader negative duties not to cause harm and not to benefit 
from injustice. For instance Hsieh (2009, pp. 258-259, 264) argues that when 
corporations operate in countries where the state does not protect the rights of its citizens, 
they might harm or contribute to injustice. Even when corporations might not directly 
harm someone, it is wrong to benefit from a system that gives rise to potential harm by 
allowing companies to pay very low wages, pay little or no tax and refrain from 
enforcing safety and environmental regulations. In order for them to discharge their 
negative duties, corporations can withdraw their operations from that country or 
promote the development of institutions similar to those of developed countries.  
The proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework agrees that corporations 
have some derivative positive duties to contribute to enabling governments to protect and 
fulfil the human rights of their population. However, it holds that even if corporations 
withdraw their activities from a country with a weak state, they could still fail to fulfil 
their negative duties. For example, if a corporation from the extractive industry 
withdraws its activities from a country with a tyrannical government but supports a 
global institutional order that foreseeably gives rise to tyrannical governments in certain 
parts of the world, that corporation would not be honouring its negative duty to avoid 
doing harm. Thus the Institutional Responsibilities Framework is more demanding that 
the aforementioned account, as it takes account not only of the direct impact 




corporations may exert on human rights but also their institutionally mediated 
contributions to harm.  
It is important at this point to consider the appropriate extent or depth of 
corporations’ duties. To do this it is necessary to consider the overarching purpose of the 
corporation, as well as the ground on which duties are attributed. In terms of the latter, 
the Institutional Responsibilities Framework sees duties again as arising from TNCs 
causing, contributing to or actively benefiting from human rights harms. At the same 
time, it recognises that corporations are not comprehensive governing institutions like 
states. Rather, they are role-specific private organisations which must meet operating 
expenses and generate some surplus in the form of profit in order to remain viable 
entities.  Thus, they should not be expected to perform the full functions of a state for any 
extended period, or even limited such functions, as they are not organisationally well 
equipped to do so. This leads to some further practical reasons not to ascribe duties to 
TNCs based solely on their economic capacity. That is, expecting them to convert any 
surplus they control to governance purposes could generate perverse incentives for 
corporations to underreport their earnings, and it could generally hinder efforts to compel 
them to accept further human rights responsibilities or accountability mechanisms (see 
Chapter 4). A more appropriate approach, specifically under conditions of state 
incapacity over the longer term, would be to set limits to TNC contributions according to 
the active benefits they obtain from the inability of the state to discharge its duties.  
A more challenging situation is when a government is able but unwilling to fulfil 
its duties and acts against the rights of its population. The UN Framework offers little 
guidance in these cases. It directs states to protect human rights, but it does not clarify 
how to deal with less than ideal conditions. For instance, the UN Guiding Principles 
indicate that the corporate responsibility to respect “[…] exists independently of States’ 
abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations, and does not 
diminish those obligations. And it exists over and above compliance with national laws 




and regulations protecting human rights” (Ruggie, 2011, p. 13). It does not elaborate on 
the cases where strong contradictions exist between regulations and the duties to respect.   
 On the other hand, the Global Compact has explored the issue in depth and has 
concluded that in some cases of weak or conflict-prone states, corporations can discharge 
their duties by collaborating with international institutions in charge of helping the 
affected population, by following and developing benchmarks aimed at guiding the 
activities of corporations in these situations, or in some cases, divestment (UNGC, 2007). 
In the proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework, as in the UN Framework, it is 
presumed that a functional government is required to actually protect and fulfil the 
human rights of a population. However, while the UN Framework tends to assume the 
existence of such a government, the proposed framework involves corporations in the 
creation of such conditions. In sum, the duty to strengthen governments’ capabilities 
stems from the assumption of ideal conditions of the division of labour that underpins the 
protect-respect-remedy triad.  
 Duties to Reforming the Global Institutional Order 7.2.4.
 
As has been discussed, the proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework 
argues that TNCs have stringent negative duties to avoid doing harm, both directly and 
by supporting a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably gives rise to 
human rights deficits. However, transnational corporations may not always be able to 
halt their participation in the institutional order, as their existence and operations are 
dependent on such a system. In cases where they are unable to avoid supporting the 
global order, TNCs can discharge some compensatory duties in order to “offset” the 
harm to which they contribute (see Section 6.2). Nonetheless given that the shape of such 
order could continue generating harm, corporations have additional duties to promote its 
reform. Reforming the global institutional order thus does not arise from a positive duty, 




but from a negative duty not to participate in the imposition of a scheme that causes 
harm.   
The global institutional approach discussed in Chapter 5 contends that what 
citizens of affluent countries can do to reform the global order is limited to their political 
participation through their national governments, as states are considered the main 
actors in shaping the rules that underpin such arrangements.71 In contrast, corporations 
can contribute to the global institutional order by acting in both the private and political 
spheres, through and beyond national governments. Corporations have several 
mechanisms at their disposal to discharge their duties to contribute to reforming the 
institutional order. “Some large or otherwise influential businesses may be able to 
support institutional change simply via changes in the way they conduct their individual 
relationships: for example, by modifying their bargaining strategies with suppliers, their 
strategic engagement with competitors or their political engagement with governmental 
and relevant non-state actors” (Macdonald, 2011, p. 559). Corporations can also use 
their clout with political leaders in order to promote institutional change, or they can use 
their reputation to advance much needed reforms or raise awareness of critical issues. A 
prominent example is the UK cosmetics company, The Body Shop, which has been 
involved in several social campaigns, including protesting against Shell for its alleged 
involvement in the execution of Nigerian civil society leader Ken-Saro Wiwa and other 
activists in 1994. One of its most recent campaigns, Stop Sex Trafficking of Children and 
Young People, presented “[…] over 7 million campaign petitions to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council, making it one of the largest petitions in the history of the United 
Nations” (The Body Shop, 2012).   
                                                       
71 This position has been contested. For example, Young argues that “our working through state institutions 
is often an effective means of such collective action to change structural processes, but states are not the only 
tools of effective collective action” (2004, p. 380). Individuals, for example, can join civil society 
organisations or other decentralised civil organisations (Young, 2004, p. 380).  




Promoting institutional change can be regarded as backward looking insofar as it 
requires understanding how social structures work and identifying the features of the 
institutional order that foreseeably engender harm (Young, 2004, p. 379). Such 
evaluation, however, has a forward-looking purpose, namely, changing the features that 
contribute to the production of human rights harm. While each company bears this 
obligation individually, discharging it may entail some degree of coordinated action of 
TNCs together with other companies, states and non-state actors  (Macdonald, 2011, p. 
559). 
 Duties of Accountability 7.2.5.
 
Accountability is commonly understood in relation to the demands an 
individual, group or entity can make on an agent to report on her activities and, in the 
case of non-compliance, has associated penalties. Often, accountability implies some 
delegation of authority to act (Keohane, 2003, p. 139; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 236). 
Thus CEOs are accountable to shareholders, just as democratic governments are to their 
citizens. In this traditional conception of accountability, it is not obvious why TNCs 
should be accountable to society in general, as there is not direct delegation of authority 
(Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 236) even though a relationship exists between society and 
corporations through legal mechanisms, including concession agreements between states 
and companies, charter granting and provision of limited liability.  
It has been persuasively argued, however, that accountability can also be 
grounded on the impact an entity has over the people whose lives are affected by it (Held, 
1995; Keohane, 2003; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 236).  This has been identified as 
“external accountability”, as opposed to “internal accountability”, which exists within 
the institutional entity (Keohane, 2003, p. 141). Contemporary patterns of global 
interconnectedness and interdependence significantly challenge the assumption widely 




held through the 19th and 20th centuries of the existence of a symmetrical relationship 
between political decision-makers and the recipients of political decisions (Held, 1995, p. 
16). It became apparent that populations were not only being affected by the decisions of 
their national governments, but also by the decisions of foreign governments and 
transnational non-state actors. Thus, some theories of democracy have argued that 
impact and not only delegation of authority could be an element to generating 
accountability relations, including beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Duties of 
accountability to TNCs thus can be grounded on the impact they exert on populations, 
and also on the claims that can be made against them. So far, the proposed approach has 
detailed the main obligations TNCs bear in relation to human rights, which derive from 
the primary negative duty to avoid doing harm. If it is accepted that at least these duties 
apply to corporations, it is necessary to establish accountability processes to ensure that 
they are discharged. Increased transparency and availability of information from 
corporations to other stakeholders is necessary to conduct a significant due diligence 
process, to strengthen existing accountability mechanisms and to develop new ones. 
 Duties of Rescue 7.3.
 
While the proposed Institutional Responsibilities Framework maintains that 
TNCs bear mainly negative duties in relation to human rights, it does not deny that they 
may also need to discharge some stringent positive duties in special cases, such as 
emergencies. These are understood as serious, unexpected, and often dangerous situations 
requiring immediate action. Sorell gives the example of a car accident witnessed by a 
passing tourist. In such a case, he argues, the tourist has a duty to help the injured person 
even if providing relief was not the main purpose of the tourist’s visit to a foreign country 
(2004, p. 130). According to Sorell, simply being in a position to provide help means the 
tourist has some responsibility to do so, even if she did nothing to bring about the 
emergency situation. Sorell draws a parallel between this example and the case of a 




corporation that operates in a country where human rights have been violated. He argues 
that, similar to the tourist, corporations acquire some responsibilities of rescue, especially 
when “[…] the rights being violated are very basic, and the violations are systematic” 
(Sorell, 2004, p. 130). I will suggest, however, that the two situations are only partially 
analogous.  
In Sorell’s example of the passing tourist and Peter Singer’s case of the child 
drowning in a pond (see Singer, 1972), those in a position to help are obliged to do so, 
not only because they have the capabilities or opportunities to do so, but also, I contend, 
because such situations are extraordinary. If on the way to the airport the tourist 
witnesses an accident and is capable of acting but decides not to do so in order not to 
miss the flight, she could be blameworthy. However, if the next day the tourist found 
herself in the same situation, and the day after that, and the three following days, she 
might not be subject to the same blame if they decided not to act. This is, first, because 
every time the tourist acts and misses the plane, she is incurring a financial cost, and she 
might also be incurring other expenses or risks such as exceeding her legal stay in the 
country. Therefore, her marginal opportunity cost for acting every day to rescue the 
injured person increases, until at some point it is not reasonable to expect her to do more. 
Secondly, the tourist might not be blameworthy after she decided not to continue 
rescuing those injured, because it might be that if such accidents are continuous, 
someone else is failing to discharge their duties, e.g. ensuring that roads are well 
maintained, that people do not drive recklessly or securing immediate medical help from 
those injured during road accidents. Focusing on ascribing blame to the passing tourist or 
to corporations for systematic harms might distract the attention for discussing who else 
is falling short from their duties. It could divert attention from the more central task of 
designing and implementing mechanisms that could prevent such regretful situations 
from happening in the first place.  




I presume that the situations that Sorell is referring to do not engender duties for 
corporations because of the emergency of the situation, but because of the benefit they 
are obtaining from injustice. He in fact says that “[…] the human rights abuses that 
companies confront do not crop up suddenly and unexpectedly, like the road accident: 
they often predate the entry of the company and are known in advance to be features of 
local life […]” (Sorell, 2004, p. 130). If knowing this in advance a corporation decides to 
start operating in a country, it is arguably because it is getting some benefit from regretful 
conditions. In these cases, therefore, the duties would be grounded on the benefit 
corporations get from injustice and not on the opportunities and capabilities they have to 
provide help. 
Therefore, according to the Institutional Responsibilities Framework, in cases of 
emergency, corporations may be attributed some positive duties to protect and fulfil 
human rights. Even in countries where the state acts as the primary agent of justice and is 
able  and willing to protect and fulfil the rights of its population, emergencies occur and 
corporations might be in a position to help at a low opportunity cost. Therefore, they 
may be ascribed some responsibility regardless of their main objectives, functions, 
causality or relation with the affected people (Shue, 1988, p. 73; Sorell, 2004, pp. 130-
132; Wettstein, 2009, p. 146). However, this does not mean that the duties of another 
agent (the state) have been transposed into a more capable agent, but instead that the 
urgency of the situation activates some obligations for those witnessing the emergency, to 
rescue those in imminent danger. 
To close this section, we can distinguish with greater clarity some elements of a 
situation that can trigger duties of rescue. First, the situation in question should be an 
emergency where something of great importance, for instance, health or life, is at risk and 
requires immediate attention. If an apparent non-emergency situation could foreseeably 
lead to an emergency if the witness did not act, she also has an obligation to help.  
Second, the corporation or person witnessing the emergency should have the capability to 




help. In the case of the road accident, it is presumed that the witness is able to easily and 
efficiently drive the injured person to the nearest hospital. If the witness did not have the 
capability to act, for example because of a physical disability, she would not be morally 
blameworthy for failing to help. Thus, capability is an essential element to attribute 
duties in such cases. 
Third, the opportunity cost of acting is reasonable. In the accident example, the 
expense for providing help to the injured person could be a missed flight. However, if the 
passing tourist had to provide help day after day, she would not be able to lead anything 
resembling a normal life, and therefore she could be excused for failing to help 
indefinitely. Furthermore, even if the witness is capable of helping but at risk of dying or 
being severely injured, she cannot be blameworthy, or at least not so clearly blameworthy 
or accountable. Providing help at a very large cost can be a matter of simple 
responsibility but of heroism. Most authors who defend a positive duties approach stress 
that intervening is required when it does not entail “significant costs” for the duty-bearer 
(Buchanan, 2004, p. 89). Note that this restriction is presented as taking into 
consideration that the person witnessing the emergency was not causally responsible for 
it. If the person pushed 20 children into a pond, and thus violated her negative duties, she 
would have to provide significant redress for the harm caused, even if it entails onerous 
costs.  
 Implications for the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework 7.4.
 
The following sections will critically analyse the grounds upon which the UN 
Framework allocates to TNCs negative duties to respect and will argue that they are not 
enough to sustain a human rights agenda against competing business interests. In turn, it 
contends that the discussion of TNCs’ duties of justice developed in this thesis can 
inform the Framework’s principles and could contribute to overcoming some of its 




shortcomings. It, however, would entail significant changes in the understanding of 
corporate impact and the allocation of corporate responsibilities.   
 Grounds for Attributing Duties to Respect and ‘Principled 7.4.1.
Pragmatism’ 
 
The UN Framework, and other policy documents that have adopted its main 
tenets, see TNCs as bearing a negative duty to respect human rights (Ruggie, 2008, p. 8). 
This duty is grounded first on its recognition in instruments of soft law such as the 
Tripartite Declaration and the OECD Guidelines, which have been embraced by most 
states, the largest corporations and salient business organisations such as the 
International Organisation of Employers, the International Chamber of Commerce, and 
the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (Ruggie, 2008, p. 8). In 
contrast, the UN Framework rejects claims that corporations have obligations to protect 
and realise human rights, which in most instruments of international law are explicitly 
allocated to states (Ruggie, 2007a, pp. 11-14). The reliance of the UN Framework on 
legal and quasi-legal mechanisms to specifying the duties of TNCs can be partly 
explained by the mandate given to Ruggie, and his goal of creating “a formula that was 
politically authoritative” by following the route of  “principled pragmatism” (see Section 
2.5.3) (2013, p. xlvi). While the UN Framework, and its widespread acceptance 
particularly across the business community, can be described as a political victory -–
particularly after the fate of previous United Nations initiatives– the emphasis on the 
legal duties of TNCs and the pragmatism of the framework have had important 
implications for business and human rights issues in general.  
The responsibility to respect, as the Special Representative understands it, partly 
depends on its recognition in instruments of soft law, whose adoption, in turn, depends 
on the support of states and some non-state actors. For example, the rejection of UN 
Norms can be partly explained by the perception from corporate home states and TNCs 




that such documents were against their interests, as it would burden them with 
significant responsibilities (see Section 2.5.2). Therefore, the responsibilities that the UN 
Framework attributes to corporations are determined to a large extent by what influential 
states and TNCs are willing to accept for themselves. This means that the UN 
Framework is unable to act as an independent source for generating or discussing the 
human rights responsibilities of TNCs, and instead is a reflection of the interests of the 
most powerful international players.  
One of the main goals of the UN Framework was to offer a pragmatic approach 
to specifying the responsibilities of TNCs. However, such pragmatism has the risk of 
making it unresponsive to some stakeholders such as NGOs and the society in general. 
“From a general public policy perspective, it is important that business entities fulfill their 
human rights responsibilities, not because doing so will advance business interests, but 
because doing so will advance human interests and signal respect for human rights based 
on their instrumental but also their intrinsic moral value” (Cragg, 2012, p. 11). Thus, 
focusing excessively on the practical aspects of business duties effectively overlooks the 
concerns of relevant stakeholders (Cragg, 2012, p. 11). 
Such pragmatism, I argue, has repercussions not only for the UN Framework, 
but for the whole business and human rights issue. While the framework’s original 
purpose was to clarify the duties of corporations under international law, it has come to 
be regarded as the main referent for political, ethical and legal discussions on the issue of 
business and human rights. Initiatives at the policy level and corporate codes of conduct 
have been deeply influenced, and even sometimes replaced, by the tenets of the UN 
Framework and the Guiding Principles. The pragmatic view has thus permeated 
dialogue around business and human rights.  
As earlier noted, while a key purpose of the UN Framework was to provide an 
authoritative clarification of the duties that TNCs already bear in legal and quasi-legal 
instruments, the framework does not only base its pillars on legal considerations, but also 




on moral grounds i.e. social norms that “exist over and above compliance with laws and 
regulations” (Ruggie, 2013, pp. 91-92). The UN Framework, for example, mentions that 
one of the grounds in attributing responsibilities to TNCs relates to the expectations 
corporations have of business, which grants them a “social licence to operate” (Ruggie, 
2008, pp. 8, 17; OECD, 2011b, p. 32). In other words, “respect for human rights is the 
global standard of expected conduct for enterprises” (OECD, 2011b, p. 32). Human 
rights, however, as recognised in the International Bill of Human Rights, will at times 
not be consistent with local customs, and therefore, not something that society may 
expect from corporations (Cragg, 2012, p. 14). For example, in countries such as 
Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, where women are systematically segregated, the expectations 
regarding the treatment of women within and by TNCs might be different than more 
liberal societies where blunt discrimination of women is penalised.  
It is also possible that the conception of the corporations’ role in society may 
vary among different countries due to past experiences. For example, in countries where 
corporations have continuously violated human rights, the population may have different 
expectations than in parts of the world where corporations have been socially expected to 
provide welfare services, such as in education or health.  Expectations can change over 
time and may also vary according to sector, particularly if they are directly related to the 
provision of a human right, e.g. the health sector. This does not mean that human rights 
are wholly culturally relative or that TNCs should be condoned for engaging in human 
rights violations when the social and cultural frameworks allow or encourage such 
practices. Instead, these examples try to highlight that the expectations societies have 
from business are variable. Thus, while it would be desirable if corporations had high 
standards in their operations across the world, there is hardly a “global standard of 
expected conduct.” 
According to the UN Framework, the failure of TNCs to meet their 
responsibility to respect “[…] can subject companies to the courts of public opinion […] 




and occasionally to charges in actual courts” (Ruggie, 2008, pp. 9, 16). Thus, part of the 
justificatory grounds offered to corporations for endorsing and implementing the 
framework and for respecting human rights relies on avoiding reputational and legal risks 
that might negatively impact on their finances. In other words, the UN Framework 
partly appeals to corporations’ enlightened self-interest to discharge their duties (Cragg, 
2012, p. 12). While such grounds might be attractive for business, they are “[…] not 
capable of sustaining the human rights agenda against competing business imperatives 
[and also] makes the framework both pragmatically and intellectually unpersuasive” 
(Cragg, 2012, p. 10). 
Attributing responsibilities to corporations on the basis of their recognition in 
mechanisms of soft law, along with enlightened self-interest, provides at best a precarious 
foundation for allocating duties that can serve as guides for corporate conduct, 
particularly in cases when they clash. The lack of independent grounds for attributing 
duties to TNCs, along with the underlying appeal to enlightened self-interest, contradicts 
the rationale of human rights, which instead seem to be mostly appreciated for their 
instrumental value. The next section will argue for the necessity of discussing and 
integrating in the UN Framework the duties of justice of TNCs, similar to those 
developed in this thesis.  
 TNCs Duties of Justice 7.4.2.
  
Discussing and integrating duties of justice may have some significant 
implications for the UN Framework and other similar policy documents. Treating the 
responsibilities of TNCs mainly as legal duties has important limitations as  
[…] TNCs that are not legitimately bound by the Framework and that 
have no instrumental reasons for adhering to elements of the 
Framework, have no reasons for respecting laws that protect human 
rights when they could lawfully do otherwise, and they have no reason 




for adhering to unenforced laws within states barring independent 
considerations (Arnold, 2010, p. 383).  
Therefore, grounding the responsibility of TNCs in soft law mechanisms can only convey 
sufficient authority when corporations have explicitly adhered to, or endorsed them, and 
where there is a somewhat clear authority capable of setting expectations. In contrast, 
duties of justice are unconditional moral duties that TNCs bear whether they are 
recognised in legal documents or not, and regardless of the existence of an external 
authority to enforce them. Acknowledging that TNCs bear moral duties as opposed to 
only legal duties may clarify the fact that, regardless of the contractual duties 
corporations voluntarily acquired, they also bear mandatory non-discretional moral 
duties of respect (Cragg, 2012, p. 29). Thus, grounding the responsibilities attributed in 
the UN Framework in duties of justice could make it much more persuasive even for 
stakeholders critical of the stand of the political documents upon which it has been 
developed.  
Discussing TNCs’ duties of justice could also contribute to bridging the 
governance gap generated by the lack of effective regulation of corporate conduct. Some 
of the attempts to bridging this gap have been focused on establishing common 
international standards for corporate conduct e.g. the UN Norms, or on clarifying and 
giving coherence to the existing politically recognised responsibilities, as in the UN 
Framework. However, such efforts depend on the recognition and support from states. In 
contrast, human rights as moral rights, and corresponding moral duties, are universal 
and apply globally wherever corporations engage in business (Cragg, 2012, pp. 16-17). 
An explicit reference to corporate duties of justice could provide an alternative pathway 
to the regulation of TNC conduct, independent from political considerations. In turn, 
this recognition could legitimate moral demands to corporations regardless of their 
affiliation to voluntary agreements or initiatives.  
Corporations have been traditionally reluctant to support commitments that 
impose on them more obligations or legally binding mechanisms that could eventually 




translate into costly legal suits, hindering entrepreneurship or giving unequal advantage 
to some companies (Ruggie, 2013, pp. xxii-xxiii). Regardless of the validity of such 
arguments, it would be much harder to deny that TNCs have minimal moral duties –
ones which exist regardless of whether they acknowledge them. In fact, TNCs have 
already accepted some moral duties for themselves. For example, respecting the law is in 
many cases a matter of prudence, but it is also a matter of moral responsibility. If it were 
just a matter of prudence, corporations could follow the law only when the penalties 
were higher than the perceived gains. However, the decision not to break the law, even if 
it would enhance the financial bottom line is a defensible managerial decision “[…] on 
the grounds that obeying the law is a fundamental corporate moral obligation” (Cragg, 
2012, p. 27). In an analogous way, it could be possible to justify respect for human rights 
not only from a prudential consideration of enlightened self-interest, but as a moral duty, 
a duty of justice, which must be discharged regardless of the impact on the bottom line 
(Cragg, 2012, p. 27). 
Recognising that transnational corporations have moral duties to avoid doing 
harm, as this thesis argues, provides a viable addition to the UN Framework, as both 
share a similar premise, namely, that corporations bear essentially negative duties to 
respect human rights. Such an addition could provide it with more clarity and address 
some of its perceived shortcomings. This does not mean that clarifying the moral duties 
of TNCs would provide a definitive answer to the most pressing conundrums regarding 
TNCs and human rights, as disputes on the hierarchy of human rights or derived 
obligations are likely to arise in complex cases. However, it provides a solid point of 
departure to reconcile human rights and competing corporate interests. The following 
section will argue that integrating the proposed approach into the UN Framework will 
require a substantive modification of its consideration of impact, which in turn would 
amend and expand the scope in which TNCs would be considered to bear some moral 
responsibility.  




 Broadening the Conception of Impact 7.4.3.
 
According to the approach proposed in this thesis, normative accounts should 
acknowledge the fact that corporations may affect human rights not only by their direct 
operations or only through their activities and business relations, but also via the global 
institutional order (see Chapter 5). This would entail for the UN Framework explicitly 
broadening its notion of ‘impact’. As described in Section 5.3, the UN Framework makes 
a sharp distinction between ‘influence’ and ‘impact’. This is of great relevance, given that 
only the former constitutes acceptable grounds to attribute responsibility under the UN 
Framework. The crucial element for defining ‘impact’ seems to lie in the exercise of 
unmediated agency, while a corporation is said to exert ‘influence’ over human rights if it 
has some leverage over the actors to whom human rights harm can be traced. Influence 
in this frame does not necessarily give rise to corporate responsibility (Ruggie, 2008, p. 
19). According to the Special Representative, the UN Framework avoids attributing 
responsibility on the basis of influence, as it would be very burdensome for TNCs and 
could generate negative incentives. In an extreme scenario, corporations would have 
little motivation to grow and expand because it could mean expanding their leverage 
over other entities, and therefore their influence-based responsibilities. Also, Ruggie is 
wary that such grounds would lead to a case of duty dumping, particularly from 
governments which “[…] can deliberately fail to perform [their] duties in the hope or 
expectation that a company will yield to social pressures to promote or fulfil certain 
rights […]” (Ruggie, 2008, p. 19). Therefore, in his view, attributing and distributing 
duties based on this specific understanding of influence would be very onerous for 
corporations.  
While attributing responsibility to corporations based on their influence might be 
burdensome, the narrow understanding of ‘impact’ potentially excludes many cases of 
corporate harm. It also creates perverse incentives for corporations to distance 




themselves from the harms to which they contribute. The closely linked ‘agency-impact-
responsibility’ means that corporations might not be considered to have exerted impact 
over human rights in cases where human rights harm cannot be traced back to the 
exercise of unmediated corporate agency. Also, cases when the harm is not directly 
linked to the corporation’s operations and activities might be excluded even if the 
corporation has reaped the benefits or contributed to harm through complex institutional 
channels.  
In line with the framework proposed, responsibility is still tied to the impact 
corporations exert over human rights, which in turn is linked to corporate agency. 
However the limits of what constitutes agency are appropriately stretched. This 
conception of agency differs from the traditional one because it acknowledges the 
relevance of institutionally mediated agency to conceptualise corporate impact. It also 
considers existing concerns on taxing corporations for human rights deficits to which 
they have not contributed. It proposes that corporate impact and its corresponding 
responsibilities should exclusively be attributed in cases where human rights deficits can 
be linked to corporate agency exercised directly or via the global institutional order.  
Note that while the concept of impact is significantly stretched, it differs from 
Ruggie’s understanding of influence insofar as it does not equate impact to leverage. 
Rather, the proposed definition of impact considers the inclusion of unmediated and 
mediated exercise of corporate agency. For example, if a given national law produces 
human rights harm, corporations would not be considered to exert impact if they did not 
contribute (directly or via the institutional arrangement) to the regretful outcome, even if 
they had some leverage over the national government to abrogate the law. On the other 
hand, corporations would be considered to exert impact if they promoted or encouraged 
a law that foreseeably and avoidably caused or contributed to human rights harm. For 
example, in the case of TRIPS discussed in Section 5.6.1, it can be said that corporations 
did not exert direct agency to bring about human rights harm connected with the 




configuration of that particular agreement. However, they exercised corporate agency in 
many instances in the creation of the TRIPS, from raising the issue in national agendas 
to lobbying national governments to include it as a trade-related issue in the WTO. 
Incorporating the proposed notion of impact in the UN Framework and other current 
related policy initiatives would entail recognising the relation between agency and the 
institutional dynamics in place. In turn, it “[…] provides a basis for holding business 
responsible for their indirect impacts on human rights, on the grounds that institutionally 
mediated casual enable business to ‘do harm at distance’” (Macdonald, 2011, p. 553). 
While responsibility has tended to be attributed on the basis of impact, which in 
turn is closely linked to unmediated corporate agency, such an approach has slowly 
expanded. It has started to be acknowledged the impact corporations may exert on 
human rights via their immediate relation with suppliers, vendors, subcontractors, etc. 
(IHBR & GBI, 2012) For example, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights intended to help operationalize the UN Framework, maintains that the 
responsibilities of corporations to respect human rights requires them to “[…] avoid 
causing or contribute to adverse human rights through their own activities, and address 
such impacts when they occur” (Ruggie, 2011, p. 14). However, they also require that 
corporations “seek to prevent or mitigate human rights impacts that are directly linked to 
their operations, products or services by their business relations, even if they have not 
contributed to those impacts […]” (Ruggie, 2011, p. 14).  
In the first clause, the element of unmediated agency is clearly present, as it 
requires corporations to prevent human rights harm they might cause through their own 
activities. However, the second one seems to contradict the idea of the UN Framework, 
as it does not necessarily involve the exercise of unmediated agency. This is an important 
shift, because it recognises that TNCs can exert harm via institutional channels. The 
instances in which TNCs are recognised to have some impact on human rights are 
significantly more restricted than those proposed in the Institutional Responsibilities 




Framework. Nonetheless, these developments show an increasing awareness and 
acceptance that TNCs may be held to account for indirect harms, providing fertile 
ground for some of the ideas proposed in this thesis.  
 Implications for the Global Institutional Approach 7.5.
 
While the Institutional Responsibilities Framework proposed in this thesis has 
adopted some of the main ideas of the global institutional approach as developed by 
Thomas Pogge, its focus on transnational corporations as opposed to citizens has 
important implications for the global institutional approach. As Section 6.4 discussed, 
the conceptualization of TNCs as transnational agents with significant clout to shape and 
maintain the global institutional order through and beyond national governments 
contributes to overcoming some of the most significant objections made against the 
global institutional approach. At the same time, if it is accepted that undemocratic TNCs 
may have a significant impact on the configuration of the global institutional order and 
that their national alliances are weak at best, it is possible to question the extent of the 
responsibility Pogge attributes to the citizens of affluent countries, because their interests 
can only be expected to be channelled through the state, which in turn seems to be losing 
power vis-à-vis corporations.    
In Pogge’s account, citizens of affluent countries again are considered to bear 
most of the responsibility for the current shape of the global institutional order, as it 
presumed that they are the actors with the most power to influence such order. This 
account tends to treat TNCs on par with citizens, and to presume that powerful 
democratic national governments represent the interests of their citizens and “their” 
corporations.   
In negotiations about the design of the global order, particular decisions 
that are best for the governments, corporations, or citizens of the 
affluent countries are not always best in terms of avoiding severe 




poverty elsewhere. […] When faced with such conflicts, negotiators for 
the affluent states generally (are instructed to) give precedence to the 
interests of their own country's government; corporations, and citizens 
over the interests of the global poor (emphasis added) (Pogge, 2007, p. 
34).  
Nonetheless, treating corporations as part of, or as a tool of, a single nation-state 
does not capture the complexity and transnational nature of TNCs, which is what has 
contributed to the governance gap in the first place. In many respects, transnational 
corporations can be regarded as instruments of states. When the first TNC, the East India 
Company, was established in 1600, it was closely related to the host state and carried out 
some of the British crown’s affairs in its colonies. Many of the political appointees of 
Britain to its colonies were indeed employees of the East India Company (Hartmann, 
2002, p. 50). Other examples are the roles of ITT Corporation and the United Fruit 
Company in South America mentioned in Chapter 2, which advanced the interests of the 
United States abroad. Still nowadays, the bond between home states and corporations is 
very close. In fact, several governments of developed nations explicitly or implicitly 
acknowledge that one of their priorities is to assist their corporations to win contracts 
abroad and lobby other governments against regulatory and political barriers 
(McCorquodale & Simons, 2007, p. 598). 
Nonetheless, in other respects, the national allegiances of TNCs seem to be 
weak at best. Corporations can have headquarters in one country but be formally based 
in another in order to avoid or minimise tax burdens. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult 
to assign a nationality to a corporation in the same way that we do with people, as well 
as to match the interest of a TNC to the interest of a single nation-state. While for Pogge 
the state represents the interests of its citizens and its corporations, he does not consider 
the fact that both interests might be opposed, or that the different interests of companies 
might be represented by more than one state. For example, one developed state might 
represent the interest of pharmaceutical companies by advocating for international 
patents, while a developing nation may advance the flexible labour laws that can allow 




corporations to exploit its own workers. In turn, the corporation, as essentially an 
undemocratic entity, seems to represent only its private interests and not those of any 
polity at large.  
Therefore, if it is true that not only states but also corporations are powerful 
entities that can make significant contributions to shaping and upholding the current 
global institutional order, the responsibility of citizens of affluent countries should be 
limited to the input that their country has in that process. Specifically, this is why in his 
account to attribute responsibility for human rights violations, Pogge mainly refers to 
affluent countries. If corporations are regarded as actors with similar or even superior 
capabilities to the state to influence the global institutional order, and if corporations are 
essentially undemocratic entities, the responsibility of citizens of affluent countries might 
be considerably more limited than Pogge realises. As Gould suggests, Pogge’s “[…] focus 
on state actors leads to an overly narrow diagnosis of the problems with globalization 
and the concomitant responsibility to rectify its impacts in developing countries” (2007, p. 
389). 
However, this does not mean that citizens of affluent countries do not have any 
responsibility because they are powerless in face of corporate power. Rather, it means 
that their contribution to shaping and upholding the global institutional order as citizens 
of democratic affluent states might be more limited than Pogge suggests, particularly in 
certain aspects such as finance, in which the power of TNCs is significant. They might 
nonetheless be attributed other moral responsibilities as facilitators or enablers of 
corporate power, e.g. as consumers and employees. Clearly, these responsibilities go 
beyond citizens of affluent countries and can encompass a broader range of actors, such 
as the middle-income and wealthy citizens of developing countries, which Pogge largely 
ignores in his account. The discussion of TNCs highlights the deficiency of the global 
institutional approach for taking into account non-state actors and their input on the 
shape and maintenance of the global institutional order. Nonetheless, it also offers a 




plausible way to complement it. Instead of assuming that states are the main global 
players as Pogge does, this thesis has argued for the necessity of reassessing the different 
channels through which the global institutional approach can be shaped and maintained 
in order to more accurately attribute some responsibility to non-state actors. 
 Conclusion 7.6.
 
This chapter has argued that in order to fulfil their negative duties to avoid doing 
harm, transnational corporations are also required to discharge some derivative positive 
duties. These include duties of due diligence in order to become aware of the instances in 
which they may negatively impact on human rights directly and through the global order. 
Companies are also required to be accountable to those that may be affected by the 
company’s actions and to collaborate in reforming the institutional order. For 
meaningful changes to take place, nonetheless, some coordinated action is required 
among companies, state and non-state actors. The attribution of primarily negative duties 
to TNCs draws from the idea that states are capable and willing to protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights of their citizens, thus TNCs are required not to undermine these 
capabilities and to respect the established division of labour. When states do not have the 
capacity to fulfil their role, corporations are required to contribute to strengthening such 
capacity. There is, however, another set of duties that do not derive from the negative 
duties to respect, namely, duties of rescue that companies are required to discharge when 
amidst an extraordinary and urgent situation they can act at a relatively low opportunity 
cost.  
This chapter also argued for the need to integrate corporate duties of justice in the 
UN Framework, such as those developed throughout this thesis. This would require 
expanding the current notion of impact so as to reflect the institutional channels through 
which TNCs operate. While the Institutional Responsibilities Framework attributes more 




onerous duties to corporations than recent accounts of corporate responsibility such as 
the UN Framework and the Spheres of Responsibility approach, the proposed account 
reflects more accurately the different ways in which corporations may inflict harm. 
Recent policy developments have started to take into consideration the indirect impact of 
TNCs on human rights, indicating the existence of some conditions for the adoption of 
some of the ideas here proposed.    
Finally, this chapter also explored the implications of the proposed framework 
for the global institutional approach as developed by Thomas Pogge. It contended that 
recognising that not only states, but also corporations exert significant impact on the 
shape and maintenance of the global order challenges the scope of responsibility Pogge 








There can be no effective control of corporations while their political 
activity remains. 
– Theodore Roosevelt, US President 1901-1909 
 
 
This thesis presented an approach to discussing the moral duties of transnational 
corporations in relation to human rights. It argued that TNCs bear primarily negative 
duties to respect human rights, i.e. to avoid doing harm, and that they can be held 
responsible when they fail to discharge such duties. It discussed how most approaches 
have focused on attributing responsibility to TNCs for their unmediated negative impacts 
on human rights. However, such approaches have a significant limitation, namely not 
taking sufficiently into consideration the institutional channels in which TNCs 
participate, such as supply chains and business relations, through which they can also 
have negative impact on human rights. TNCs also can indirectly participate in inflicting 
harm, and in a morally and practically very significant way, by supporting a global 
institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably engenders human rights deficits. This 
thesis thus proposed the Institutional Responsibilities Framework, which attributes to 
corporations moral responsibility for their direct and also indirect impacts on human 
rights, including those inflicted via the global institutional order.  
To advance these arguments, as well as to situate the contribution of this work, I 
began by discussing the main positions in political theory and philosophy regarding the 
moral duties of transnational corporations in relation to human rights. It was noted that a 
significant number of scholars subscribe to a positive duties approach, which argues that 
TNCs bear negative duties to respect human rights and also positive duties to protect and 




fulfil them. Then, I described the two main strands of this approach. The first, the 
conditional positive duties approach, argues that TNCs acquire some positive duties to 
protect and fulfil human rights when the state is unwilling or unable to do so. This view 
is grounded in the idea that, given that human rights are of the utmost importance, it is 
necessary to discuss who can serve as a substitute to protect and fulfil them when the 
state does not. Corporations are thus contemplated as possible back-ups when they have 
sufficient capabilities to act as primary agents of justice.  
By contrast, the non-conditional positive duties approach argues that even when 
the state can act as the primary agent of justice, other actors including transnational 
corporations are required to promote and fulfil human rights. According to some 
commentators, this is because TNCs have enough capabilities, leverage and/or 
opportunities to do so. Therefore, not requiring them to discharge some positive duties 
would be a “lost opportunity”. In contrast, others argue that TNCs can be attributed 
some positive duties similar to those borne by the state because they share some similar 
characteristics, such as substantial powers and capacities to protect human rights (as well 
as to abuse them). Additionally, some companies have taken de facto governing roles and 
have also engaged in providing public goods that have been traditionally considered as a 
responsibility of the state. Therefore, it was argued, if TNCs share some characteristics 
and roles with states, they can be attributed similar duties to protect and promote human 
rights. 
However, unlike states, which have as a constitutive aim protecting and 
promoting human rights, the main goal of companies is arguably generating profits, 
which is sometimes in tension with the objectives of advancing human rights. Thus, 
given the particular interests and motivation of TNCs it is possible to question the 
justifiability of the positive duties approach. In addition, the idea that companies can be 
attributed positive duties on the basis of their superior capabilities was challenged and it 
was argued that although this might be a necessary requirement to bear positive duties, it 




is not the only one, as illustrated with the example of vary capable drug cartels, which 
are not considered to be able to bear similar duties. Furthermore, if as the positive duties 
approach argues, the attribution and the extent of duties are positively related to the 
capabilities of TNCs, corporations could be inclined to misrepresent these in order to 
reduce their moral burden, as exemplified with the cases of tax heavens and secrecy 
jurisdictions.  
Additionally, the positive duties approach poses some problems of efficiency or 
compliance. While transnational corporations may have several objectives, it seems 
accurate to say that their main goal is generating and maximising profits. To this end, 
corporations often externalise costs by economising expenses related to the improvement 
of working conditions and the maintenance of environmental standards. Thus, I argued, 
it would be inefficient to expect TNCs to protect human rights, as many of them would 
seek an escape clause or simply shirk, making it costly to monitor them and try to obtain 
compliance. Furthermore, I contended that historically, transnational corporations have 
been reluctant to accept the allocation of stringent positive duties, considering that they 
are against their perceived interests. Hence, it is unlikely that, for the time being, 
companies will deliver on more responsibilities, as discussed in the positive duties 
approach. 
Then, I explained that the positive duties approach tends to follow an 
interactional conception of human rights as a set of entitlements which all human beings 
have by virtue of their humanity, and which assign to individual and collective agents 
direct responsibility for their fulfilment. This conception thus attributes to moral agents 
positive duties to protect and promote human rights. As an alternative, I proposed 
following an institutional conception of human rights, which sees rights primarily as 
claims on coercive social institutions and secondarily as claims against those who uphold 
such institutions.  According to this approach, the responsibility of the participants in an 
institutional order is an indirect shared responsibility for the justice of any practice they 




help impose. Such a conception thus entails mainly a negative duty to avoid cooperating 
in the imposition of a coercive institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably creates 
human rights deficits. 
 Conceptualising the duties of corporations as essentially negative duties to 
respect, I argued, helps circumventing the main theoretical and efficiency issues of the 
positive duties approach. For instance, it was argued that in order for a right to exist (e.g. 
right to life) every individual and collective agent has at least a negative duty to avoid 
doing harm (e.g. refrain from killing). Thus, while it can be questioned if TNCs can bear 
positive duties, it is clear that as moral agents they bear at least negative duties. Such 
consideration is not only relevant in theory, but it also helps to overcome some the 
efficiency problems of the positive duties approach. For instance, while companies have 
been reluctant to accept that they are responsible for protecting human rights, they have 
widely embraced the idea that they must respect human rights as reflected in the UN 
Framework and the UN Guiding Principles. Thus, the fact that the Institutional 
Responsibilities Framework develops from this established notion makes the proposed 
approach more appealing in practice than others that develop from the idea that 
companies must protect human rights because they have the capabilities to do it.  
Then, I made a case for rethinking what the negative duties of TNCs to avoid 
doing harm entail. I explained that most of the recent approaches that discuss the duties 
of transnational corporations have tended to consider that they can only inflict harm 
directly through their actions and operations. For example, an oil company would be 
violating the human rights of the populations near its operations when it unsafely dumps 
oil residues in a river or releases pollutants into the environment; whereas a 
pharmaceutical company may violate the human rights of parts of the population by 
conducting unsafe drug trials. These approaches can be identified with what Thomas 
Pogge refers to as interactional moral analyses, which explain social phenomena by 
tracing them back to the conduct of individual or collective entities, which, in turn, are 




attributed moral responsibility (2010a, p. 15). They are applicable to many kinds of cases 
involving TNCs in human rights violations, as frequently harm can be traced to a specific 
source –the oil and pharmaceutical companies– and responsibility can be attributed to 
them for the negative outcomes.  
There are, however, other channels through which transnational corporations 
can indirectly participate in human rights violations, for example, through their supply 
chains and business networks, which mediate the actions of the company. An example is 
the responsibility of retailers for the sweatshop-like conditions in the factories that 
manufacture the products that they sell. In such incidents, the contribution of a 
corporation to human rights violations is less clear, and so is the responsibility that it can 
be attributed for the regretful outcomes. However, as reflected in the UN Guiding 
Principles, there has been increasingly more acceptance that TNCs bear some 
responsibility for what happen across their supply chains and business relations, and that 
they can be held accountable for it. In those cases, interactional approaches have limited 
explanatory adequacy, because they cannot capture the complex network of institutional 
channels through which corporations operate. Also, they are very limited insofar as they 
are unable to recognise the role of the institutional structures in place to engender some 
human rights harms, for example, a disproportionate prevalence of sweatshops in certain 
parts of the world.  
The Institutional Responsibilities Framework developed in this thesis highlights 
the relevance of the global institutional order in the incidence of human rights harms and 
the participation of corporations in its design and maintenance. It contends that such an 
order can be described as harmful, since the incentives and penalties it has in place make 
human rights violations likely to occur, particularly within certain segments of the global 
population. Such incentives include, for example, international agreements tilted in 
favour of some powerful countries, unequal representation in international organisations 
such as the WTO, IMF and UN Security Council, and commonly accepted international 




principles, such as the borrowing privilege, which allows whoever is in power to borrow 
funds in the name of a whole country, often leaving the debts on the books for decades.  
I then argued that states as well as some non-state actors, including transnational 
corporations, play an important role in the configuration and maintenance of this order. 
They influence the shape of the global institutional order by acting in both the political 
and private spheres. By political sphere, I referred to the involvement of corporations in 
public life, for example, by participating in international negotiations and forums such as 
the World Trade Organisation, and by ensuring that their interests are represented by 
national governments through practices such as lobbying and political activism. However, 
corporations can also contribute to shaping the global institutional order within the 
private sphere, that is outside of the reach of the government, where they enjoy certain 
leverage to conduct their day-to-day operations. Here corporations can influence the 
shape of the global order through several mechanisms including establishing a corporate 
culture, launching voluntary initiatives, funding think-tanks, preventing or enabling 
technology transfer.  
The Institutional Responsibilities Framework thus holds that in order to avoid 
doing harm, TNCs should also refrain from upholding a global order that foreseeably 
and avoidably engenders human rights deficits, and that they can be attributed some 
moral responsibility if they fail to do so. Then I explained that often, even when 
companies want to honour their negative duties, halting or avoiding participation in the 
global order is not possible because the penalties associated are unreasonably high. For 
example, corporate contribution can take the form of tax compliance with governments 
that support the shape of the global order or compliance with laws that engender human 
rights harms as exemplified in the cases of Internet-based companies operating in China. 
However, stopping paying taxes or disobeying laws may entail high penalties, such as the 
dissolution of the company or incarceration of their executives. In such cases, 
corporations can be required to provide some compensation for the harms to which they 




contribute. Thus they acquire some remedial duties. Providing such redress to victims of 
harm is not a matter of benevolence or charity, but a matter of justice, which means that 
the duty to provide compensation is not discretionary and corporations can be attributed 
moral responsibility if they fail to discharge it.  
Having established that directly inflicting or indirectly contributing to human 
rights harms can be considered grounds for attributing moral responsibility to TNCs, I 
then argued that actively benefiting from such harms are additional grounds for 
attributing responsibility. By active benefiting, I refer to cases in which companies seek to 
take advantage of injustice or to reap a benefit at the expense of someone else, for 
example, by paying very low wages, by skimping on environmental and safety standards 
or by avoiding paying their fair share of taxes, thus depriving governments of significant 
revenues. Therefore, according to the Institutional Responsibilities Framework, 
companies bear some negative duties to avoid contributing to a harmful institutional 
order without providing adequate compensation and to avoid actively benefiting from 
harm. 
While it was argued that corporations bear mainly negative duties, honouring 
them also requires discharging some positive duties, including the following.  
• Duties of due diligence: these refer to the responsibility that corporations have to 
conduct an assessment of the instances in which they might negatively impact 
human rights. They can discharge this duty, for example, by conducting due 
diligence processes as required by the UN Framework, the OECD Guidelines 
and the UN Guiding Principles. 
• Duties of coordination: sometimes in order to avoid doing harm, corporations 
need to coordinate with other companies or parts of their business operations. 
For example, a retailer can be allocated a duty to coordinate with its 




subcontractors in order to avoid violating human rights through the production 
process of the garments it sells.  
• Duties of accountability: it was argued that corporations bear some duties of 
accountability towards those affected by their operations and conduct, not only 
to their stockholders. Corporations thus could be required to make some 
information available to the public and to engage in accountability processes such 
as external audits.  
• Duties not to undermine and to strengthen the capabilities of the state to protect 
and fulfil human rights: corporations are required to avoid undermining the 
capabilities of the state as the primary agent of justice. This requires, for example, 
not engaging in bribing government officials or aggressively lobbying to obtain 
private gains. Nevertheless, when the state is unable to act as the primary agent 
of justice, companies may also be required to strengthen its capabilities in order 
to preserve the division of labour between primary and secondary agents of 
justice.  
• Duties to reform the global institutional order: In order to fulfil their negative 
duties, companies are also required to contribute to reforming the global order so 
as to prevent the continued generation of human rights deficits.  
• Duties of rescue: These duties do not derive from a corporation’s negative duties 
to avoid doing harm. However, it may be required to provide help in 
extraordinary situations of emergency, when it can do so at a relatively low 
opportunity cost. 
After discussing the main principles of the proposed framework, I argued that it 
could inform current policy-making mechanisms and documents on the issue of business 
and human rights, specifically the UN Framework and the UN Guiding Principles. I 
suggested that incorporating the discussion on the duties of justice into the UN 




Framework could provide it with more coherence among competing corporate interests 
and changing political and economic conditions. 
Although the Institutional Responsibilities and the UN Framework share the 
premise that TNCs mainly bear negative duties in relation to human rights, the 
institutional conceptualisation of harm of the proposed approach would entail the UN 
Framework widening the instances in which it considers that corporations can have 
negative impact on human rights. It would also require modifying the due diligence 
processes of companies, as it would require corporations to survey the impact to which 
they contribute by participating in the global institutional order. While this proposed 
addition would be more demanding on companies than current approaches, the duties 
that the Institutional Responsibilities Framework allocate to TNCs are given in regard to 
the function of their contribution to harm, not to their superior capabilities or powers. 
Therefore, it is not subject to the principled objections against the positive duties 
approach in that it does not “penalise” the companies for their large assets and 
capabilities. Thus, the fact that the proposed framework develops from similar 
considerations from those already widely accepted makes it more attractive than others 
that develop from the positive duties approach. Furthermore, the fact that some of the 
newest documents on business and human rights such as the UN Guiding Principles 
have started to recognise the impact that corporations can exert via some institutional 
relations provide reasons to believe that there are conditions for the adoption of the 
principles of the proposed framework.  
In addition, I analysed some of the implications of the Institutional 
Responsibilities Framework for the global institutional approach. I explained that the 
such an approach sees states as the main actors that shape and maintain the current 
institutional order, and, given that they represent the interests of their national citizens, 
the latter are held responsible for the harms that such an institutional order engenders. 
Nevertheless, I have argued that corporations are also powerful and independent actors 




that have a significant input into the configuration of the global order, and whose 
interests do not necessarily match the interests of a particular nation-state or group of 
citizens. Therefore, I proposed re-evaluating the responsibility that can be attributed to 
citizens of affluent countries for the shaping and maintenance of the global institutional 
order in light of the significant input of TNCs as entities that largely escape democratic 
processes of accountability.  
I then went on to assess some of the main criticisms against the global 
institutional approach, with which the current framework shares the conceptions of 
human rights and harm. One of the main criticisms refers to the adoption of the 
institutional conception of human rights, which attaches moral significance to a shared 
institutional order and thus penalises people for their membership of a particular scheme. 
To address this criticism, I argued that the distinction between members and non-
members has little pragmatic significance as, arguably, given the globalisation process, 
virtually everyone lives within a common institutional arrangement, and therefore 
everyone can be considered a member of it. Moreover, the moral relevance attached to 
the global institutional order corresponds to the fact that, by definition, TNCs can only 
exist and operate within a global institutional arrangement which includes, for example, 
economic rules, trade agreements and international legal norms.  
The second criticism refers to the validity of the claims that the global order 
engenders human rights violations. Some commentators have argued that the global 
order does not violate human rights, but in fact contributes to realising them. However, 
in line with the global institutional approach, I contended that the design of the global 
institutional order engenders foreseeable human rights deficits and can be described as 
unjust in comparison to a feasible alternative design. Further objections could be made 
against the claim that negative duties are necessarily more stringent than positive duties. 
Here, I explained that the proposed approach does not deny that TNCs may have some 
positive duties, but instead the approach builds upon the negative duties that 




corporations have already admitted for themselves in order to overcome some of the 
efficiency problems of the positive duties approach.  
Additionally, some objections have been raised against the global institutional 
approach for assuming that national governments represent the interests of their citizens, 
which in turn can be considered as the main entities responsible for the global order. It 
has been argued that, even in democratic countries, governments do not represent the 
interests of all of their citizens, and as individuals they wield limited power. In contrast, 
TNCs as global elites can exert significant influence in the configuration of the global 
institutional order and have several mechanisms at their disposal to ensure that their 
interests are represented by national governments. Thus the attribution of responsibility 
to TNCs for the shape of the global institutional order seems to be less problematic than 
the attribution of responsibility to individual citizens. Finally, although the proposed 
framework is significantly more demanding than other accounts of corporate 
responsibility, it reflects more accurately the different instances in which TNCs may 
negatively impact human rights and, unlike the positive duties approach, it does not 
“penalise” companies for having significant power or capabilities.  
Although the Institutional Responsibilities Framework shares some principles 
and core assumptions with the global institutional approach, it is not susceptible to the 
same objections, or at least not to the same extent. This is because the proposed 
framework focuses on analysing defined agents with significant leverage to have impact 
on the global institutional order, as opposed to citizens of affluent countries whose 
participation in the global order is more attenuated and complex to determine. 
Furthermore, unlike individuals, corporations by definition operate within a global 
institutional order, which in turn contributes to clarifying the significance that the 
proposed framework attaches to that order.      




 Further Research  8.1.
 
One contribution of this thesis lies in establishing that corporations inflict 
human rights harms directly, but also indirectly, by shaping and maintaining the global 
institutional order through several mechanisms, as described in Chapter 5. The approach 
could be advanced and deepened through empirical research aimed at systematically 
identifying the main channels through which corporations contribute to shaping the 
global order, in both the political and private spheres. While it would be virtually 
impossible to survey all of these, it is feasible to detect the main ones and assess the 
contribution of firms. This could make it more feasible to incorporate them explicitly in 
policy documents such as the UN Guiding Principles. In turn, this could provide some 
grounds to hold corporations accountable for their contribution to human rights harms 
through the global institutional order, and to require corporations to expand their due 
diligence processes to include instances that are currently neglected.  
Further, while this thesis largely focused on privately-owned transnational 
corporations, it would be useful to widen the scope of analysis, in both normative and 
empirical terms, to state-owned enterprises. Intuitively, the duties of state-owned 
enterprises would be considerably different, as these companies can be regarded as 
branches of national governments. It also would be useful to treat in more detail how to 
reconcile the moral negative duties to respect human rights within particular industries 
which seem to inherently contradict those duties, such as arms manufacturers. Finally, a 
future step could involve elaborating specific policy recommendations that incorporate 






Appendix A: Core 
Documents and Initiatives 
  
 
Draft UN Code of Conduct 
on Transnational 
Corporations (the Draft UN 
Code) 
 
Written in 1976 by the UN Commission on 
Transnational Corporations. It aimed at establishing 
common standards for the conduct of TNCs, enhancing 
the negotiating capacities of host states and establishing 
rules for the treatment of foreign investment. It touched 
upon political, economic, financial and social issues 
associated with the operation of TNCs, disclosure of 
information, treatment of TNCs by host countries and 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
 
OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD Guidelines)  
Created in 1976 by the OECD (updated in 2011). They 
are non-legally binding recommendations addressed to 
TNCs operating from or in adherent countries to the 
organisation (plus Argentina and Brazil) in a range of 
issues such as employment and industrial relations, 
human rights, taxation, science and technology, 
environment, information disclosure, competition and 
consumer interests. 
 
The Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy (the Tripartite 
Declaration) 
Enacted by the ILO in 1977 (revised in 2001), urged for 
the creation of international instruments to regulate the 
conduct of TNCs and to define the terms of the 
relations between companies and host countries.  
 
Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
(the Maastricht Guidelines) 
Created in 1997 with the purpose of supplementing the 
Limburg Principles, identifying and understanding the 
violations to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, and providing 
recommendations to monitor these rights are respected. 
It affirms that it is the responsibility of the state to 
ensure that private entities including transnational 
corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction, 
respect human rights.  
 
The United Nations Global 
Compact (the Global 
Compact or the UNGC) 
Established in 2000 by the then UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan, it was designed as a learning forum to 
promote socially responsible practices in the areas of 
human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption 
Currently, it is the largest initiative on corporate 
responsibility with around 7,000 participant companies 
and national networks in more than 50 countries. 





UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights (the UN 
Norms) 
Presented in 2004 to the Commission on Human Rights 
(now Human Rights Council). They aimed at 
establishing a common enforceable set of standards to 
regulate the activities of TNCs and prevent human 
rights violations and other corporate misconducts in the 
areas of sovereignty, corruption, environmental 
protection, child labour, working environment, 
adequate wages, workers’ rights and the right of 
security of the person. They intended to become part of 
soft law that could eventually lead to the development 
of a treaty.  
 
UN ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework (the UN 
Framework) 
Unveiled by John Ruggie in 2008, the Framework aims 
at clarifying the duties of TNCs as existent in 
international legal documents. It puts forward the idea 
that corporations have the primary responsibility to 
respect human rights as recognised under various 
international instruments of soft law, whereas states 
bear the duties to protect the rights of their population 
and seek remedy for the victims of abuses committed by 
third parties, including business. 
 
Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights 
for Implementing the UN 
‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework (the UN 
Guiding Principles) 
Presented in 2011, the document comprises 31 
principles to implement the UN Framework, which 
correspond to its three pillars: protect, respect and 
remedy in relation to human rights.  
 
 
  
 
 





































